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Abstract (English) 
 
In this paper I discuss the context and character of what is called “social performance 
in microfinance” by referencing discourse theories. I focus on the interest group of 
private foreign investors and examine in which way five organizations that define 
themselves as social investors - BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Oikocredit, Triodos and 
Triple Jump - influence the discourse of social performance. While fostering a trend 
towards commercialisation, they promise to reach a “double bottom line”, social 
benefits for poor people and financial profits for investors, at the same time. 
 
My main findings give evidence that some of the leading private foreign investors 
contribute significantly to the distribution of industry information and shaping the public 
image of microfinance. Their participation in several initiatives is definitely not unselfish 
and they use international acknowledged social performance indicators for advertising 
efforts. However, given increasing stress of competition, their engagement helps to 
remind the various players in microfinance, not to lose sight of their social mandate.  
 
 
Abstract (German) 
 
In dieser Arbeit dikutiere ich das Thema „Soziale Leistung von Mikrofinanz“ unter 
Bezugnahme auf Diskurstheorien. Ich konzentriere mich auf die 
Interessengemeinschaft der privaten, ausländischen Investoren und untersuche, auf 
welche Weise fünf Organisationen, die sich selbst als soziale Investoren bezeichenen - 
BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Oikocredit, Triodos und Triple Jump - den Diskurs über 
die soziale Leistung von Mikrofinanz beeinflussen. Während sie den branchenweiten 
Trend in Richtung zunehmender Kommerzialisierung fördern, versprechen sie eine 
„double bottom line“, also einen doppelt positiven Effekt, sowohl für die 
Lebensbedingungen armer Menschen, als auch in Form finanzieller Profite für 
Investoren. 
 
Meine Resultate belegen, dass einige der führenden privaten, ausländischen 
Investoren einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Verbreitung von Fachwissen und der 
Gestaltung des öffentlichen Profils von Mikrofinanz leisten. Ihr Mitwirken an diversen 
Initiativen ist sicherlich nicht ganz uneigennützig und international anerkannte Sozial-
Indikatoren werden für Werbemaßnahmen genutzt. Doch angesichts zunehmenden 
Wettbewerbsdrucks hilft ihr Engagement, die zahlreichen Mikrofinanz-Akteure daran zu 
erinnen, den sozialen Zweck ihres Handelns nicht aus den Augen zu verlieren. 
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1. Introduction 
 
„Not having enough money is bad enough.  
Not being able to manage whatever money you have is worse.  
This is the hidden bind of poverty.”  
(Collins et al. 2009: 184) 
 
Although overall global wealth has increased significantly in the past 50 years, its 
allocation is extremely unbalanced so that poverty is still widespread. The most 
complete data on poverty currently available indicates that in 2005 about 1.4 million 
people worldwide lived below the absolute poverty line, defined by the World Bank as 
$1.25 a day. That represented 26 percent of the developing world’s population (Chen 
and Ravallion 2008). Many more living slightly above this statistical benchmark were 
still hampered by poverty-related problems in their daily lives. For decades, several 
initiatives for cooperative development cooperation have been launched to improve this 
situation but due to the problem’s complexity the results fell short of expectations. 
 
In 2000 the United Nations set 10 “Millennium Development Goals” (MDG) to reduce 
poverty verifiable until 2015, using criteria such as relative standards of income, 
education, health care and human rights, to name a few. The MDG 2010 progress 
report revealed the following sobering facts: the recent global economic and financial 
crises negatively impacted emerging economies and labour markets; malnutrition 
persists in many regions; education has improved considerably although girls are still 
disadvantaged. Furthermore, the MDG report found that increasing rural migration was 
forcing increasing numbers of people to live in urban slums (refer to UN 2010). While 
great effort will be necessary to achieve the MDG by 2015, one evolutionary, innovative 
financial concept that offers promise is microfinance. 
 
What is microfinance? A frequently cited story begins with a visionary professor of 
economics at Chittagong University in Bangladesh, Dr. Muhammad Yunus. During a 
severe hunger crisis in the mid 1970s he extended a personal loan to several poor 
women who were ineligible for credit from conventional banks due to a lack of 
collateral. Consequently, Yunus learned that most of these women were dependent on 
local moneylenders to whom many of them were deeply indebted. Microcredits, also 
known as microloans, provided these women the seed capital to start up small 
businesses and create new sources of income. What Yunus began with his students as 
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a small project gradually evolved into a bank for poor people, the Grameen Bank. The 
bank’s business model was a great success and was instrumental in providing the 
blueprint for a relatively new industry:  microfinance. In 2006, Muhammad Yunus and 
Grameen Bank were awarded Nobel Prizes for Peace in recognition of their important 
contribution to humankind.   
 
Today microfinance comprises not only loans, but also other financial services, such as 
deposits, money transfers and insurances. The financial products’ terms are adapted to 
the living conditions of poor people, and microfinance is now popular in many countries 
in various forms determined by the local socio-economic conditions. Grameen Bank 
alone serves over eight million borrowers (Grameen 2010). Yunus’ project has been a 
best practice model for thousands of newly created institutions commonly known as 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), which manufacture and deliver microfinance products 
and services to the world’s poor. In the field of development cooperation, microfinance 
has become a broadly recognised and promoted tool for reducing poverty and 
developing economic structures in peripheral regions.  
 
Unlike donation-based development projects that depend on charity, MFIs are self-
sustaining operations that rely on sound business practices to fund their activities. MFIs 
have proven to be successful not only socially but also in a cost-effective way, thus 
allowing them to overcome the financial obstacle of restricted donor funding. Currently, 
there is a huge, unsatisfied demand for financial products and services for the world’s 
poor: Financial services are concentrated worldwide on wealthy people in high-income 
countries while in poor regions only a small percentage of the population has access to 
formal banks (CGAP and The World Bank 2010). However, as more commercial 
finance companies discover its business merits, microfinance is gradually becoming a 
relevant sector in the global finance industry.  
 
Although MFIs’ customer services are restricted to certain territorial areas, the 
operations required to deliver a microcredit may involve a diverse range of players from 
around the world. In many cases, MFIs must rely on foreign sources of capital as the 
working capital and banking services they require is unavailable to them in the local 
financial market. During the 1980s and 1990s donors and public investors supported 
the development of the microfinance industry through subventions and loans with 
favourable terms. More recently, as the basic infrastructure became established and 
the sector has shown stability and favourable returns on investment, an increasing 
number of private foreign investors have entered the industry (Reille et al. 2009; 
  
- 3 - 
MicroRate 2010). Most of these private microfinance investors are set up as 
specialised investment management companies. They channel money from wealthy 
individuals, foundations and institutional investors towards MFIs, using financial 
instruments called Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs). MIVs attract financiers by 
offering attractive financial conditions and the social bonus of helping poor people. 
They call this dual outcome a “double bottom line” (see e.g. Triple Jump 2010). At the 
same time private foreign investors may influence changes to the character of 
microfinance. For example, they may have direct influence on the business strategies 
of MFIs, play an active role in the international microfinance arena, or act as a link 
between research institutions and MFIs. 
 
With this trend towards increasing involvement of private capital, the global 
microfinance sector is currently undergoing a phase of fundamental change. A strong 
trend towards commercialisation is influencing the practice and the image of 
microfinance. Advocates and critics of commercialism are debating whether it is 
possible to reach a double bottom line, social benefits for poor people and financial 
profits for investors, at the same time. Or whether profit orientation is rather necessary 
for the advancement of the microfinance sector. Is there a trade-off between social and 
financial objectives or does social efficiency go hand in hand with good business 
practices? The disagreement on this issue leads to a need to evaluate the social 
performance of microfinance activities. As recent developments in microfinance have 
produced unprecedented challenges for the players involved, they strive to establish 
new reference points with which to appraise their business approach. Social 
performance measurement is intended to provide statistical evidence about the player’s 
social behaviour. The respective activities are summarized as “Social Performance 
Management” (SPM) which has become a keyword in discussions about this changing 
sector and various stakeholders contribute to what I call the “Discourse of Social 
Performance in Microfinance”. 
 
The term “Social Performance” does not stand for a static, predefined concept. On the 
contrary, its meaning is modelled in the course of a dynamic process of ongoing, 
discursive debate. It was brought into existence by certain interest groups that follow 
similar strategies and aim to establish broadly recognised standards by creating special 
institutions, know-how and a certain public image. My thesis describes the context and 
character of what is called social performance in microfinance. By referencing 
discourse theories I address questions regarding the social construction - the origins, 
development and effects - of this discourse. Because of the complexity of this topic and 
  
- 4 - 
the diverse array of players involved I found it prudent to focus on one interest group I 
believe is, and will continue to be, among the most powerful and influential player, the 
private foreign investors. My research examined the following two core questions: 
Which strategies do private foreign microfinance investors follow with regard to the 
discourse of social performance in microfinance? What influence might their 
participation have on the development of the entire microfinance sector given the trend 
towards increasing commercializing of the industry? 
 
My investigation is divided into seven parts. Following this introduction, chapter two 
deals with the approach of discourse analysis in social science. While it is not possible 
to execute a comprehensive research program, which I will explain later, I use 
guidance of discourse analysis to look beyond a superficial description of social 
performance in microfinance. In chapter three I give an overview of microfinance and 
discuss important issues and developments in the sector, including a short 
presentation of various groups of players. In chapter four the focus is directed to one of 
the most influential of these groups, the private foreign investors. This involves an 
evaluation of their current standing and influence on the global microfinance sector. In 
chapter five I examine the discourse of social performance and sum up recent 
developments and different viewpoints, mainly on the basis of scientific sources and 
specialised institutions’ publications. After this I go back to my focus group and analyse 
five specific private foreign investors in chapter six. I explain why I estimate these case 
studies as meaningful and assess their contribution to the discourse based on 
publications and interviews with representatives. Chapter seven concludes with a 
review of my findings and highlights meaningful aspects as answers the core research 
questions. 
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2. The research program  
 
“Of course, discourses are composed of signs; 
 but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things” 
Foucault (2007: 54) 
 
Before addressing the issue of microfinance I will provide some background to socio-
scientific discourse analysis. What do I expect from including perspectives of this 
approach into my research?  
 
Soon after I became involved with microfinance I became aware of the tremendous 
expectations the public had for this sector. Microcredit was being hyped as the "magic 
bullet" for eliminating poverty by influential entertainment and political personalities and 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN). Consequently, the sector underwent rapid 
expansion within a short period of time. A major part of this success story can be 
attributed to the creation of this public image. However, the higher the expectations the 
more difficult is it to keep the positive image alive. Eventually, observers questioned the 
potential of microcredit to be the panacea for global poverty. The recent trend towards 
commercialism gives further credence to the critics as profits often collide with social 
interests. The participation of private foreign investors in social performance initiatives 
may be an attempt to perpetuate the positive image of microfinance by dressing 
commercialism in social wardrobe. This possibility leads to the question as to why 
people believe that microfinance is either good or bad. Socio-scientific discourse 
analysis investigates why certain phenomena are acknowledged as real within a 
society.  
 
Although discourse analysis is sometimes classified as a method, more precisely it can 
be attributed to constitute a research program. There is no standardized set of methods 
which gives researchers a work schedule for analysing discourses. There is not one 
prominent mentor or school which defines how to exercise discourse analysis. 
Discourses are elusive and a researcher can only concentrate on some aspects from a 
certain perspective, so it does not make sense to determine a specific set of methods 
for the analysis. Several authors describe their methodologies for investigating specific 
topics. But first and foremost they present a research perspective. Following this 
perspective various socio-scientific methods can be adapted to the needs (Schwab-
Trapp 2003: 169-170). 
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2.1. The discursive construction of knowledge 
 
For my purposes I apply aspects from a research program defined by the sociologist 
Rainer Keller as “discourse analysis based on the sociology of knowledge”. Keller’s 
approach assumes that everything we know is produced through discourse. What we 
consider as knowledge is socially constructed, typed and legitimized. The aim of 
Keller’s research program is to investigate how these discourses are constructed 
through communication and social practices by the process of stabilising and 
transforming symbolic orders. Furthermore, he is interested in the effects discourse has 
on societies, such as on the establishment of laws, classifications, statistics or 
technical innovations. The analysis is meant to retrace processes and impacts of social 
construction, objectivation, communication and legitimization of knowledge on the level 
of social players. Social players receive special attention as they are considered to be 
the architects of discourses (Keller 2007: 57). Keller provides a theoretical framework 
as well as practical suggestions for carrying out the analysis.   
 
In summary, Keller’s theoretical deliberations combine the sociology of knowledge 
presented by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann and discourse theories, initially 
developed by Michel Foucault. Sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
(1997) define knowledge as everything which is accepted by society as knowledge. 
Thus, every medium of meaning which makes sense or which can be reasonably 
interpreted (for instance patterns of action and interpretation, norms and regulations, 
language, classifications, institutions, professions, feelings and perceptions) is 
knowledge. For them, reality is socially shaped in a continuous process of interactive 
objectivation, stabilization and acquisition of arrangements of knowledge. In this way 
every society collects a storehouse of knowledge which is complex, heterogeneous 
and inconsistent. This conglomeration is shaped by social structures, erratic allocation 
and differentiation. It is generated over time and presented to individuals as objective 
facts through intermediates like family, school or media. In the end nobody possesses 
the same knowledge nor does everybody have equal opportunity to contribute to the 
production, implementation and acquisition of knowledge. For every person certain 
fragments of societal knowledge are more important than others. 
 
How is knowledge created in detail? According to Berger and Luckmann the acquisition 
of knowledge occurs in steps. The starting points are abstract symbols which become 
externalized in certain situations. Actions and interpretations related to these symbols 
then become solidified through reciprocal typification by various players. This process 
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is repeated continuously and finally institutionalised, which gives the actions and 
interpretations the appearance of being objective. Institutions can be described as 
legitimized complexes of rules for action. They outlast short-term situations and apply 
certain instruments for control and sanction. Institutions stand for stability and 
objectivity especially when they deal with third parties who are not involved in their 
construction. Institutionalization is the final step for knowledge to become legitimized 
and objectivised. Thus, created reality is the basis for individual action in certain 
societies. It becomes implanted early on in childhood and is reinforced through 
secondary socialisation in specific social areas (Keller 2005: 41-43).    
 
Keller uses this understanding of knowledge as a starting point and adds discourse 
theories, especially those formulated by Foucault. In contrast to linguistic traditions of 
discourse analysis, Foucault does not investigate the formal use of language but 
focuses instead on the construction of reality through the social act of communication. 
For him, speakers do not act solely according to their intention independent of their 
environment. Rather, they are guided by institutionally stabilized regulations and orders 
of certain discourses. Foucault tries to uncover regularities in the practical 
communication of discourses, structures as expression of power and knowledge, and 
the historical embedding of certain phenomena. Using a constructivist perspective 
Foucault asks for basic patterns of scientific classifications in specific historical periods. 
He investigates discourses as expressions of formations of knowledge and social 
practice (Keller 2005; Foucault 2007).  
 
Foucault defines “discourse” as a number of statements which appear at different 
locations but follow the same regulatory guidelines and deal with a specific topic. The 
emergence of these statements is regulated by institutional and symbolic mechanisms 
which determine what people say and in which context. Rules of formation structure, 
which statements appear in a certain moment. Thus, discourses are not only the sum 
of symbols but, in fact, social practices which form objects in a systematic way. 
Foucault questions this systematisation. His proposal of discourse analysis asks for the 
conditions of a statement’s existence, for their borders, for correlations to other 
statements and for which alternatives are excluded (Keller 2007: 44-46).  
 
The question of how a discourse is formed is linked to the power relations within a 
society. Foucault states that every society has its own “politics of truth”. Mechanism 
and instances decide on which statements are considered true and which are not. 
Foucault uses the term “dispositive” to name the set of activities which carry a certain 
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discourse and implement consequences. For instance, dispositives can be laws, 
practices of communication or patterns of action (Keller 2007: 48-50). He furthermore 
points out that knowledge is not only a resource of power but also creates power 
(Keller 2005: 126).   
 
 
2.2. Putting theory into research practice 
 
Keller suggests merging Berger and Luckman’s action oriented theory of knowledge 
with Foucault’s more structural discourse theory. By this means he tries to sensitize for 
the procedural social construction on knowledge as well as for power relations defining 
which statements become legitimized (Keller 2003: 205). The following paragraphs 
explain core elements of Keller’s theoretical foundation which is composed of the 
above mentioned inputs, then proceed to describe the practical guidelines for empirical 
research. 
 
2.2.1. Discourse analysis based on the sociology of knowledge 
Discourse analysis based on the sociology of knowledge deals with processes and 
practices of the production and circulation of knowledge within societies. It focuses on 
discourse as a specific field where these processes take place (Keller 2007: 58-59) and 
investigates the objectivity of orders and its construction through discursive 
communication. The aim is to reconstruct processes of social construction, circulation 
and mediation of patterns of action at the institutional level and among social players. 
Discourse is a structured practice which constitutes knowledge in a dynamic way. A 
discourse is continuously updated, reproduced and transformed by new statements. 
Keller's interest is in the stages of the process where knowledge is created, formed, 
developed and regulated and where consequences become effective as power 
relations. Construction of knowledge through discourse has several effects, one of 
those being that social players put discourses into dispositives or practices which gives 
them a more or less solid appearance. Thus, produced knowledge is the basis for the 
perception of certain phenomena and adequate reactions. Discourse not only 
appraises and legitimizes knowledge, it also produces know-how, for example 
instruments to deal with certain phenomena. Through this process it also encourages 
the emergence of new social players (Keller 2005: 181-232).  
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Neither Berger and Luckmann nor Foucault provide concrete suggestions for empirical 
research practice. Keller attempts to remedy this by suggesting the use of qualitative 
socio-scientific methods for discourse analysis and a need to look for structures of form 
and content. He poses several questions: Who is legitimized to give statements in a 
certain context? What can be said? Which resources are used to take part in the 
discussion? The underlying assumption is that discourse constitutes reality (Keller 
2003: 206). Discourse can be retraced by referencing empirical data, the most 
important being text produced by social players. Given their theoretical qualities, 
statements should be investigated not as singular expressions, but within the context of 
their formative input as elements of discourse. The actions and speaking roles of social 
players should be conducted and evaluated not from a level of individual self-interest, 
but from the level of their position within the discourse process (Keller 2005: 181-188). 
It is the social players who produce the statements that transform discourses. They 
decide which statements are perceived as true and which are false by using symbolic 
methods. However, they also are influenced by the specific rules and resources of 
current discourse (Keller 2007: 62).  
 
2.2.2. Hints for empirical research 
 
Discourse analysis based on the sociology of knowledge may address the following 
questions: 
 
 When does a certain discourse appear? When does it disappear? 
 Where and in what way does a discourse emerge? What practices, resources, 
means and strategies are used to form a discourse? 
 What terms and strategies are typical for a discourse? 
 What rules of formations and which structures are effective? 
 What incidents influence a discourse? 
 How is a discourse implemented as a dispositive? 
 What social players are active in the formation of a discourse? What resources 
do they use and what interests and strategies do they follow? 
 Who carries a discourse? Who is the target group? 
 What do the relationships between different discourses look like? 
 What are the consequences of a discourse? What effects of power does it have? 
 How can certain characteristics of a discourse be explained? 
 What phenomena do the analysis of a discourse explain? 
 
  
- 10 - 
Discourse analysis does not necessarily look for the first sources of a discourse. More 
important is the context of space and time, the spreading, institutional regulation and 
the contribution of different players to the development of a discourse. It asks for 
resources of power like money, know-how, symbolic, social or cultural capital which 
influence the player’s capacity to take part in the formation of a discourse and its 
consequences (Keller 2005: 257-258).  
 
In a more detailed discussion of the practical research process, Keller explains that 
discourse analysis is always a form of hermeneutic interpretation of text. Hence, it is 
essential to disclose steps of interpretation. Statements about the issue of research 
always need to be supported and open to critical examination. The researcher needs to 
act systematically and self-reflexively. He must be aware of his own positioning within a 
discourse and continuously question the methods in use. It is never easy to draw a line, 
for instance when choosing the period under study or selecting the data, but these 
decisions must be made on the basis of justified criteria. A discourse analysis is meant 
to describe, understand and explain. First, a discourse should be reconstructed by 
investigating regularities, issues and players, then hypotheses should be presented 
explaining different aspects of the development of a discourse, the relationships 
involved, and the anticipated effects and consequences (Keller 2005: 265-269).  
 
From the outset, the methodological procedure requires that a number of decisions be 
made. Firstly, the discourse areas - issues, institutional settings and players - must be 
selected. Secondly, the research question should be defined, although it can be 
modified in the course of the research process. Next, an adequate theoretical 
perspective as well as the methodological approach must be chosen. The fourth 
decision requires the selection of a data set that is compatible with the research topic. 
To familiarize oneself with the range of possible data, one can follow links between 
various data sources. Keller recommends using the grounded theory approach, that is, 
using a seemingly important document as a guide to locate other works which may 
have similar or very different points of view. Also, social players of the investigated 
discourse can be used as sources of information, however it is imperative to not take 
their opinions for granted and to always question their statements. A discourse can 
never be isolated from others and the deeper the researcher delves into a topic the 
more sub-discourses become visible. While the selection of meaningful data may be 
difficult, the selection process is of critical importance for ensuring the integrity of the 
project. Thus, data sets should be qualified and representative of a variety of positions 
on the research topic, but within a practical, manageable range.  The ongoing research 
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process necessitates continuous, ongoing modifications to the data set. One must 
recognize that while data sources provide information about the context of a discourse, 
they are also a component of it.  
 
Following the selection process a method for analysing the data must be chosen. It is 
necessary to keep in mind certain expectations since it is possible to use the same 
data to obtain information, simultaneously, about both context and construction of a 
discourse, although the research perspective is different in each case. In any case, it is 
not only about summarizing the collected data but rather a systematic reflection. For 
detailed data analyses Keller proposes to follow approaches of qualitative socio-
scientific research and Foucault’s interpretative analytic. He distinguishes three 
components for analysing the structure of a discourse:  
 
1. Statements shall be examined with regard to their formation in certain 
situations, which means questioning who produces statements, in which way, 
where and for whom. It is about the positioning and relations of speakers and 
recipients, formative institutional settings, actions as provocations for 
statements, societal context and power relations within a discursive area. Keller 
denotes the system behind this process as “patterns of interpretation”. He does 
not ask for subjective intentions of a speaker but for typical social frames for the 
emergence of a statement. The situational context can be differentiated into 
historical, institutional and situative categories. Methods for interpreting 
statements in such a context are listed in a discourse-specific “repertoire of 
interpretation”.  
2. Statements need to be analysed in terms of  linguistic and rhetorical structures, 
for instance which terms, categories, classifications, metaphors and arguments 
are used. Keller calls this the “story line” of a discourse.  
3. Several data sets should be combined to describe a discursive area as one set 
never deals with a discourse exhaustively. In fact, one set may affect elements 
of various discourses so fragments must be identified step by step. The goal is 
to work out a matrix for classifying issues, functions and effects of a discourse 
which provides a basis for interpreting the findings.  
 
Finally the empirical outcomes must be correlated to the question of research and 
incorporated into the current body of science (Keller 2007: 82-109; 2003: 208-212).  
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2.3. Application for analysing social performance in 
microfinance 
 
Following this guidlines I carry out a discouse analysis of “social performance in 
microfinance” as followed: 
 
Context 
Specific content and the issue of investigation was discussed in the introduction 
chapter. This is already the result of comprehensive research about microfinance in 
general. To familiarize myself with the issue I relied on various sources, including 
introductory literature, press articles and websites of organisations involved, applying 
Keller’s recommendations for data gathering. I soon discovered there has been much 
discussion about the increasing involvement of private foreign investors and about 
social performance initiatives. Consequently, I redirected my investigations to related 
working papers of research facilities, publications of private foreign investors and took 
part in the Annual Meeting 2010 of the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF). There, 
I observed discussions about recent developments, learned the approaches of the 
players involved and conducted interviews with representatives of private foreign 
investors. These experiences convinced me that the question of investors’ strategies 
with regard to the discourse of social performance and potential effects on the industry 
are worthwhile topics for investigation. A detailed explanation of this conclusion will 
unfold throughout the following chapters.  
 
Data and analysis 
As a discourse can never be investigated exhaustively meaningful data sets must be 
selected. Some of the aforementioned sources used for determining context were also 
referenced for analysing the discourse of social performance in microfinance. My 
discourse analysis is limited to its  focus on the interest group of private foreign 
investors. While this group includes a diverse array of companies and organisations it 
is concentrated on about a dozen prominent leaders, five of which I investigate in 
detail. To analyse their approach toward social performance I rely on publications 
(especially their homepages, annual reports and social performance reports) and 
interviews with representatives.  
 
The information presented in the following chapter is confined to what I consider most 
pertinent to gain an understanding of the discourse. Discussions about social 
performance are as yet incomplete as they have only recently begun. Nevertheless, I 
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include only data that was published as of January 2011. Analyses of the five case 
studies follow the approach of Meuser and Nagel (1991) for evaluating expert 
interviews: first I go through the contents of the publications as well as the interview 
transcripts and look for meaningful headlines to summarise comparable data. Then I 
tighten the information and form categories. Finally I screen these categories for 
statements which constitute important elements of the discourse.  
 
Interpretation 
I am aware that the selected data sets contain limited elements of the broad discourse 
about social performance in microfinance and that the data also touches other 
discourses. The challange is to identify those statements which are essential parts of 
the discourse of interest. Others must be excluded to maintain focus on the research 
subject. The conclusion will provide qualified answers to the questions: Which 
strategies do private foreign microfinance investors follow with regard to the discourse 
of social performance in microfinance? What influence might their participation have on 
the development of the entire microfinance sector given the trend towards increasing 
commercializing of the industry? To address these questions I extrapolated the findings 
from the case study analyses to the broader context of the discussion about social 
performance in microfinance.   
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3. Overview on microfinance  
 
“Every now developed country has its  
own history of microfinance.” 
(Seibel 2003: 1) 
 
Microfinance today comprises a very heterogeneous field. It is a globalized, fast 
developing sector that goes back to widely ramified historical roots, modified to meet 
specific local and social requirements and which involves many different players. The 
following overview of microfinance provides points of orientation by describing a 
number of key aspects. I focus on characteristics that will provide the reader with a 
basic understanding of microfinance function in preparation for further discussion. 
 
I start with the question of why financial services are needed by poor people to manage 
their lives. Thereupon, I explain why they are generally excluded from formal banking 
systems and describe the alternative sources of financial services available to them. I 
then discuss the pros and cons of these alternatives and how their limitations lead to 
the emergence of microfinance. Following a review of important microfinance 
“ancestors”, I present three initiatives – Grameen Bank, Banco Solidario and Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) – that were important role models for the emergence of several 
thousand MFIs in recent years. I discuss key aspects of microfinance programs offered 
by today’s practitioners today. Finally, I give a practical example of the processes and 
players involved in advancing a $200 microcredit to a woman. 
 
The following statements about characteristics of microfinance are based on 
introductory literature, publications of research facilities and websites of important 
organizations. In the view of discourse analysis it draws a picture of reality which is 
commonly accepted by the public.  
 
  
- 15 - 
3.1. Managing little money 
 
The World Bank’s estimate of 1.4 million people living in absolute poverty, defined as 
earning less than $1.25 per day, only gives a rough idea of the global dimensions of 
poverty. One must keep in mind this $1.25 value represents a statistical average only. 
Closer observation of the day to day lives of people living in poverty reveals they not 
only have very little money but also very unsteady incomes. One day they earn more 
money, the next day less, the day after maybe nothing. For instance, day labourers 
never know whether they will get a job when they get up in the morning, street hawkers 
may be robbed and lose their whole stock, while farmers rely heavily on unpredictable 
weather patterns and earn money only in times of harvest. Members of poor 
households carry the full risks of volatile incomes. In addition, many of their jobs 
involve unhealthy and dangerous working conditions, complicated by the fact that poor 
people are unable to afford adequate insurance protection and medical treatment in the 
event sickness or injury. In any case, social safety nets and health care are virtually 
non-existent in most low-income nations. 
 
A team of researchers from Princeton University (Collins et al. 2009)  accompanied 250 
poor households in India, Bangladesh and South Africa in the course of one year and 
observed how they manage their daily lives in the face of extreme financial constraints. 
The financial diaries of these households provide the following insights: 
 
Although poor households earn very little money and have to spend most of it on 
basics, first and foremost to buy food, they do not immediately use up their total funds. 
There is a strong need to save and lend money to manage risks and to afford bigger 
expenditures for housing, education, medical treatment, social events and other 
essentials. The households observed spent a lot of time and energy on financial 
management. The annual cash turnover of their financial transactions reached up to 
500 percent of the household’s income. They saved, borrowed and loaned at the same 
time, using various informal instruments because, in general, they did not have access 
to established banking infrastructures (Collins et al. 2009: 1-16). As one of the persons 
interviewed stated: „I don’t really like having to deal with other people over money, but 
if you’re poor, there’s no alternative. We have to do it to survive” (Collins et al. 2009: 
13).  
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3.1.1. Formal banking services 
 
How do poor people manage their financial needs? Let us first look at the formal 
banking system which is a fundamental pillar of well-functioning economic systems. As 
licensed entities with certain legally defined competences, banks administer 96 percent 
of all registered deposits worldwide (the number of registered deposits is the indicator 
giving the most comprehensive data on access to financial services). The Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), an independent policy and research centre 
dedicated to advancing financial access for the world's poor, estimates that in sum 
there are about as many registered bank accounts as people living worldwide. 
However, the distribution is very unbalanced: In high-income countries people typically 
have several bank accounts, whereas the majority of people living in developing 
countries are excluded from the formal banking systems. For instance, in sub-Sahara 
Africa only about 12 percent of the population is able to use formal banking services; in 
South Asia 22 percent; and in Latin America 40 percent (CGAP 2010: 4-8). Even within 
these poorly covered areas, formal banking is concentrated on rich people living in 
urban centres (CGAP and The World Bank 2009: 12-13).  
 
The main reason for this disparity is that commercial private banks are generally not 
interested in providing their services to poor people. To compete, they focus on those 
business areas which promise the best returns on investment. Providing services to the 
poor is considered too laborious for two reasons:  First, the potential clients only deal 
with small amounts of money which results in high transaction costs; and second, risk 
assessment is difficult because poor people can neither provide a stable income and 
collateral for loans nor credit histories (see e.g. MIX 2010). Alternatives to private 
banks can be state-owned institutions which serve poor people through social 
programs. Some have built good infrastructures on a regional or national level and 
have the potential to effectively provide financial services to low-income households. 
However, in the past most state owned banks have been managed inefficiently. 
Consequently, they relied on subsidies and very few reached their outreach and social 
impact objectives (Mukherjee 1997). 
 
3.1.2. Informal providers of financial services 
 
As discussed previously, poor people have a strong need to carefully manage the little 
money they have. Without access to conventional financial institutions they must rely 
on various informal ways to manage money. Unofficial observations show that modes 
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of informal financial management are similar in different regions of the world. The most 
common sources of financial services for the poor are family members, friends or 
business partners. Borrowing from relatives and friends is often reciprocal and/or 
obligatory. Members of a social network with a temporary surplus of funds lend to 
others in need and borrow later, perhaps from the previous borrower, when their own 
situation deteriorates. Additionally, anyone who has been successful in improving his or 
her financial position is morally obliged to help others. Normally the deals are not 
recorded and no interest is charged, but social costs, obligations and shame can be 
influential factors in these transactions (Collins et al. 2009: 47-53).  
 
Another source of loans to the poor are the so called “moneylenders”. Historical 
accounts report that moneylending had already become an organized profession in 
India 1,700 to 2,200 years ago (Seibel 2005). Moneylenders possess financial 
resources which they use to provide loans. They know the local market well and 
maintain personal relationships with their customers through lending procedures that 
are quick, easy and flexible. In agricultural areas it is common for traders, processors 
or input suppliers to act as moneylenders. Moneylenders are often accused of charging 
exorbitant interest rates and of otherwise exploiting their clients (Helms 2006: 37-38). 
Informal methods also exist for saving money. It is dangerous to store money at home 
as theft is widespread in poor areas. Furthermore, saving money requires tremendous 
self-discipline, especially for those who have very little to begin with. To overcome 
these potential obstacles, many households use “money guarding” services whereby 
they entrust their savings to another person for safe-keeping (Collins et al. 2009: 47-
53). Deposit collectors offer this service similar to moneylenders in an informal but 
professional way in exchange for fee and do not pay any interest on deposits like it is 
usual on formal banking accounts (Helms 2006: 37-38).  
 
In summary, these individual modes of informal money management are often the most 
comfortable, if not the only, options available to poor households. Close personal 
relationships provide incentive for honouring the debt and allow flexibility in difficult 
situations. However, these instruments have three main disadvantages:  
 
1. Informal financial services are unreliable. There may be no money available 
when it is needed simply because no member of a person’s social network has 
any surplus funds on hand at the time. In addition, promises may be broken, 
emergencies can make arrangements impossible to execute, money may be 
lost due to criminality, etc.  
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2. A second disadvantage is lack of anonymity. Because of the close personal 
relationships involved, knowledge of a person’s financial weakness may get out 
into the community. This can result in social ostracization of the individual with 
its predictable consequences for that person - a loss of dignity and self-respect. 
3. Thirdly, no transparency about the terms of the “contract”. Cheating and 
exorbitant, obscure costs are unavoidable in many cases (Collins et al. 2009: 
54-58; Helms 2006: 39-40).  
 
Another informal mode of financial management involving more people in a more 
equitable arrangement is commonly referred to as a “savings club”. The basic idea of 
savings clubs is that a number of persons contribute a small amount of money at 
regular intervals. Social relations within the group help reinforce the discipline to save. 
One person is in charge of depositing the money at a banking account or other secure 
location. At a certain date everyone gets their contributions back to use at their 
discretion. Members are not permitted to withdraw their funds before the specified date 
to prevent them from squandering their money on unnecessary expenses (Collins et al. 
2009: 114-115). Like most people, the poor are not immune to temptations to buy 
goods that promise instant gratification, such as alcohol, but which can be 
counterproductive, if not destructive, in the long run.   
 
Savings clubs come in different forms, such as “rotating savings and credit 
associations” (ROSCA) or “accumulating savings and credit associations” (ASCA). In 
the case of ROSCAs individual contributions are pooled in a common fund. One by 
one, each group member gets the use of the total fund to meet their individual needs 
for a specific period of time. The procedure is repeated until every member has had the 
exclusive use of the funds for the specified time period. As no money needs to be 
stored in one location since it is always in circulation risk of loss or theft is minimized 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005: 57-60). ASCAs are similar, the main 
difference being that more than one group member gets the use of the whole fund. 
Instead the common pot is used to give loans to a number of persons. They must repay 
the money and some interest on an agreed schedule. This gives members flexibility in 
making use of a loan and the ASCA’s capital grows over time (Collins et al. 2009: 117). 
 
These collective modes are inexpensive to operate, easy to manage, transparent and 
flexible because members decide on the rules themselves. However, they do have 
inherent risks, one of which is that too much flexibility can undermine the repayment 
moral. Another disadvantage is that savings clubs lose their frameworks as soon as 
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one member defaults on his contribution or cheats on the others. In these cases the 
whole system can easily collapse. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of savings clubs 
is the limitation imposed on the amount of money they can accumulate due to the 
limited size and limited financial means of the memberships (Collins et al. 2009: 118-
138). Nevertheless, savings clubs are a success story considering their long history 
dating back to the 15th century in regions of Western Africa and South-East Asia 
(Sütterlin 2007: 39-40). As I point out in the following section, the core principles of 
savings clubs can be retrieved in the early stages as well as in the current practice of 
today’s microfinance sector. 
 
 
3.2. Building inclusive financial systems 
 
Economic relations are monetized throughout most of the world. Wealthy countries rely 
on a formal banking system which offers the majority of the population efficient and 
safe ways to manage their money. In the absence of comparable structures in low-
income countries, the majority of their population must rely on available informal modes 
of financial management. While important for their daily lives, they have several 
shortcomings. The origins of formal banking systems provides important tips for 
improving services to the world’s poor. The following short historical review shows that 
important pillars of today’s banking system in Europe started as initiatives which 
resembled present-day microfinance programs. Indeed, they have a long tradition of 
providing best practice models for subsequent activities and discussions about issues 
like joint liability and appropriate interest rates. 
 
3.2.1. Roots of microfinance  
 
Perhaps one of the first successful initiatives for offering formal financial services to the 
poor on a wide-scale was the Irish “loan fund” system. It was started in 1720 and aimed 
to give loans to people living in penury. Initially, wealthy persons provided capital for 
interest free loans which were administrated by independent institutions. Repayment 
was enforced by the historically approved method of peer monitoring within credit 
groups. The system worked to some extent for a century, but growth was limited. 
However, with modification of various principles, including the introduction of interest 
on loans and deposits and establishment of a Loan Fund Board in 1836 to regulate and 
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supervise the fledgling sector, loan funds experienced a phase of extensive growth 
(Seibel 2003).  
 
In 1840 about 300 institutions providing loans and deposits were operating throughout 
the country. They worked on a sound capital basis, administration was efficient and the 
credit groups which included a high participation of women were reliable in repaying 
the loans. Ironically, the model’s success led to its demise. As funding was attracted on 
the capital markets by offering high interest rates to investors, the loan fund system 
increasingly became a serious competitor for established banks. The latter used their 
political influence to induce the government to cap interest rates in 1843. 
Consequently, loan funds lost their main competitive advantage and suffered from 
insufficient funding. In addition, severe famines led to high defaults and in the end most 
of the institutions went bankrupt (Sütterlin 2007: 40-41).  
 
“This history of the Irish Loan Funds thus comprises three phases: a century of gradual 
growth as informal institutions; a few decades of rapid expansion as formal institutions in a 
conducive regulatory environment; and a century of decline due to financial repression” 
(Seibel 2003). 
 
The Irish loan funds lost their practical importance but not their exemplary function. In 
Germany similar systems offering financial services to the poor arose in the 19th 
century and established the foundation from which developed an inclusive banking 
system in Western Europe. Inspired by the Irish model, the first credit institution called 
“Sparkasse” was established in Hamburg in 1778. The initial aim was to build reserves 
for illness and old age (Sütterlin 2007: 41-43). After regulation was introduced in 1838 
the movement spread and services were expanded to provide loans to rural areas. 
 
Around the same time, but independently, two other initiatives were started: credit 
cooperatives for peasants, introduced by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen; and Hermann 
Schulze-Delitzsch’s „Volksbanken“, urban savings and credit cooperatives targeting 
manufacturers. Delitzsch did not use any substitution from the beginning and Raiffeisen 
also soon realized that support from the wealthy hinders long term sustainability, and 
consequently shifted away from charity. After several decades of slow growth the 
“Cooperative Act of the German Reich” of 1889 gave the cooperatives a legal 
framework and the Raiffeisenbanken, Volksbanken and Sparkassen started to push 
moneylenders and most private banks out of business.  
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Investigating this development in detail, Seibel (2003) identifies the following factors for 
their success:  
 
 self-help and self-reliance, based on savings provided by depositors or 
shareholder 
 local outreach with lasting house-banking relationships 
 the evolution of a legal framework 
 abandoning joint and several liability of cooperative members in favour of limited 
liability 
 effective delegated supervision through own apexes, so-called auditing 
federations 
   
The German movement of cooperative banks is a perfect example of how banking on 
the level of poor households can foster economic progress, albeit, only in combination 
with other positive macro-economic developments. Even within Western Europe 
different countries have taken different paths in building up banking systems, 
suggesting that there is no single best practice model. In fact, replication of the German 
model has failed in many low-income countries. For example, the Indian government 
tried to replicate the Raiffeisen banking model in 1892 and enacted the “Co-operative 
Credit Societies Act” in 1904. However, the state was not able to establish an 
appropriate administrative structure so that bureaucracy, immoderate government 
intervention and loan channeling to certain groups or individuals undermined self-
management and self-reliance (Seibel 2005). 
 
Following World War II the reconstruction of war-damaged Western Europe 
demonstrated the importance of financial infrastructure to emerging economies. The 
German state-owned bank „Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau“ (KfW) played a decisive 
role in channeling aid capital provided by the European Recovery Program for 
productive purposes, a role model that was replicated by many low-income countries 
(Sütterlin 2007: 44). These countries attempted to develop their agricultural sectors by 
introducing large agricultural banks to provide subsidies to farmers. Inexpensive loans 
were meant to encourage farmers to invest in irrigation, fertilizer, new crop varieties 
and technologies to increase productivity. But in most cases the models failed mainly 
because of inadequate regulation of interest rates. Often, inflation was higher than 
borrowing rates and deposit interest was too low to attract savings. In many cases 
credit was allocated on the basis of political favouritism rather than according to 
productivity of recipients. In addition, government banks often became instruments of 
financial repression by powerful persons. Finally, incentives to save and disincentives 
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to default on loan payments were omitted from these models (Armendáriz de Aghion 
and Morduch 2005: 8-10).  
 
This brief historical review shows there have been several past attempts to offer 
financial services to the poor. German cooperative banks are still very successful 
although the socio-economic context has changed and the income level of their 
customers has improved. However, many attempts to establish formal banking systems 
in low-income countries have failed. Only since the 1980s have three organizations – 
Grameen Bank, Banco Sol and BRI – established themselves as successful leaders in 
and models for today’s microfinance sector. Several key elements for their success 
reflect the lessons learned from the Irish loan fund system and the German cooperative 
movement. 
 
3.2.2. Role models of today’s microfinance sector 
 
The three MFIs most often considered to be role models for the global microfinance 
sector emerged around the same time, but independently, in different parts of the 
world. Their practical approach for offering microfinance services is similar but their 
organizational structures differ. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, headed by its 
charismatic leader Dr. Muhammad Yunus, was set up as a social business. It follows a 
non-profit approach and is owned predominantly by its clients. Banco Solidario in 
Bolivia started as a NGO but was converted into a commercial private bank in 1992. In 
contrast, Bank Rakyat Indonesia is a state owned bank which underwent important 
reforms in 1984. The following discussion explores possible origins of MFIs.  
 
Grameen Bank, Bangladesh 
In the context of independence from Pakistan, widespread flooding and a severe 
famine in the mid-1970s, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a professor of economics at 
Chittagong University, began a series of experiments of lending to poor households. 
The borrowers repaid reliably and Yunus eventually convinced the central bank of 
Bangladesh to support the establishment of a special branch in the village of Jobra. 
Soon the model was expanded to other regions and group lending as a central 
mechanism for loan security became a substitute for collateral, which is virtually non-
existent in poor populations. Donor support by the International Fund for Agriculture 
and Development, the Ford Foundation and various governments enabled a rapid 
growth of the bank (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005:11-12). 
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By the end of the 1990s Grameen Bank faced some major crises. Certain business 
practices proved to be unfavourable while at the same time disastrous flooding 
destroyed the businesses of many clients. Within a short period of time rates of 
repayment dropped from 98 percent to 75 percent. In response, a new model, 
“Grameen II”, was introduced incorporating two major reforms: First, the lending terms 
were amended to offer creditors not only one-year loans with weekly repayments but 
also contract periods ranging from three months up to three years. Also, outstanding 
loan balances could now be topped up to the full value of a new loan in the event of 
liquidity problems while the client and loan officer negotiated a new repayment 
schedule, thereby loosening the joint liability. Second, Grameen II introduced deposit 
services following the model of its competitor ASA. This brought an important new 
product to its customers and an efficient source of funding. By the end of 2004 the loan 
portfolio was completely covered by savings of Grameen members (Collins et al. 2009: 
154-162).    
 
As of October 2010, Grameen Bank had 2,565 branches, serving 8.33 million 
borrowers, of whom 97 percent were women. The borrowers own 95 percent of the 
bank’s equity with the remaining 5 percent owned by the government. It had a loan 
recovery rate of 97 percent and deposits amounted to 150 percent of outstanding loans 
of $922.34 million. Deposit rates are attractive, ranging from 8.5 percent to 12 percent, 
while the loan interest rate of 22 percent is relatively low (unless otherwise indicated, 
all credit interest rates are stated per annum on a declining basis). In addition, 
Grameen Bank offers less expensive microcredits for income generating purposes (20 
percent), for housing (8 percent), for students (5 percent) and interest free loans for 
beggars (Grameen 2010).     
 
 BancoSol, Bolivia 
In Latin America the American development organization ACCION (Americans for 
Community Cooperation in Other Nations) started a microcredit program in 
Recife/Brazil in 1973. The initiative was successful and eventually expanded to 14 
countries on the continent. In 1986 ACCION supported a group of entrepreneurs in 
Bolivia to found a NGO called “Fundación para Promoción y el Desarrollo de la 
Microempresa” (PODEM). Initially based on donor funding, PODEM was able to serve 
45.000 microcredit clients within the first five years (Sütterlin 2007: 47-48). Small 
working capital loans were provided to groups of three or more people dedicated to 
similar activities. The group members had to guarantee for their obligations jointly. 
Because of the initiative’s success and a huge unsatisfied demand for its services, in 
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1992 the NGO was converted into the first commercial bank to specialize in 
microfinance and re-named Banco Solidario S.A., or BancoSol. Today, 18 years later, 
BancoSol has more than 100 branches in eight large cities, currently offering loans to 
130,000 clients and deposits to over 260,000 customers. Women comprise 46 percent 
of the customer base and 40 percent of the total loan portfolio (BancoSol 2010).    
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
BRI was founded as a small association in 1895 during Dutch colonialism. After 50 
years of slow but steady growth and several organizational changes, it became owned 
and regulated by the independent state of Indonesia after World War II (BRI 2010). In 
the early 1970s the government used the infrastructure of 3,600 local branches to 
provide inexpensive, subsidized microcredits to farmers to promote agricultural 
development. However, with a repayment rate around 50 percent, in 1984 BRI was 
reformed. Attractive deposit interest rates were introduced to attract investors while 
loan rates were raised to 44 percent to cover costs. Loan repayment incentives were 
implemented and local authorities were integrated into the program. Consequently, the 
recovery rate improved to 95 percent (Sütterlin 2007: 49).  
 
Today BRI is the leading bank for rural microcredits in Indonesia and with $19.4 billion 
assets, is the largest institution offering microfinance services worldwide, in addition to 
its retail-, corporate- and investment-banking operations. It is based on a strong 
franchise, stable and low-cost funding base, reasonable asset quality and a 
conservative provisioning policy (Fitch 2008: 11). Since 2003 BRI has been publicly 
listed, with the public controlling 43 percent of its shares (BRI 2010).  
 
 
3.3. Frequent points of discussion 
 
So far some aspects of how microfinance services are delivered to end clients were 
already mentioned. Recall that every MFI has its own mode of operation which is 
adapted to its unique local, social and economic conditions. While a detailed discussion 
of this heterogeneity is well beyond the scope of this thesis, in this chapter I point out 
some basic attributes which are frequent topics of discussion. Although my main 
research is focused on the global level of foreign investments it is important to keep 
these various aspects of MFI practices in mind, in order to follow the development of 
social performance management.    
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3.3.1. Microcredits for the poorest of the poor? 
 
Microfinance clients are often described as poor people, predominantly women, who 
are excluded from the formal banking sector. Lacking collateral they are considered by 
commercial banks to be poor credit risks. Small loans help them to start small 
businesses such as shopkeeping, sewing or stock breeding to create new sources of 
income (see e.g. MSC 2009).  
 
In fact, microfinance clients are a diverse group of people living at various levels of 
poverty. Studies show that only a small percentage fit the defining criterion for 
“absolute poor”, which is living on less than $1.25 a day (see e.g. Ghalib 2010; PPI 
2010). Supporting very poor and destitute people with microfinance services may only 
be reasonable in combination with other initiatives like education or health care 
programs and may require ongoing subsidies. Thus, various development 
organizations have integrated microfinance programs into their projects (see e.g. World 
Vision 2010; Care 2010). Most MFI clients already have a source of income and may 
use microcredits to expand their business or diversify into a second one. However, not 
all of them are entrepreneurs so microcredits may also be used to buy consumer 
products, improve housing, bridge periods of low income or to pay down other debt 
(Collins et al. 2009: 164-167).  
 
About two thirds of MFI clients worldwide are women and some MFI’s cater exclusively 
to women (CGAP 2010). Practitioners cite women’s higher vulnerability to poverty and 
their more socially responsible behaviour as reasons for this gender bias. In addition to 
increasing their income, microfinance is promoted as a tool for empowering women 
and strengthening their social positioning (see e.g. Grameen 2010). However, critics 
claim the gender preference is because women are more susceptible to social 
pressure than men, making it easier for lenders to induce them to repay their loans. 
Furthermore, they suggest that while women are seen as reliable borrowers, in fact 
their husbands compel them to pass on the money to them so that, ultimately, it’s the 
men who use the money while the women assume responsibility for repaying the loans 
(Onyuma and Shem 2005). On the topic of empowerment one must understand that 
microcredits can also add more working pressure on women, the family situation may 
become heavily influenced and changing gender roles can lead to severe conflicts (see 
e.g. Mayoux 2007; Dabringer 2007). Thus, while microfinance has the potential to 
improve many aspects of women’s lives, it can also have negative effects which must 
be anticipated and avoided.  
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3.3.2. Why are poor people reliable debtors? 
 
MFIs face two major constraints for managing the risk of defaults: First, they know little 
about their clients’ incomes and repayment behaviours, and second, their clients have 
little, if any, property which can be used as collateral. Nevertheless, historically MFI 
loan repayment rates have been very high and many outperform conventional banks in 
this category. Grameen Bank for example can rely on the experience that 97% of its 
borrowers repay their loans reliably (Grameen 2010). How can this be explained?  
 
Traditionally, most MFIs used to work with credit groups as did the early Grameen 
Bank and the Latin-American forerunners ACCION and Finca. The latter developed the 
method of village banking. In contrast to Yunus’s model based on small solidarity 
groups of about 5 persons, village banking organizes whole communities to process 
loans to individuals and encourage collective socio-economic development on a local 
level (Finca 2010). Today there are various group lending models around the world. 
What they have in common is a foundation built on personal relationships and social 
pressure. Group members support each other by sharing advice and motivating one 
another to maintain discipline. They may also influence repayment by threats of social 
exclusion, or disqualify in advance those they consider unlikely to meet their obligations 
(see e.g. Marr 2004; Hermes and Lensink 2007). Although the functionality of credit 
groups has been emphasized in the past, negative effects from too much social 
pressure led many MFIs to adopt other incentives for repayment. Several studies (see 
e.g. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Jain and Moore 2003) indicate that the 
model of credit group may not be crucial for achieving a high repayment rate. 
 
Perhaps the biggest incentive for clients to repay is the prospect of qualifying for an 
even larger loan after the initial loan has been repaid. Microcredits have relatively short 
credit periods of about six to twelve months so that entrepreneurs can only use them to 
improve their business in increments. Also, if clients use the loan to smooth 
consumption, for instance to pay school fees in the beginning of the school year, they 
may want this support in the next year. Thus, clients often stay with the same MFI for 
several years through multiple loan cycles. This requires MFIs to ensure they have 
enough working capital to disburse subsequent credits when their clients are 
performing well, to avoid losing both the client’s trust and future business. In certain 
cases, to reduce their risk MFIs may ask the borrower for a third party guarantor, or 
assign property such as business or household assets as collateral (Dellien et al. 
2005).    
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3.3.3. Exploitation by high interest rates? 
 
What is an adequate interest rate for microcredits? MFIs need to cover their costs and 
earn some surplus to fund improvements to their operations. However, relative to 
credits, expenditures are high. Adjusted for inflation MFIs generally charge between 10 
percent and 35 percent per annum interest on loans. What makes microcredits so 
expensive to maintain are the high transaction costs (Collins et al. 2009: 133). These 
include wages for loan officers to make regular visits to clients, often in remote 
locations; travel expenses and the inherent risk of transporting money; and, the 
expenditures of time and energy invested in teaching clients how to manage their 
finances. As a rule of thumb, the poorer the clients and the worst the pre-existing 
infrastructure, the higher the transaction costs. Table 1 shows a breakdown of Indian 
microloan interest rates by component and loan value. The comparison of two loan 
amounts, 2,000 and 20,000 Rupees (about 30 and 300 Euro) shows that operating 
costs, which are fixed and independent of the loan amount, represent a much higher 
interest rate for the smaller loan. 
 
Can poor customers afford the 
interest rates necessary to 
cover these costs? To reduce 
interest rates would require 
some form of subsidy, such as 
donor funding. Although many 
leading MFIs benefited from 
donations in the past, they 
learned that subsidies made 
them dependent on donors 
and constrained their range of 
activities. However, micro-
credit clients have shown they 
are able and willing to pay 
interest rates that allow MFIs to operate independent, financially sustainable 
organizations. While the relationships between costs to the client, MFI services and 
MFI profits determine interest rates, studies indicate that profit-orientation is not a 
predominant driver of interest rates and unreasonable lending practices are an 
exception within the microfinance industry (Rosenberg et al. 2009).  
 
     
 Table 1: Cost Components of Lending  
 
Component 
 
Rs. 2,000 
Loan 
Rs. 20,000 
Loan  
 
Financial Costs 10 percent 10 percent  
 
Loan Loss 2 percent 2 percent  
 
Operating Costs 25 percent 7 percent  
 
Profit 3 percent 3 percent  
 
Total Price 40 percent 21 percent  
 Source: MicroFinance Transparency (2011)  
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3.3.4. Not only loans? 
 
Muhammad Yunus gained broad public attention with his concept of microcredits, but 
by the 1990s MFIs began to realize there was a need for other financial products 
besides microloans. Increasing sophistication of the sector drove innovation and the 
implementation of more flexible loan products, money transfer services, deposits and 
insurances adapted to the needs of the poor. To encompass this plurality the term 
“microfinance” came into use (Helms 2006: 4). 
 
 Flexible loan products 
In order to keep transaction costs as low as possible MFIs only offer a limited range of 
products. Conventional loans have the advantage of greater efficiencies due to their 
repetitive, routine administration procedures that require only limited skills from staff. 
Monitoring conventional loans is much easier as managers can focus on key indicators 
like fixed repayment rates and contract periods (Jain and Moore 2003: 12-13). 
Increasing  competition between microfinance providers and the target groups’ 
requirements for loans to meet their specific needs has motivated more progressive 
MFIs to expand their range of loan products. These MFIs tailor their loans to fit the 
project to be funded, whether it be an agricultural investment, housing, school fees or 
special projects like supplying drinking water or outfitting biogas plants (see e.g. 
KADET 2010; PRASAC 2010). As flexibility is a crucial factor for poor people managing 
their household income this development also strengthens the MFI’s competitiveness 
with informal moneylenders. 
 
 Deposits 
Although there are many more savers than borrowers in the world (CGAP and The 
World Bank 2009) the importance of savings to the poor has been largely neglected 
until recently. One reason may be that in most countries only licensed financial 
institutions are allowed to offer deposit services, which excludes MFIs structured as 
NGOs. In addition, setup costs and administration are prohibitive and many institutions 
are not aware of the benefits of savings (Helms 2006: 24). But deposits are of value not 
only to clients, but also to MFIs as a source of funding.   
 
Money transfer 
In poor regions it is common for family members to leave their homes to look for 
sources of income in urban centres or foreign countries and send money back to their 
relatives. Traditionally, the funds are transported back home in cash either by the 
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income earner or by a trusted third party, practices which can be expensive and risky. 
MFIs may use their infrastructure and modern techniques (for example banking via 
mobile phones) to process money transfers quickly and easily thus mitigating risks, 
reducing costs and delivering a more regular, stable income to relatives at home (see 
e.g. Tameer Micro Finance Bank 2010). 
 
 Insurances 
Injuries, sickness, death of family members and loss of income or property are frequent 
shocks that can have devastating effects on poor households. In most low-income 
countries there are no public safety nets. Studies reveal that in many countries less 
than six percent of the population has health insurance. Informal methods of pooling 
risk and sharing costs among a number of people are popular but tend to be insufficient 
(Collins et al. 2009: 66-70). Currently, micro-insurance is not wide-spread but many 
MFIs are working aggressively to develop this service. To meet the needs of the poor, 
micro-insurance must be adequate to cover the risks, easy to understand and 
affordable. Many MFIs already offer insurance protection against death of the debtor 
and loss of property. This insurance not only protects the clients’ households against 
unexpected events, but also secures the loan repayment for the MFI. More difficult to 
underwrite are agricultural insurance, due to the myriad of unpredictable variables 
involved, and health insurance which requires a complex administration process. Some 
argue that insurance services should not be commercialized, but instead, should be 
offered by the state (Helms 2006: 25-29). 
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3.4. Different actors commited to microfinance 
 
After discussing important aspects of the daily practice of microfinance at the client 
level, I conclude this chapter by identifying the main players that comprise the global 
microfinance sector. While there are many more players involved I limit my discussion 
to the most influential ones, which are important for my further research. 
 
3.4.1. Microfinance Institutions (MFI) 
 
A MFI is characterized by the target group of poor people that it serves. The term 
stands for a heterogeneous group of institutions which include, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), cooperatives, non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) as well as 
state-owned or private banks (CGAP 2005). While MFIs generally pursue similar 
mandates to reduce poverty in a socially and economicly sustainable way, their 
approaches may differ.  
 
NGOs and cooperatives tend to emphasize social benefits for poor people. They try to 
reach the most under-supplied customers living in urban slums or remote rural areas. 
Typically, these organizations are officially listed but are not regulated and therefore 
not allowed to deliver financial services other than microcredits. Many are subsidized 
by donors who enable them to charge reduced interest rates or to offer additional 
services like education programs. However, they may lack the financial strength 
necessary to reach a broad customer base and to improvise new techniques for 
improving efficiency. On average, to cover their administrative costs these 
organizations require a loan interest rate of about 25 percent (inflation-adjusted). 
Although most NGOs and cooperatives follow a not-for-profit approach, Cull et al. 
(2008: 11-15) emphasize this does not mean they don’t generate enough income to 
cover costs and earn a surplus. What distinguishes them from commercial players is 
that they don’t distribute profits to investors or shareholders. For NGOs their reputation 
is crucial. „For microfinance to continue expanding on these terms, institutions will need 
to maintain access to a stream of subsidized funds – and that will depend on the ability 
to prove the institution’s social worth relative to other social interventions” (Cull et al 
2008: 12).   
    
Most MFIs start as NGOs, then evolve into licensed institutions as they expand. NBFIs 
represent an organizational model with more compete
  
- 31 - 
allowed to administer deposits) but less entitlements and supervision than banks. 
However, there are also established commercial banks that expand their client base by 
targeting relatively poor people with microfinance services, in addition to their 
traditional products. Compared to NGOs and cooperatives, banks tend to serve 
customers mainly in urban areas with a smaller proportion of women as clients. 
Furthermore, they disburse larger loans on average, preferably on an individual basis 
secured by collateral, which suggests their microcredit customers are better-off. As 
their costs for screening, monitoring and processing loans are lower banks, despite 
their profit orientation, charge only about 13 percent interest (Cull et al 2008: 13-22).  
Banks’ well-developed infrastructures permit them to offer not only loans but various 
microfinance services. They are also leading in the implementation of technical 
innovations such as mobile banking (see e.g. Equity Bank 2010). 
 
It is difficult to estimate the total number of active MFIs worldwide as many of them are 
not registered, nor is this statistic officially recorded in any international database. The 
largest global data collection is done by Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX). This 
business information provider reported that, as of year-end 2010, about 2,000 MFIs 
were reporting financial and social performance data on a voluntary basis (MIX 2010). 
This represents roughly 20% of the estimated 10,000 or more MFIs operating 
worldwide. 
 
To improve microfinance services MFIs often join forces either within a country or that 
span national borders. These networks facilitate information and resource exchanges 
between MFIs, such as ongoing training programs, industry events, latest research and 
tools, legal and regulatory changes, etc. (see e.g. the African Microfinance Network 
AFMIN 2010). Additionally, they provide a more influential collective voice for 
microfinance providers to advocate policy issues (Helms 2006: 69-72).  
 
3.4.2. Governments 
 
The role of governments in microfinance is a controversial topic. Helms explains:  
 
“An emerging consensus holds that governments do have an important role to play in 
ensuring favourable policy environments within which microfinance can flourish. A good 
policy environment allows a range of financial service providers to coexist and compete to 
offer higher-quality and lower-cost services to large numbers of poor clients” (Helms 2006: 
75). 
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Well-informed governments can help to improve the financial system through 
favourable policies in areas like banking regulation or supervision. They can provide 
infrastructure, such as credit bureaus, which help simplify the administration of loans 
and prevent over-indebtedness of customers. They can also enact legislation to protect 
borrowers who may otherwise be at the mercy of lenders. Unfortunately, most 
countries have yet to implement these safeguards (CGAP and The World Bank 2009: 
30). 
 
Furthermore, many government welfare programs like Bolsa Família in Brazil include 
microfinance components (MDS 2010). BRI demonstrates that state-owned banks 
have the potential to deliver microfinance services efficiently. However, many others 
have failed because of bad governance, political patronage and weak incentives for 
borrowers to repay. Government credit programs are often limited to certain sectors 
(e.g. agriculture) or geographical regions and do not necessarily reach the most 
dynamic markets. Often, they do not even serve the intended target group due to 
corrupt misappropriation of the resources. While subsidies allow more favourable terms 
for clients, absence of penalties for default undermines the borrowers’ discipline to fulfil 
their obligations. Publicly-funded, state-owned banks also have competitive 
advantages over their private MFI counterparts which can be used to drive the latter 
out of business (Helms 2006: 76-79).  
 
Next to competitive situations there are many opportunities for public-private 
partnerships to cooperatively advance the development of a nation’s microfinance 
sector. The Columbian program, Banca de las Oportunidades, is one example. 
Through close cooperation between the Colombian government and several private 
MFIs, the extension of financial services to the country’s poor, especially those in 
remote areas, has been advanced significantly within only a few years. Banca de las 
Oportunidades improves the financial infrastructure, initiates financial education and 
sets other policies to lower expenses for private microfinance suppliers which, in 
exchange, deliver services to the end clients (Banca de las Oportunidades 2010). 
 
3.4.3. Funders  
 
A well-developed, inclusive financial system should provide the bulk of funding for 
microfinance on the domestic market from public savings, loans from commercial 
banks, bond issues and the domestic stock market (Helms 2006: 93). In practice, 
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foreign funding sources still play an important role. International support helps to 
establish and strengthen microfinance infrastructure.  
  
Donors 
International Institutions, for instance the World Bank, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the European Commission, as well as private companies and 
foundations like Deutsche Bank, the Ford Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation support governmental microfinance programs, private MFIs and various 
global initiatives as donors (see e.g. the sponsors of the Microcredit Summit Campaign 
MSC 2010). They sponsor or deliver policy support, technical assistance, grants and 
give favourable loans, equity investments and guarantees. CGAP (2005) reports that at 
least until the year 2004, donations of about $500,000 to one billion per year have been 
the main source of international support for the microfinance sector. Meanwhile, foreign 
investors surpassed this amount and are actually leading sources of foreign loans, 
equity investments and guarantees. As commercial providers cannot keep up with the 
high demand for these services, which are both costly and risky to administer, there will 
be an ongoing need for donors, especially in the areas of research and development of 
new technologies, extension of financial infrastructure, increased transparency and 
improving know-how on all levels (Helms 2006: 95-99).  
 
 Development Finance Institutions (DFI) 
In the early days of microfinance, funding was provided almost exclusively by donors. 
By the late 1990s bilateral and multilateral organizations had begun to offer quasi-
commercial loans, equity investments and guarantees. In doing so, they introduced 
commercialization to the sector. Their mandates were to strengthen the microfinance 
infrastructure and introduce benefits to attract private investors. Their quasi-commercial 
status allows some degree of latitude for these organizations to offer more favourable 
terms and to invest in less developed areas with their inherent higher risks. 
Investments in this group grew rapidly, reaching $2.5 billion by the end of 2006. In 
2008, there were 19 DFIs investing primarily in MFIs but also through private 
Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIV), governments and networks. They are highly 
concentrated with five DFIs (KfW, EBRD, IFC, AECI, FMO) representing 72 percent of 
the total sum of public foreign investments. However, while DFIs are meant to be 
precursors to private commercial investments, the relationship between the two camps 
can become tense. For example, they may come into competition, especially when 
DFIs withdraw too slowly from already mature markets and undermine commercial 
competition with more attractive terms (Reille and Forster 2008). 
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Private foreign investors  
As MFIs matured throughout the 1990s and proved to be well-managed, sustainable  
entities with reliable performance histories , private investors began to invest in the 
industry. An exception is the Dutch cooperative society, Oikocredit, founded in 1975 to 
manage reserves of members of The World Council of Churches in a social 
responsible way and already financing MFIs in the 1980s. Otherwise, the first 
international commercial bank involved was Deutsche Bank which began investing in 
microfinance in 1998. Soon, other global investment banks followed and introduced 
new microfinance funds in cooperation with specialized investment companies. Thus, 
Credit Suisse started the “Global Microfinance Fund” in association with responsAbility; 
Morgan Stanley partnered with BlueOrchard launched the “Loans for Development I 
and II” funds. These hybrid organizations promote investment products with a “double 
bottom line”: a solid financial return plus the social return from contributing to a 
worthwhile cause (see e.g. BlueOrchard 2010). In addition to providing new sources of 
capital, the engagement of commercial banks also introduces mainstream financial 
tools to MFIs, such as currency hedging (Reille and Forster 2008). 
 
Capital raised by these investors is delivered to MFIs in the form of debt obligations, 
equity investments or guarantees, mostly through a range of so called “Microfinance 
Investment Vehicles” (MIV). These financial instruments are defined by CGPA as 
follows: 
 
“An MIV is an independent investment entity specialized in microfinance with at least 50 
percent of its portfolio invested in microfinance. It intermediates capital from private and 
public investors to microfinance providers operating in emerging markets and/or to other 
MIVs” (CGAP 2009: 4). 
 
MIVs have gained importance in recent years, managing about half of all foreign 
microfinance investments as of 2008. They are backed by individual investors, 
foundations, DFIs and, increasingly, by institutional investors such as international 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds. The investment enterprises which 
manage MIVs are predominantly private companies, but also non-profit organizations, 
cooperative societies and other financial organizations (Reille and Forster 2008). I 
dedicate chapter four to a detailed discussion of this group. In chapter six I present in 
depth case studies of BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Oikocredit, Triodos Bank and Triple 
Jump. Below, figure 1 shows a summary of the various foreign sources of microfinance 
funding, the majority of which become pooled in MIVs.  
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 Source: CGAP (2006) 
 
 
 Domestic funding market 
For domestic funding, MFIs may utilize debt and equity investments from local 
commercial banks, deposit proceeds from their own clients, or both. In general, to 
ensure compliance with legal and regulatory procedures, these avenues for accessing 
capital are available only to registered institutions. An important advantage of domestic 
funding over foreign funding is the absence of currency exchange risk with its inherent 
hedging costs. As microfinance clients also benefit from deposit services, the whole 
domestic financial sector is strengthened by funding through domestic sources. 
Regardless, many MFIs prefer foreign funding sources as they offer better terms and 
conditions than commercial domestic banks and deposit taking requires additional 
knowledge (Helms 2006: 104-105). Generally, domestic banks investing in 
microfinance are more commercially orientated (CGAP 2005: 4) 
 
Another potential source of domestic funding may be an Initial Public Offering (IPO). 
Recently, some of the biggest microfinance banks issued IPOs, tapping into a new 
source of funding for their operations. In 2007 the Mexican Banco Compartamos 
received much public attention when its valuation reached 13 times book value. 
Commercially oriented players felt encouraged by this high demand while critics 
pointed out the risk of creating a speculative bubble (Reille and Forster 2008). 
Eventually, headlines reported that Compartamos Banco had been charging interest 
rates on its microloans sometimes in excess of 100 percent (see e.g. Epstein and 
Smith 2007).    
n/a 
$300 million 
$50 million $2 billion $1.5 billion 
$700 million $800 million $1.5 billion $150 million 
 
DFIs 
 
Individuals 
 
Institutional Investors 
Government & 
Networks 
Microfinance 
Investment 
Vehicles 
 
Microfinance Institutions 
$3.9 billion 
invested  
in total 
Figur 1: Foreign Investment Microfinance Landscape 
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3.4.4. Research facilities, consultants, platforms 
 
The tremendous development of the microfinance sector in recent years would 
certainly not have been possible without the support and accompanying services of 
research facilities, consultants and platforms on different levels. Those discussed in the 
following paragraph are only a handful of many different organizations within this 
group. The selection shall provide a general overview of the wide variety of players that 
comprise this group. 
 
Perhaps the most recognised research centre dedicated to microfinance is CGAP. It is 
housed at the World Bank and supported by over 30 development agencies and 
foundations. Next to providing market intelligence, CGAP develops new tools, 
promotes standards and offers advisory services (CGAP 2010). The World Bank itself, 
or to be more precise, the group’s members IBRD (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) and IDA (International Development Association) 
are also directly support the microfinance sector by offering policy advice and financial 
support to governments (Worldbank 2010). In Europe, the non-profit organization ADA 
(Appui au développement autonome) based in Luxembourg has been an active 
promoter of microfinance for over 15 years. ADA works on research, the development 
of new financial products and on building partnerships (ADA 2010). One initiative 
launched by ADA with the support of others is The Rating Initiative. Its aim is to foster 
the development of independent ratings for MFIs which makes the involvement of 
investors, donors and other microfinance stakeholders easier. Financial ratings are 
important for providing relevant information as a basis for investment decisions. In 
addition, the initiative also promotes social ratings which assess the MFI’s social 
performance (The Rating Initiative 2010). Various other initiatives correlated with social 
performance tools will be presented in chapter 5. The first of these will be the 
international platform SPTF, which brings together over 850 members working on 
social performance issues. Of course, there are several other forums and associations 
which pool with different organizations, for example The European Microfinance 
Platform or IAMFI (International Association of Microfinance Investors). The latter helps 
commercially oriented microfinance investors fulfill their financial and social goals by 
offering market intelligence and educational and networking events (IAMFI 2010). In 
addition to non-profit institutions there are also specialized companies like Symbiotics, 
which combine research and advisory services with brokerage and asset management 
services (Symbiotics 2010). 
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4. Focus group: Private foreign investors  
 
“Some people see a logical progression from donors supporting microfinance  
in its infancy, to social investors helping it to become financially viable, 
before more commercial investors replace them to propel the industry  
further forward to bigger and better things – at a profit. We disagree.” 
(Van Golstein Brouwers/Triodos Investment Management 2003: 2) 
 
Essential characteristics of microfinance were presented in the previous chapter. I now 
turn to the group of players I chose to investigate in greater detail - private foreign 
investors. My primary questions are: What strategies do private foreign microfinance 
investors follow with regard to the discourse of social performance in microfinance, and 
what influence might their contribution have on the development of the microfinance 
sector in the context of increasing commercialization? In this chapter I give my reasons 
for selecting this group as the focus of my discussion. I describe them in more detail, 
explaining their activities, significant developments in recent years, the current 
allocation of investments and their standing in relation to other sources of funding. I 
conclude with evidence to support my opinion of this group as being a key factor in the 
context of the increasing commercialization of microfinance. Other goals in this chapter 
are to prepare a basis for questioning the role of this group in the discussion about 
social performance (chapter 5), and to establish the context for analyzing five case 
studies in chapter 6. The data sources for this chapter are primarily specialized 
publications of research facilities. 
 
4.1. Investing in microfinance 
 
In a Focus Note of August 2005, CGAP called attention to the rapid growth of foreign 
microfinance investments. These totalled $1.2 billionUS of foreign investments by mid 
2004. The majority was administered by DFIs, but already $460 million was being 
channeled via private MIVs to 500 MFIs. The Dexia Microcredit Fund, managed by 
BlueOrchard, was considered a flagship for a number of rising specialized financial 
instruments (CGAP 2005). Over the next two years, from 2004 to 2006, MIV 
investments tripled and CGAP’s specialists were most appreciative: 
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„This new investment stream is good news for microfinance providers. Microfinance needs 
a broader capital market to secure the funding required to scale-up outreach and serve a 
greater number of financially excluded, low-income people” (Reille and Forster 2008) 
 
As of December 2009, CGAP counted 91 active MIVs. Together they managed $6.2 
billion assets out of an estimated $12 billion of total foreign investments in 
microfinance.  MIVs growth rates were impressive: 86 percent in 2007, 34 percent in 
2008 and 25 percent in 2009 during the years of global financial crisis (Glisovic and 
Reille 2010). Compared to the 20 percent sell-off experienced on average by emerging 
market funds in 2008, this was very good performance, indeed (Reille et al. 2009). An 
examination of the various MIV funding sources shows that 42 percent of the capital is 
provided by institutional investors, foundations and NGOs, 34 percent comes from 
individuals, 21 percent from public investors and three percent from other MIVs (Reille 
and Glisovic-Mezieres, 2009). The preferred regions for private foreign investments 
were Latin America and the Caribbean (37 percent of MIVs investments in 2008) as 
well as Eastern Europe and Central Asia (35 percent). The remaining 28 percent went 
to Southern Asia (nine percent), East Asia and the Pacific (seven percent), Sub-
Saharan Africa (six percent) and others. This concentration was due to better 
infrastructures and less volatile markets in the preferred regions, although Southern 
Asia, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa all experienced rapid growth in 2009 
(MicroRate 2010). 
 
4.1.1. Investment environment  
 
Although foreign microfinance investments are growing rapidly, a total volume of $12 
billion is dwarfed by the global market for socially responsible investment with assets of 
$4 trillion. Reille and Forster (2008) believe the recent investment boom does not 
signal the entrance of mainstream commercial, profit-driven investors to the 
microfinance sector. They argue that there is still much potential to attract investors 
who are primarily socially motivated and willing to accept relatively low returns on 
investment. Despite limited profits, investing in MFIs can offer favourable financial 
attributes. Joan Trant, Executive Director of the International Association of 
Microfinance Investors (IAMFI), describes the microfinance sector as a challenging 
market for commercial investors: 
 
“From the investors’ perspective, the industry suffers from a dearth of information, a low 
level of transparency, a lack of accepted guidelines and standards, and an absence of 
many investor services common in more established asset classes such as uniform credit 
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ratings, credit bureaus, debt default tracking, objective equity valuations, exit strategies, a 
secondary market for liquidity, and fund manager rankings. Local legal, regulatory and fiscal 
environments can give rise to daunting hurdles. Furthermore, the vast majority of 
commercial MFIs have their roots in nonprofits that transformed to regulated entities, and 
ownership, governance and management capacity often raise concerns” (Trant 2010). 
 
On the other hand, Trant suggests that from a business perspective the high market 
demand for investments and promising prospects regarding the future development of 
the microfinance sector are great incentives to accept these challenges. As business 
partners MFIs offer additional potential benefits: loyal client bases; low default rates; 
high interest rates can be justified to cover operational costs; and, high solvency rates 
due to short loan periods. Debt and equity offerings by MFIs, while growing, are limited 
to only a few in the sector due to valuation difficulties and lack of exit strategies. In 
addition, opposing views on governance between founders with a strong social 
mandate and profit-oriented new shareholders may cause internal conflicts. But again 
the excellent asset quality of MFIs and high net interest returns can make equity 
investing in microfinance attractive. The possibility of long-term funding provided by 
developmental investors is an additional bonus (Trant 2010).    
 
According to the rating agency Fitch Ratings (2008), experience has demonstrated that 
microfinance can be a commercially-viable, financially-sustainable enterprise as MFIs 
are characterized by good asset quality and low rates of delinquency and default. The 
sector has also demonstrated a resilience to external macroeconomic shocks, and 
MFIs also tend to recover more quickly from economic downturns than traditional 
banks. This can be explained by the fact that an MFI’s asset base is domestic and 
relatively independent of international macroeconomic events. Of the funds they may 
receive from international sources, much comes from donors or aid agencies which, in 
contrast to commercial investors, stay invested with the MFIs throughout times of 
financial crisis thereby reducing systemic risk. More threatening are events that 
influence the repayment capabilities of microcredit lenders, but even here the impacts 
of external shocks are seldom an issue as MFI client businesses generally serve local 
markets, usually operate in the informal sector and are not dependent on imports. In 
fact, increasing costs for imported products may actually benefit MFI clients as the local 
consumer chooses to buy more affordable domestic products and services. 
Furthermore, micro businesses typically have few assets, short lead production times 
and high turnovers of stock, and they often employ family members and friends, all of 
which make them very flexible in adjusting to changing economic conditions. It is these 
very features of micro businesses that makes ongoing access to MFI loans essential to 
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maintaining their operations, thus creating the incentive for borrowers to establish and 
sustain a clean repayment record. However, despite borrowers’ best efforts increases 
in default rates may result from rising prices (especially food prices) which burden the 
budgets of microfinance customers, domestic events that increase unemployment, 
foreign remittances and local currency devaluations (Fitch 2008: 12-14). Recent 
developments from the global financial crisis 2008/2009 show the microfinance sector, 
while not immune to the effects, is relatively stable during macroeconomic downturns. 
Growth rates slowed mainly because of local consequences of the financial crisis. 
 
4.1.2. Categorization of Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIV) 
 
Given this challenging environment it is understandable why few international 
companies have ventured into the microfinance market until now. Over half of all 
private microfinance investors’ assets (about 59 percent) are managed by the ten 
largest specialized investment enterprises. Although this value has decreased from 78 
percent in 2005, the industry is still highly concentrated within a few key players. The 
investment company BlueOrchard alone manages several MIVs with assets totalling 
more than $1 billion. Its competitor responsAbility has $0.8 billion under management 
(MicroRate 2010).  
 
MIVs can be categorized in several ways. CGAP (Reille and Forster 2008) proposes 
one differentiation into six groups, suggesting several approaches: 
 
1. Registered mutual funds: the biggest group, targeting mainly individual 
investors by offering close to money market returns (around 3 percent p.a. in 
Euros). They invest primarily in senior debt of MFIs in the most mature markets 
and must follow strict disclosure regulations. Examples are the responsAbility 
Global Microfinance Fund and Triodos Fair Share Fund.   
2. Commercial fixed-income investment funds: similar to the first group but with a 
higher share of institutional investors, larger investments, relatively low 
operating cost ratios and without regulation and supervision by capital market 
authorities. The average net return in Euros is 4.8 percent. One example is 
Triodos-Doen. 
3. Structured finance vehicles: one of the newest forms of financing in 
microfinance. They pool and repackage loan assets as marketable securities 
and provide MFIs larger loans and longer maturities. One example is 
BlueOrchard Microfinance Securities-1. 
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4. Blended-value funds: these funds are most heavily mission-driven, serving 
smaller MFIs also in more difficult regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. Investors - 
primarily individuals, foundations and NGOs - only receive below market returns 
of about 1.5 percent. One example is Hivos-Triodos Fund. 
5. Holding companies of microfinance banks: they finance equity and technical 
assistance to start-up MFIs, often acting as an investment arm of DFIs. One 
example is Opportunity Transformation Investments. 
6. Private equity funds: equity firms and venture capital companies comprise this 
fast growing group by offering equity investments to high-growth MFIs in 
emerging markets, especially in Asia. One example is ACCION Investments in 
Microfinance. 
 
Some funds, like Oikocredit, do not fit into any of these categories. There are two major 
forms of foreign investment in MFIs: debt, where funds are loaned to MFIs in exchange 
for an interest return, and equity, where the investor buys shares of the institutions. 
Depending on the share class, equity investors may have voting rights and gain control 
of a seat on the board of directors. A third form is guaranteeship where the investor 
provides a guarantee of loan repayment to the lending institution in the event of a 
borrower’s default (CGAP 2005). By yearend 2009 debt far exceeded the other 
investment categories, accounting for 81.6 percent of all MIV investments. Equity was 
a distant second at 17.6 percent followed by guarantees at 0.5 percent and other forms 
at 0.3 percent. Including all categories, over 3,000 investments in MFIs averaging $1.4 
million each were processed in 2009. The average equity investment was considerably 
higher at $2.3 Million (MicroRate 2010).  
 
4.1.3. Recent developments and prospects 
 
How did the microfinance sector develop in recent years from an investor’s point of 
view? In reaction to the financial crisis DFIs increased their investments to prevent a 
credit squeeze. Two new funds of $250 million and $100 million were introduced in 
2008 (Reille et al. 2009). However, while institutional investors such as pension funds 
did not increase their investments, they at least maintained their positions and a feared 
flight of investment capital did not occur. In contrast, investment enterprises were 
successful in attracting additional capital from retail investors and recorded high growth 
rates. For example, ResponsAbility’s Global Microfinance Fund grew 96 percent in 
2008 and, in December 2008, was the fifth largest MIV with $378 million assets under 
management (Reille and Glisovic-Mezieres 2009).  
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In 2009 the supply of MIV assets grew faster than the demand from preferred partner 
MFIs, as the latter decelerated expansion in response to the overall economic decline. 
The result was a significant increase in portfolio cash holdings with no productive place 
to go. This put MIVs under pressure as a certain amount of liquidity is necessary for 
bridging timing differences between transactions, whereas too much liquidity reduces 
the return on portfolio investment (MicroRate 2010). Also, for the first time a few MIVs 
were forced to take significant write-offs. The combined effect was an average two 
percent decline in MIV fixed-income returns. While these events dampened investor 
expectations somewhat, relative to other financial sectors microfinance continues to 
deliver dependable, attractive investment returns in times of crisis (Glisovic and Reille 
2010) 
 
For 2010 and 2011, MIV asset managers expect similar returns to those in 2009, 
although they expect increasing competition among MIVs will put pressure on 
management fees. Many are redirecting their focus from fundraising to risk 
management and investment diversification and some are moving up-market, from 
microfinance to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Promising emerging markets for 
microfinance investments are Brazil, China and Nigeria (Glisovic and Reille 2010). 
However, the rapid growth rate of private foreign investments is limited by the slower 
rate of development to bring new MFIs to maturity. To become a registered institution 
in order to gain access to a broader selection of investment capital requires 
improvements in administrative and operational capacity. Thus, back office upgrades, 
more sophisticated risk management processes, more experienced, specialized staff 
and strengthening of management structures will be necessary (Fitch 2008: 14-15). 
One positive effect of the recent financial crisis for the microfinance sector is that it 
served as a selection process for weeding out those MFIs that did not have a viable, 
sustainable business model.  
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4.2. Impacts on MFIs  
 
Why is funding from private sources important for MFIs? Because the ratios of 
microcredit recipients to people in poverty remain quite low, even in many relatively 
well developed microfinance markets, clearly indicating the need to reach out to more 
clients. For example, by mid 2007, in Bangladesh 35 out of 100 persons living in 
poverty were microcredit clients, in Vietnam the rate was 25 percent and in Peru only 
13 percent (Fitch 2008). The capacity for millions of private investors from around the 
globe to allocate large amounts of capital to MFIs makes them a valuable and reliable 
source for funding the growth of MFI portfolios. 
 
4.2.1. Growth and transformation  
 
MFIs can be divided into four tiers on the basis of their attractiveness to foreign 
investors (see figure 2). The top tier comprises about 150 institutions representing less 
than 2 percent of all MFIs worldwide. These MFIs are mature, mostly regulated 
companies with a track record of profitability over several years (Fitch 2008). The 
majority of MIVs focus on this top tier. On average, MIVs allocate 40 percent of their 
capital to only five major MFIs, giving these top tier MFIs a strong bargaining position 
with investors from which they can negotiate higher loans with longer terms of up to 8 
years. While much shorter than DFI loan terms of up to 15 years they are still much 
longer than local investors will offer. On the other hand large MFIs already have debt-
to-equity ratios of seven to one on average which limits further borrowing and 
necessitates a buildup of equity capital. In fact, in some markets the supply of debt 
already exceeds the demand. This situation also affects smaller tier two and tier three 
MFIs. These less established operations are increasingly targeted by MIVs offering 
debt financing to an oversaturated market, when equity investment combined with 
technical assistance would better serve the MFIs (Reille and Foster 2008).  
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Joint ventures between private investors and MFIs often coincide with the 
transformation from a not-for-profit NGO or cooperative to a registered, profit-driven 
institution. This introduces the potential for “mission drift”, where social goals become 
secondary to profits. Shareholder interests may pressure MFIs to neglect their 
mandates to serve and assist the poor (Trant 2010). Muhammad Yunus expressed his 
opinion on profit-oriented MFIs as follows: “Commercialization has been a terrible 
wrong turn for microfinance, and it indicates a worrying “mission drift” in the motivation 
of those lending to the poor. Poverty should be eradicated, not seen as a money-
making opportunity” (Yunus 2011).  Ultimately, the investors’ priorities will determine 
the nature and policy of the MFI, so to avoid mission drift it will be crucial for MFIs to 
partner with like-minded investors interested in delivering social returns, even at the 
(potential) cost of lower financial returns. 
 
Transforming to a registered institution introduces several practical changes to the day-
to- day operations of MFIs. Product lines may be expanded to include new client 
services, such as deposit accounts; the institution becomes more complex presenting 
challenges to staff and management who must adapt to new regulations, goals and 
operational procedures; and, the MFI may become too bureaucratic and lose the close 
relationship with its client base. The process of transformation from unregulated MFI to 
a regulated NBFI or bank is costly and requires expertise which must be provided by 
Tier 1 
 
• Max. 2% of total MFI universe by number 
• Often referred to as “top-tier”, estimated to number 150 
• Track record of profitability over several years 
• Mature, and mostly regulated 
• Access to commercial funding from domestic and inter- 
  national sources 
 
Tier 2 
• Max. 8% of total MFI universe by number 
• At or near profitability 
• Younger, smaller and typically unregulated NGOs 
• Access to international funding sources from specialised  
  microfinance funds, typically non-deposit taking, limited  
  sources of domestic funding 
 
Tier 3 
• 20% of total MFI universe by number 
• Approaching profitability 
• Typically young, small and unregulated NGOs 
• Dependent on grants and donations 
 
Tier 4 
• 70% of total MFI universe by number 
• Not profitable 
• Start-up, small and unregulated NGOs 
• Funded by grants and donations only 
 
  Source: Fitch (2008) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Figure 2: The MFI Pyramid 
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third parties through grants and technical support. Business opportunities for private 
investors are dependent on development agencies that provide this backing (Fitch 
2008). 
 
4.2.2. Ownership structures 
 
In 2005 CGAP predicted low demands for equity investments as only a limited number 
of MFIs that met criteria regarding legal status, size and profitability were considered 
worthwhile partners for MIVs and eligible for equity investments. CGAP pundits 
believed that future regulated MFIs would focus increasingly on deposit taking and 
local investors as capital sources (CGAP 2005). Initially, due to their perceived risk, 
only investors with a strong social mandate used equity investments. Today, equity 
investments have increased in popularity as attractive MFI growth rates, limited 
competition and high market potential entice commercial investors (Reille and Forster 
2008). By the end of 2008, 13 private equity funds had invested $257 million in MFIs. 
Because of their short track record - 3.5 years on average - the return on investment 
was still uncertain (CGAP 2009). However, in 2009 equity investments increased by 46 
percent compared to 15 percent growth of debt investments. Glisovic and Reille 
welcomed the positive trend in equity investments: “[...] such investments are needed 
to strengthen the equity base of distressed MFIs, as well as to propel MFIs in high-
growth markets such as India” (Glisovic and Reille 2010).   
 
An ADA discussion paper (2009) investigates the ownership structure of 39 regulated 
MFIs at the end of 2002 and 2007. It shows that foreign equity in these MFIs increased 
by 336 percent over five years, more than double the growth of local equity funding. 
Generally, when foreign investors buy shares, they either acquire an insignificant 
proportion (0 percent – 20 percent of an MFI’s total equity) or acquire controlling 
interest through the purchase of 80 percent to 100 percent of the shares. Currently, the 
numbers of MFIs under foreign control are limited but increasing. The highest 
proportion of foreign equity investments (about 50 percent) comes from commercial 
investors, although NGOs, Foundations, Development Funds and Agencies also make 
significant contributions. This has disturbing implications when one recalls that public 
money is intended to support smaller MFIs but only mature institutions are eligible to 
receive foreign equity investments (ADA 2009).  
 
As statistics show a clear trend towards foreign ownership, one must consider what 
effects this may have on development of the microfinance sector. Equity investments 
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are attractive alternatives to debt financing and a necessary source of funds for MFIs 
which intend to expand their businesses. Foreign sources of equity capital may have 
further positive influences on MFI efficiencies:  
 
“It is almost accepted as a general principle that foreign equity investments, in contrast to 
local equity investments, have the positive effects of not only offering MFIs much larger 
sums of money, but of also providing them with more expertise in terms of products and 
services, and with more knowledge in terms of governance” (ADA 2009: 22). 
 
Nevertheless foreign ownership also involves certain risks. When strategic and 
operational decisions concerning MFIs are made by foreign entities, it is not 
guaranteed the consequences will be beneficial to the local community. For example, 
the professional training of local staff may be neglected, or the steps required to 
achieve future autonomy of the MFI may not be taken. Also, foreign shareholders often 
repatriate large portions of MFIs’ profits to their countries instead of spending it to 
improve the MFIs’ operations. In the long run these disadvantages can make foreign 
equity investments less sustainable than local sources of funding through savings or 
local debt and equity investments. Furthermore, it appears that local ownership can be 
very positive for both MFIs and the communities they serve. As numbers of local 
shareholders increase, it becomes easier for MFIs to attract more local funding, which 
in turn influences the MFI towards more community-oriented policies and goals which 
ultimately strengthens the entire domestic financial sector (ADA 2009). Unfortunately, 
compared to the relatively rapid growth of foreign equity investments, local ownership 
of MFIs is increasing very slowly. 
 
Local equity is often not available at all, or not available in adequate amounts or under 
adequate conditions. And local investors are sometimes only attracted by the expected 
financial returns of microfinance investments, but are not interested in the influence that 
local ownership and local governance can have for the economic development of their 
country or their region, in the long run. Thus, MFIs are almost forced to accept foreign 
equity funding, as shows the case.” (ADA 2009: 23) 
 
4.2.3. MIVs compared to DFIs and domestic funding sources 
 
As discussed earlier, there are four general categories of commercial funding sources 
available to MFIs depending on their stage of development. Table 2 provides a 
comparison of the main features in each of the following categories: MIVs, DFIs, local 
banks and deposits. 
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Table 2: Main characteristics of funding sources 
Funding 
Sources MIV DFI Local banks Deposits 
Backing Private investors Public investors Various MFI clients 
Main advantages 
for MFIs 
Large loan-
amounts 
Favourable loan 
terms 
No currency 
exchange risk Self-sufficiency 
Considerable 
disatvantages for 
MFIs 
Currency 
exchange risk Limited sources Rare availability Difficult to introduce 
Trend Increasing 
importance 
Still important, but 
decreasing 
compared to MIVs 
Increasing, but still 
limited number of 
players 
Increasing, but slow 
implementation  
Source: own description based on the references of the following paragraphs 
 
 MIV versus DFI 
DFIs are intended to pave the way for private investors. While they follow a more 
commercial approach than donors, DFIs offer favourable conditions to MFIs which 
gives them time to develop sustainable economic structures. In addition, DFI 
investments are frequently linked with technical assistance. However, MIV managers 
often complain that DFIs withdraw too late from a relatively mature market, compete 
against MIVs and force them out of markets. When MFIs have the choice, they prefer 
DFI funding: 
 
„From the MFI’s perspective, the long-term commitment and brand value of DFI investors 
can be crucial to protect their social mission and provide comfort given the relatively 
unstable political and socioeconomic contexts within which they operate. Many fear that 
private investment will be the first to flee in times of crisis.” (Reille and Forster 2008: 14) 
 
However not only donors and DFIs contribute to the structural development of MFIs via 
technical assistance and favourable terms. Private investors also play a crucial role in 
imparting governance capacity and management skills (Reille and Foster 2008).  
 
 MIV versus local banks 
MFIs have access to various sources of private funding. In addition to MIVs, domestic 
commercial banks in some countries are becoming increasingly involved in funding 
MFIs. As more foreign investors ask MFIs to prioritize social and environmental results 
and there are still relatively few profit-oriented foreign investors in this sector, local 
banks tend to follow a more profit-oriented approach (Reille and Foster 2008). For 
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MFIs, foreign investors offer the advantages of lower interest rates, few collateral 
requirements, more willingness to negotiate, longer credit periods, quick disbursement 
and good reputations (CGAP 2005). Thus, if an MFI is accepted as partner by a 
recognized MIV like Oikocredit, other investors step in because they trust Oikocredit’s 
due diligence process. On the flip side, one of the biggest advantages of local funding 
sources compared to foreign investments is the absence of currency exchange risk. In 
2008 about three quarters of cross-border investments were processed in the hard 
currencies US-Dollar or Euro (Reille et al. 2009). The exchange risk commonly stays 
with the MFIs although MIVs might have better opportunities to handle this risk. 
Consequently, many MFIs experienced severe losses over the course of the recent 
financial crisis and learned to demand their loans be issued in local currency. The 
positive effect of adopting this strategy shows: in 2009 local currency loans increased 
by 54 percent and at the time this was written, accounted for 31 percent of all 
outstanding direct debt investments (Glisovic and Reile 2010). Today, social investors 
and donors are ushering in the development of new foreign currency hedging 
strategies. Long term, the development of deeper, broader local currency markets will 
make it easier to mitigate this risk (Apgar and Reille 2010). The ultimate goal, in any 
case, should be to wean MFIs off of dependence on foreign capital as they become 
viable, sustainable operations capitalized by local capital markets.  
 
 MIV versus Deposits 
Another source of local funding is the deposits of microfinance customers. This method 
has the advantages of allowing MFIs to create their own, independent capital bases as 
well as   providing clients with an important, additional financial service. A study on the 
stability of small deposits which investigated five MFIs, concluded that some portion of 
small balance deposits can be used as a stable source of funds. Despite the 
conventional view that low-income depositors transact more frequently, the data show 
that, in general, this is inaccurate and even natural disasters have no significant effect 
on deposit balances. As a precaution, the authors recommend MFIs analyze the 
depositer behaviour over at least three years before using their savings for loans 
(Abakaeva and Glisovic-Mezieres 2009). An obstacle for many MFIs is that most 
countries require MFIs to be registered and supervised before they are eligible for 
deposit-taking. As such, this option is only practicable for banks and NBFIs which 
excludes  MFIs set up as NGOs. 
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4.3. The key role of private foreign investors 
 
Chapter 4 concludes with a summary of points discussed above that support the 
argument that private foreign investors will play a leading role in the further 
development of the microfinance sector. In my opinion, events from recent history and 
those currently transpiring have revealed three certainties: (1) private foreign investors 
are crucial to the whole industry; (2) the future supply of private foreign investments is 
almost guaranteed, and; (3) MIVs can exercise substantial influence over MFIs.  
 
(1) Microfinance has been developing well, especially over the past five years, as 
measured by  indicators like the outreach to increasing numbers of poor, the efficiency 
of MFIs, and the expanding range of products offered by MFIs. However, the demand 
for microfinance services is far from satisfied. Penetration rates remain low, even in 
relatively well-developed microfinance markets, so at the regional level the demand for 
MFI services far exceeds supply. The fact that many MFIs receive MIV investments 
suggests that a growing MFI industry will require ongoing foreign investment into the 
foreseeable future. This view is reinforced by the observation that MFIs tend to evolve 
from unregulated institutions to formal banks, which coincides with business expansion 
and a need for additional funding, and also makes them more attractive to MIVs. MIVs 
concentrate on about 150 top tier MFIs in certain geographic regions. Although 
currently, it appears the demand of these MFIs for foreign debt funding is almost met, 
the number of mature MFIs will increase continuously and more countries will be able 
to offer favourable environments for foreign investors in future. While domestic sources 
of funding increase in popularity, MIVs can offer attractive terms to persuade MFIs, to 
some extent, to choose foreign funding over other capital sources. In fact, data show 
that MIVs already overtook DFIs in terms of the amount of capital invested. Admittedly, 
DFIs are still growing but MIVs develop much faster. While DFIs will carry out their 
mandates to prepare the field for private investments, they will ultimately withdraw to 
be replaced by MIVs. Equity investments represent another promising field. 
 
(2) The main advantage of MIVs over DFIs and the reason why the public tries to 
encourage private capital investment is that, in the long run, the private sector can 
provide far more capital. The recruitment of private individual and institutional investors 
as sources of microfinance capital has just begun. As MIVs attract larger financial 
players like pension funds, which are now cautiously sampling the market, investment 
volumes will likely experience rapid and unprecedented growth. In particular, the 
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relative resilience demonstrated by MFIs during the recent financial crisis makes it an 
attractive alternative investment for large financial institutions. From an investor’s 
perspective, microfinance is an asset class worthy of closer inspection and monitoring 
based on its short-term performance record. With time it could become a key sector to 
hold in any well-diversified portfolio. 
 
(3) The importance and promising aspects of MIVs make private foreign investors 
influential players in the microfinance sector. Today’s largest of these enterprises are 
opinion leaders and actively represent this group of players on the international stage. 
They exercise considerable bargaining power, introduce commercial business 
practices at various operational  levels and influence public opinion. That same 
influence plays a significant role in their relationships with MFIs. They can offer 
attractive funding terms, making them desirable partners for MFIs which, in exchange 
are willing to be more accommodating to the MVIs. In fact, it is the prospect of 
receiving MIV funding that motivates small MFIs to transform into regulated entities. 
Representing a large share of the MFI’s capital empowers the investor to demand 
special terms, such as higher yields or adoption of specific social standards. Even 
more evident is their influence regarding equity investments. As shareholders, MIV 
managers can at least have input at board meetings - a right which many indeed 
exercise, as chapter 6 will demonstrate. Majority shareholders may even take charge of 
strategic decisions and change the whole direction of an institution.   
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5. The emergence of Social Performance Management 
 
“Creating the base for responsible finance in low-access environments 
is likely to be a complex undertaking that can be achieved only over time.  
The potential pay-off makes the investment in getting started worth the effort”. 
(Brix and McKee 2010: 21) 
 
I begin this chapter with a question: do microfinance services help the poor to improve 
their lives? In an attempt to answer this important question, I discuss the many claims 
by MFIs of successful microcredit clients who escaped poverty by starting small 
businesses with their loans. Over the years public campaigns gained momentum and 
spread a very positive image of microfinance, but more recently critics have surfaced 
who question the validity of these claims. While impact studies give much empirical 
evidence to support claims that microfinance has contributed to alleviation of poverty, it 
does have its limits and has also been tainted by the inappropriate practices of some of 
its less ethical participants. Practitioners have responded to these criticisms with 
initiatives designed to measure social performance and develop management tools that 
can be used as benchmarks for evaluating an MFI’s efficacy in achieving its social 
goals. They can also help reveal weak areas and provide valuable information for 
improving operations. Despite these initiatives the current trend towards 
commercialization has sparked an ongoing debate as to whether or not a double 
bottom line in microfinance – simultaneous financial and social returns – is a possibility 
or contradictory. 
 
To address these issues I discuss the background and significance of the discourse of 
social performance in microfinance. I chose this approach based on the experience I 
gained about the key points of this discussion at the SPTF Annual Meeting 2010. I also 
present for discussion some social performance initiatives supported by the five private 
foreign investment enterprises introduced in chapter 6. The sources for this chapter 
were derived from various websites, press articles and scientific literature.  
 
  
- 52 - 
5.1. The public image of microfinance 
 
The story of Bathula Vijaya, a client of the Indian MFI SHARE, reveals how 
microfinance can enable disadvantaged women to escape poverty:  
 
Bathula Vijaya was born in Macharla town of Guntur district, Andhra Pradesh. Her parents 
were daily labourers. […] On being told about SHARE, Bathula attended one of its meetings 
conducted at Chilakaluripeta. She enrolled herself as a member. She took Rs 6,000 as her 
first loan and invested the amount in the pickle business. Soon, their business started to 
flourish. Unfortunately while they were in the fourth year of their relationship with SHARE, 
Yasudaya met with an accident. Out of the earnings from the business, Bathula managed to 
pay the hospital charges and also the loan instalments without any difficulty. Today Bathula 
has her house renovated; she is able to send her children to an English medium school; 
and she has diversified her business to sell spices along with pickles. She is grateful to 
SHARE for helping her become financially comfortable (SHARE 2010). 
 
Success stories like this are often used by microfinance advocates to promote their 
cause. MFIs and investment enterprises list similar examples on their homepages. 
Press articles often start with such personal stories to establish a relationship with the 
audience. The story line usually follows the same pattern: a young woman grows up in 
poverty, becomes a MFI client, uses a microloan to expand a small business and pays 
back the loan. She employs other people, becomes socially empowered, sends her 
children to school and so forth. These stories are plausible and, although people may 
wonder about the persistence and assertiveness of the women as they strived towards 
their goals, the stories have seldom been questioned. Even if one assumes these 
stories are based in fact, it is likely that only the stories of greatest success were told 
while the tales of lesser success were buried. As such, these anecdotes must not be 
construed as objective evidence of positive social impact generated by microfinance 
activity.  
 
5.1.1. Raising global awareness of microfinance 
 
Trust in the poverty-reducing benefits of microfinance is shared by various international 
actions to promote the concept and make it known publically. The biggest global 
initiative for that is the Microcredit Summit Campaign (MSC). In 1997 the American 
NGO „RESULTS Educational Fund“ organized a first global summit in Washington D.C. 
where nearly 3.000 persons from 137 countries involved with microfinance participated. 
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They set a goal to reach 100 million of the world’s poorest families with microfinance 
services until 2005. The target group “poorest” is defined by the MSC as people, “[...] 
who are in the bottom half of those living below their nation’s poverty line, or any of the 
more than 1 billion people who live on less than $1 a day adjusted for purchasing 
power parity, when they started with a program” (Daley-Harris 2006: 1).  
 
Although the campaign is faced with the problem of data gathering within a widely 
informal context (the number of people reached is based mainly on self-reporting of 
MFIs which is to a certain extend controlled by third parties), the promoters were able 
to announce in 2005 that the goal is almost reached. Thus, a new target was set: by 
2015 an additional 175 million of the poorest shall be reached and in addition 100 
million families shall raise their income above $1.25 a day. Along with this primary goal 
the MSC’s intention is to make microfinance in general more recognized and act as a 
forum for people involved in the sector. This has a precedent in the annual summits 
which take place in different parts of the world. These events attended by business 
leaders and hundreds of delegates from many countries attract considerable media 
attention. The MSC is funded by sponsors, including private foundations, banks, large 
MFIs and national development agencies. The executive committee consists of eight 
well-known personalities among whom are Muhammad Yunus, Juan Somavia (general 
director of the ILO), Manuel Zelaya (former president of Honduras) and 
businessman/investor George Soros (MSC 2010).   
 
In December 1998, a year after the start of the MSC, the UN decided to support 
microfinance by designating the year 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. 
This was a powerful endorsement and promotion for microfinance as a credible 
instrument for achieving the MDGs, increase public awareness and encouraging 
innovations and new partnerships (Year of Microcredit 2010). This official recognition of 
microfinance by the UN was a social seal of approval for the sector.  
 
The International Year of Microcredit generated a lot of media attention and publicity for 
the sector, but perhaps even more significant was the awarding of the 2006 Nobel 
Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank. The Nobel Prize Committee 
praised Yunus’s efforts to turn his vision of a world without poverty into practical action 
and set an example not only in Bangladesh but throughout the world (Nobel Peace 
Prize 2006). With the award Yunus became an icon for microfinance. Whenever the 
opportunity arises he exerts his influence to advocate for a purely socially-oriented 
industry. He also promotes more projects that adhere to a “social business” philosophy. 
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Under the Grameen banner other enterprises emerged in telecommunication, 
renewable energy and education (Grameen 2010). Yunus formed cooperatives with 
large companies, such as the French yogurt giant, Danone, to benefit the poor and his 
countless public appearances around the world make him a highly recognized and 
respected ambassador for microfinance.    
 
These three events, the Microcredit Summit Campaign, the International Year of 
Microcredit and the honouring of Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank with Nobel 
Peace Prizes, were the most powerful contributions to the promotion of microfinance. 
Their timely convergence produced a very positive portrayal of the industry and laid a 
solid foundation for future expansion.  
 
5.1.2. Criticism of microfinance 
 
Despite the aforementioned endorsements of the microfinance industry it is not without 
its critics. They cite examples of excessive expectations, various negative features of 
the concept, and suspect systemics of the industry, among others. Following is a 
random selection of these various criticisms: 
 
Bengali human rights activist Alam Khorshed is one of few who did not support the 
awarding of Nobels to Yunus and Grameen. He argued that the highly praised activities 
of Grameen Bank did not significantly reduce poverty in Bangladesh. Khorshed claimed 
that only a small percentage of microcredit borrowers were able to improve their 
situation, half succeeded only to sustain their former standard of living and the 
situations of up to 45 percent deteriorated. In his opinion, terms offered to clients are 
inflexible and mismatched to the living conditions of the poor and interest rates of 30 to 
40 percent cause over-indebtedness. He also expresses doubt that microcredits 
empower women since their husbands claim the money for themselves (Khorshed 
2007).  
 
Another Yunus critic is Patrick Bond (2010), a professor of development studies at 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal in South Africa. He warns of “the danger of 
Grameenisms”, neo-liberal values underlying Yunus’s business philosophy, namely 
non-state, self-help, fiscal responsibility and entrepreneurship. This would make Yunus 
popular among international donors like the World Bank but takes the responsibility 
away from those who profit from the current situation.  
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„Microcredit propagators are always the first to advocate that poor people need to be able to 
help themselves. The kind of microcredit they promote isn’t really about gaining control, but 
ensuring the key beneficiaries of global capitalism aren’t forced to take any responsibility for 
poverty” (Bond 2010).  
 
Bond further accuses Yunus of collaborating with companies that exploit the poor, 
treating Grameen clients poorly and of hindering critics. He cites the example of Jobra, 
the village where Yunus started his microcredit project. According to Bond, Jobra still 
suffers from poverty and is not accessible to researchers. To Bond, microcredit’s main 
shortcoming is that it is only suitable for low-skill businesses which yield inadequate 
profits (Bond 2010). The journalist Gerhard Klas joins in with the attacks against 
Yunus, accusing him for portraying the poor as a market for profit-oriented investors. 
He also suggests that NGOs would, due to the popularity of microfinance, change their 
social activities to market-based microcredit programs (Klas 2010).  
 
Reports like these have stirred up much controversy about microfinance as have 
newspaper articles that reach a much wider audience. The latter tend to appear when 
sensational events occur, for instance in autumn 2010 when German newspapers 
including “Die Tageszeitung” (TAZ 3.8.2010), “Frankfurter Allgemeine” (FAZ 
14.8.2010), “Frankfurter Rundschau” (17.11.2010) and “Die Zeit” (18.11.2010) reported 
the initial public offering of the Indian MFI SKS which they portrayed as an example of 
increasing commercialism of the microfinance sector. Those same articles reported a 
spate of suicides of microcredit clients, implying they were evidence of unethical 
practices of MFIs exploiting overheated markets. Negative media reports like these 
probably cast more doubt on the microfinance sector than well- researched critical 
studies.  
 
A discussion of the validity of these criticisms is beyond the scope of this thesis and not 
pertinent to my research topic. The key point is that microfinance has a very good 
image, but the extent of its positive impact is being challenged. As the sector expands, 
more critics appear, not only from within industry ranks, but also from outside media.  
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5.2. Measuring social effects 
 
Client stories that paint a rosy picture of how microcredits improved their lives are often 
biased in favour of MFIs and ignore some of the negative aspects. The reverse is true 
for critics of microcredit, for example their stories of desperate borrowers committing 
suicide because of a business failure or an accident that prevented them from repaying 
their loans (see e.g. Die Zeit 2010). In many cases these damaging stories are as 
biased as the positively-embellished client stories. So, how can the social benefits of 
microfinance be evaluated more objectively? One method is to conduct impact studies 
where a select group of clients is investigated in detail. Another approach is to use 
social performance evaluations to assess MFI’s efficacy in reaching predefined social 
indicators.  
  
5.2.1. Impact studies 
 
Impact studies investigate how microfinance changes the lives of a selected group of 
clients over a specific period of time. Researchers use different qualitative and 
quantitative methods to draw conclusions about certain indicators of social impact. 
Since the late 1980s several impact studies have been published. Nathaneal Goldberg 
(2005) provides a thorough overview of the most influential of about 100 publications 
between 1988 and 2005. The mixed results of these studies suggest that while 
microfinance does not necessarily improve incomes of poor households, it has the 
potential to do so. It can also have additional impacts, for example the empowerment of 
female clients, more frequent use of contraceptives, and improved nutrition for children. 
However, the final conclusion of an impact study is very much dependent on the 
method used. As Hulme (2000: 81) puts it: “The fact that no agent can both experience 
an intervention and at the same time not experience an intervention generates many 
methodological problems”. How can it be shown that changes in borrowers’ lives are 
due to  microcredits? What would have happened if they had not received a loan? 
 
Let us take the first comprehensive impact assessment which was published in 1988 
as an example. In this study, Muhabub Hossain compared Grameen Bank clients to 
non-clients and reported the average household incomes of the former group were 
significantly higher and that the whole village was positively affected. He also observed 
that Grameen clients were younger and better educated than non-clients (Goldberg 
2005: 16-17). This early study already revealed the problem of comparisons:  
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If we find that people who got microloans are doing better than those who didn’t, does this 
mean that the loans caused the improvement? Maybe not. There are several other 
plausible explanations - for instance, that the people who apply for and get the loans may 
have more drive and ambition, in which case they would probably tend to do better than 
others whether or not they get the loan“ (Rosenberg: 2010: 1). 
 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched a project in 
1995 to work on a solution to resolve this uncertainty. They developed five indicators 
and proposed to compare MFI clients who already ran through several loan cycles with 
clients who recently joined the program (Goldberg 2005: 7). The underlying assumption 
was that since both groups qualified for loans they were comparable in terms of 
preconditions for business. However, the limitations of this method are exposed with a 
single question: why did the second group join the program several years after the first 
group? Is it because of personal motives which made them somehow different from the 
others: perhaps they were afraid of the risk at the beginning? Did the MFI change its 
business strategy, for example began focusing on poorer clients so the initial situation 
for new clients was worse?  
 
Another problem with evaluating a group of clients over a period of time is the task of 
differentiating the influence of microfinance from other factors which either help or 
hinder people’s business activities. For instance, since 1997 Grameen Bank has been 
evaluating its branches using five criteria. One criterion is to determine whether clients 
remain in poverty. To measure this, Grameen asks 10 questions about the clients’ 
living conditions. By the end of 2004 about 55 percent of clients that had been in the 
program for more than five years had raised themselves above the poverty line. 
Although the method and conclusion may be questionable, the result indicated that 
these 55 percent could meet certain basic needs. However, nobody knows what their 
living conditions would have been had they not participated in the program. There are 
many plausible explanations for this improvement of people’s lives, for example that 
the Bangladeshi economy, which had been growing at about 5 percent per annum for 
the previous several years, improved living standards for the whole population. On the 
other hand, a study by Helen Todd found that out of 17 Grameen borrowers who were 
unable to improve their incomes within a decade, ten of them were set back by a 
serious illness in the family (Goldberg 2005: 9-12). “’The point is that a simple “pre-
post” (before and after) comparison can be useful, but does not yield enough 
information to definitively determine the impact of the program”’ (Goldberg 2005: 12). 
The method cannot give an accurate answer to the question “Does microfinance 
work?” 
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The current trend in impact evaluation dates back to the method Hossain used in 1988 
to compare microfinance clients with non-clients. Researchers agree that only by this 
method can a program’s influence can be isolated from other factors. Current studies 
rely on a selection of two groups of people of similar age, gender, education, etc. The 
groups are defined in advance with one group given access to microfinance services, 
the other group not. With time it becomes apparent whether or not the qualities of life of 
the first group, who had access to microfinance services, are significantly better than 
those of the microfinance-excluded group. 
 
While this method is currently the most reliable, the problem remains that the 
comparison groups are far from identical, since many characteristics can’t be 
measured. For example, if two similar villages are compared, one may be located 
closer to a main road which may give it a business advantage. This problem of 
“selection bias” often occurs in social science research and limits impact studies on 
microfinance. (Goldberg 2005: 12). Using “randomized controlled trials” may improve 
the method of control groups. The idea is to select a large number of people who are 
then randomly divided into two groups. The groups are presumed to be statistically 
identical, so the fact that loans are provided to one group is the only difference. Until 
2010 only two studies using randomized controlled trials had been published. Neither 
study found any improvement in terms of household incomes for the group served by 
an MFI compared to the excluded group within the first 12 to 18 months (Rosenberg 
2010: 2). Longer-term results were not available at the time of this writing but will be 
required to produce reliable statistics, as MFI clients typically run through several loan 
cycles over many years before they improve their living conditions.    
 
Impact studies are important tools for generating meaningful information about the 
effects of microfinance acitvities on human lives. Practitioners may focus too much on 
success indicators and either overlook unpleasant side-effects or completely ignore, 
even hide, negative outcomes. However, scientific studies must also be questioned as 
every method has its deficiencies and every investigation involves a uniquely different 
set of variables. Findings can never applied universally as every microfinance program 
has its own modalities and operates in a unique environment. In addition, the reported 
results may be influenced by the agendas of certain parties, such as study sponsors, to 
produce an outcome that serves the best interests of these parties but is not supported 
by the scientific data. 
 
Conducting microfinance impact assessments presents two main challenges: time and 
money. The more diversified the methods and the broader the sample set, the more 
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meaningful are the results. The downside is that the preparation, implementation and 
interpretation of a detailed research program, including the observation review, takes a 
lot of time. Rapid developments in the microfinance sector present the risk that study 
results could be old news or irrelevant before they are published. “The common 
response to initial findings presented more than 9 months after completion of fieldwork 
is »our program has already been redesigned so your findings have little relevance«” 
(Hulme 2000: 91). 
 
Perhaps an even greater challenge is the cost. Impact assessments may cost between 
$500,000 and $5 million, a hefty sum for institutions working in microfinance and hardly 
affordable without subsidies. In comparison, social performance assessment tools, as 
described below, only cost around $5,000 to $10,000 and may deliver more meaningful 
results for improving business practices (Hulme 2000: 89-93). 
 
5.2.2. Social performance measurement and management 
 
Social performance measurement is a more practice-oriented attempt to evaluate the 
social benefits of microfinance and provide guidelines to help practitioners improve. 
The findings are meant to be incorporated into business practices in a process called 
“Social Performance Management” (SPM). While impact studies investigate results at 
the client level, the social performance approach focuses on MFIs’ business practices:   
 
Simply put, SPM is about achieving your social goals and being socially responsible. SPM 
is related to how an organisation aligns its strategic planning and operational systems to an 
understanding of client vulnerability and poverty. Because MFIs work with vulnerable and 
poor communities, they also have an implicit objective to protect clients from over-
indebtedness and harm – as well as to treat their staff responsibly (Campion and Linder 
2008: 19). 
 
In the absence of applied world-wide social policies for microfinance, social 
performance initiatives aim to advance the development of social performance tools as 
well as set standards based on self-commitment. For this purpose an international 
platform called “Social Performance Task Force” (SPTF) was created in 2005. As of 
2010 the SPTF consisted of over 850 representatives from various microfinance 
stakeholder groups: practitioners, donors and investors, networks, technical assistance 
providers, rating agencies and researchers. Nine working groups work on specific 
topics. Regional conferences and an annual global assembly are popular events for 
industry participants (SPTF 2010). As a recognized forum for social performance 
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issues the SPTF established a reference list of SPM principles for defining and 
evaluating social performance activities:  
 
 
As organizations involved in the field of microfinance, members of the SPTF: 
1. Define social performance as the effective translation of an institution’s social goals into 
practice in line with accepted social values such as: 
 Serving increasing numbers of poor and excluded people sustainably (e.g. expanding and 
deepening outreach to poorer people) 
 Improving the quality and appropriateness of financial services available to target clients 
through systematic assessment of their specific needs 
 Creating benefits for clients of microfinance, their families, and communities relating to 
social capital and social links, assets, reduction in vulnerability, increase of income, 
improved access to services, and fulfilment of basic needs 
 Improving the social responsibility of our own organizations and the partners we support. 
This includes consumer protection and gender equity, as well as responsibility to staff, 
environment and the community. 
 2. Recognize that financial performance alone is insufficient to achieve our goal of serving and 
improving the lives of increasing numbers of poor and excluded people sustainably. Success in 
microfinance is driven by a double-bottom line, strong financial and social performance, and 
these equally important aspects are mutually reinforcing in the long run. 
3. Further recognize the contributions from donors, networks, practitioners, rating agencies, 
investors, and other stakeholders in the systematic application and improvement of tools for 
social performance management, assessment, monitoring, and reporting. 
4. Commit to improving the social performance of microfinance by: 
 Setting clear and specific social objectives for our own organizations and expectations for 
the organizations we support. 
 Designing, introducing and using systems to manage, assess, monitor, and report on 
social performance inside our own organizations and the organizations we support. 
 Using information on social performance to improve our own operations. 
 Verifying our social results with external assessments, audits and ratings where 
appropriate and available. 
 Being transparent about our social performance and promoting transparency of the 
partners we support through regular reporting to the MIX on its indicators of social 
performance standards (SPS). 
 Promoting and exchanging ideas, resources, good practices, and other information on 
social performance. 
 Endorsing the Social Performance Management Principles for MFIs 
(SPTF 2010) 
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To assess an MFI’s social performance, the SPTF identifies several indicators which 
are assigned to eleven categories: mission specifics, governance, range of products 
and services (financial and non-financial), client outreach by lending methodologies, 
client retention, social responsibility to clients, transparency of the costs of services to 
clients, human resources and staff incentives, employment creation and enterprises 
financed, social responsibility to the environment and poverty outreach (SPTF 2010). 
User-friendly questionnaires (excel-sheets) in five different languages can be accessed 
on the SPTF website free of charge. MFIs can complete the form as a self-assessment 
and deliver it to MIX. MIX personnel qualify the information and publish the results with 
the MFI’s financial profile on its public online database (see MIX 2010).  
 
Several MFIs, donors and funders have now incorporated the SPTF social 
performance guidelines as tools for self-evaluation and determining management 
policy. Some instruments are developed in-house and customized to fit the specific 
needs of the enterprise. Others may be provided by specialized organizations to allow 
comparative analyses of peer groups based on standardized categories. Following are 
examples of international social performance initiatives and popular tools for measuring 
an MFI’s social performance: 
 
Client protection 
In most cases the relationships between MFIs and their customers is unequal. 
Microfinance clients are in a weak position as they are dependent on the MFIs services 
and have limited knowledge of common business practices. An effective client 
protection policy is needed to level this playing field in order to prevent unfair practices, 
improve transparency and provide a recourse mechanism.  The report on “Financial 
Access 2010”  reveals that several countries have passed consumer protection 
legislation in the previous two decades, but these are often inadequate and lack 
efficient enforcement mechanisms (CGAP and The World Bank Group 2010: 23-25). 
To address this problem “The Smart Campaign” was started in 2009 with a goal to 
implement a common code of conduct. Several “Client Protection Principles” were 
defined to ensure minimum client-service standards for MFI clients. The core principles 
are: 
 Avoidance of Over-Indebtedness 
 Transparent and Responsible Prizing 
 Appropriate Collection Practices 
 Ethical Staff Behaviour 
 Mechanism to Redress of Grievances 
 Privacy of Client Data   (for a more detailed overview see SMART 2010) 
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By February 2011 more than 1.600 MFIs, microfinance support organizations, 
investors, donors, and individual industry professionals had endorsed the Smart 
Campaign and adopted the Client Protection Principles. The next initiative, currently 
underway, will be to launch a certification process for third party verification of MFI 
compliance these principles. The program is scheduled to be completed and 
implemented by the end of 2011 (Smart 2011). Guidelines similar to the Client 
Protection Principles but focusing on the investor level have been launched by the 
United Nations. They are called “Principles for Investors in Inclusive Finance” (PIIF) 
and consist of six self-commitments to promote certain environmental, social and 
corporate governance issues (see UNPRI 2010).  
 
Transparent pricing 
A survey of microcredit lenders in India revealed that 90 percent knew the size and 
duration of their loan, but only 15 to 20 percent were aware of the actual interest rate 
they are charged (CGAP 2009b: 33-34). Aside from the fact that many borrowers lack 
the education to deal with interest rates, the pricing calculations of MFIs can be 
confusing and the terms may not have been clearly or completely disclosed. Standards 
for calculating interest rates are virtually non-existent in most countries. Thus, some 
MFIs may use declining balance rates (basis of calculation is the amount which the 
borrower actually owes) while others charge flat interest rates (the interest rate is 
charged on the initial loan amount, not on the declining balance). In addition to interest 
rates, many MFIs charge fees for administration or insurances. These inconsistencies 
make it difficult to isolate the various costs for borrowers and create an ideal 
environment for fraud (Waterfield 2010). To address this problem “Microfinance 
Transparency” (MFT) was launched in July 2008. Its mission is to improve the 
microfinance industry by encouraging transparent pricing methods. MFT promotes the 
pricing calculation model “Annual Percentage Rate” (APR) which includes all costs an 
MFI charges its borrowers on an annual basis. MFT provides a calculation tool to 
convert loan costs into APR and trains MFI staff how to use this tool. MFT also collects 
data on MFI loan products and publishes MFI APRs and other pertinent information, 
country by country, on its website. This makes the terms of MFI services more 
transparent and easier to compare, giving stakeholders like regulators or investors a 
more reliable data base for their decision-making  (MFT 2010).  
 
Poverty Indicators 
From the foundation of Grameen Bank’s method for measuring a client’s progress out 
of poverty (see chapter 5.2.1.), in 2005 Grameen Foundation began developing a 
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“Progress out of Poverty Index” (PPI) in partnership with CGAP and the Ford 
Foundation.  The PPI is a tool for measuring the initial poverty level of MFI clients and 
tracking their situation over time. It consists of a questionnaire with ten country-specific 
indicators which can be completed by loan officers when they visit their customers. The 
questionnaire is easy to handle and helps to create a profile about the living conditions 
of clients, using indicators like access to clean water, the possession of livestock and 
education levels of their children. The data gives MFIs valuable information from which 
they can customize their services to fit the needs of their clients. Over time it can also 
be used as a tool to measure their clients’ progress out of poverty. By the end of 2010 
the PPI was available in 37 countries (PPI 2010). Another method with similar 
objectives and procedures is the “Poverty Assessment Tool” (PAT) developed by 
USAID. PAT is currently available in 33 countries and USAID requires its MFI partners 
to report on the indicators (PAT 2010).   
 
Social audits 
The French organization CERISE (Comité d’Echanges de Réflexion et d’Information 
sur les Systèmes d’Epargne-crédit) provides a very popular social audit tool for MFIs 
called “Social Performance Indicators” (SPI). SPI evaluates the social aspects of an 
MFIs’ activities through audits of four areas of operation: outreach, products and 
services, benefits to clients and social responsibility. Audit results are rated, counted 
and transferred onto a graph which shows strengths and weaknesses of the MFI. 
CERISE will either conduct the evaluations, or provide the SPI tool free of charge to the 
MFI to do a self-assessment. SPI adapts easily to local conditions and is standardized 
to allow users to compare results of different MFIs. There are over 250 MFIs currently 
using the SPI. Table 3 summarizes the results of 204 assessments in various 
categories and provides insight into MFI social performance priority settings in different 
areas. Recently CERISE also developed an SPI for investors which is being tested by 
Oikocredit (CERISE 2010).   
 
Social ratings 
Other tools for external assessments of MFI social performance are social ratings. 
Similar to financial ratings, specialized services like M-CRIL, Microfinanza Rating, 
MicroRate or PlaNet Rating collect data about MFIs, prepare reports and classify them. 
Socially-oriented investors can use these ratings to supplement their due diligence 
process before making an investment decision. M-CRIL also piloted a social rating for 
MIVs which has been tested by Incofin, Blue Orchard and Oikocredit (SPFT 2010). 
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Table 3: Social performance scores according to MFI peer groups 
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Total SPI score 58 54 66 47 59 54 57 62 53 58 54 56 60 61 54 54 59 59 56 53 60
Dim1-Targeting 63 53 77 48 67 70 61 73 54 61 66 65 57 67 62 57 65 59 53 56 72
C1-1 Geog targeting 55 48 66 52 57 66 54 72 39 53 57 57 49 62 52 47 57 48 48 44 63
C1-2 Indiv targeting 52 40 67 30 58 49 50 56 51 52 58 49 50 53 51 53 52 60 37 51 62
C1-3 Methodol targeting 57 51 67 44 58 68 56 63 52 55 57 65 50 60 59 50 59 44 53 52 62
Dim2-Services 62 55 68 51 65 55 63 62 60 63 56 59 69 65 56 63 61 70 59 60 63
C2-1 Range of services 62 58 67 51 65 40 63 61 62 64 55 56 67 70 56 62 62 77 68 57 58
C2-2 Quality of services 71 62 76 56 75 70 73 68 71 72 65 67 80 76 62 72 70 78 65 72 73
C2-3 Innovative non fin services 54 46 62 47 57 53 53 57 49 54 50 53 60 51 50 54 53 57 47 53 56
Dim3-Benefits 49 54 55 38 48 35 47 59 42 50 44 48 52 49 47 41 52 39 60 42 47
C3-1 Eco Benefits for clients 50 48 56 34 52 34 47 55 47 51 48 46 53 52 46 50 49 63 54 48 46
C3-2 Participation 48 64 50 33 42 31 44 65 37 49 43 48 50 46 49 34 53 16 71 37 42
C3-3 Empowerment 50 50 60 47 51 40 50 56 44 52 42 49 52 48 47 41 53 43 53 42 53
Dim4-Responsibility 56 52 62 50 58 57 57 55 56 58 51 52 63 62 51 57 56 67 53 55 59
C4-1 SR to staff 64 60 67 65 65 65 66 59 66 66 65 59 71 72 57 67 64 76 59 65 68
C4-2 Client protection 64 59 71 61 65 73 66 60 65 67 55 61 72 72 58 66 64 85 59 62 67
C4-3 SR to community environ 40 33 49 23 44 32 37 45 37 41 34 36 44 41 36 37 40 43 38 37 42
 
 
Source: Bédécarrats et al. 2010 
  
- 65 - 
5.2.3. Synergies and trade-offs 
 
The mission of most MFIs is to help poor people work their way out of poverty by 
offering them financial services adapted to their needs. However, any MFI which does 
not want to remain dependent on donor subsidies needs to earn profits or at least be 
able to cover its costs. Customer services are related to expenses which limit an MFI’s 
flexibility. Likewise, social performance activities are often viewed as nothing more than 
additional costs. For instance, targeting clients in remote areas with very small loans is 
more expensive than lending larger amounts in cities with much better infrastructures. 
Furthermore, client consultations require additional resources, although over time, 
social activities can improve financial performance as better educated clients are more 
likely to use a loan efficiently and fulfill their obligations to the MFI.   
 
Campion and Linder, who work for the Imp-Act Consortium which specializes in 
capacity building to support SPM, stress the advantages of SPM, to not only achieve 
an MFI’s social mission but also improve its financial performance. Their experiences 
show that improving social performance can lead to more appropriate products and 
services; better client retention rates; lower operational costs; enhanced reputation and 
brand value; better trained and motivated staff; stronger policies and human resource 
procedures; improved risk management; and more efficient operations. They also 
found that financially sound MFIs can use profits to improve their social performance by 
cross-subsidies, for example by initiating special programs which target very poor with 
smaller loans or clients living in remote areas (Campion and Linder 2008: 12).  
 
A more critical view of synergies between financial and social performance is published 
by Cull et al. (2009). In a study named “Microfinance tradeoffs” they searched a MIX 
data set of 346 MFIs for statistically significant correlations between financial and social 
performance indicators. Their key findings were: 
 
 While high microcredit interest rates can increase MFI profits, when rates 
surpass a certain level, repayment rates and, consequently, profits decrease.  
 Although serving the poorer clients is more costly, MFIs which target this more 
disadvantaged group can still be self-sustainable, but rarely earn enough profits 
to attract commercial investors. 
 Although most non-profit MFIs earn at least a small profit, banks outperform 
them financially. 
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 As non-profit organizations issue much smaller loans and serve a higher 
proportion of women than commercially oriented MFIs, they do not compete for 
the same clients.  
 On average, NGO operational costs are no less than 26 percent of loan value 
compared with banks at 12 percent, which requires NGOs to charge much 
higher interest rates. 
 Even though becoming a regulated institution entitles an MFI to use deposits as 
a source of funding, the expense of “regulating” induces many MFIs to increase 
their income by targeting customers who are relatively better off. 
 Competition from the formal banking sector drives MFIs to poorer customers.  
 
Cull et al. claim the fact that regulated MFIs serve better-off clients with higher loans 
and a smaller proportion of women does not necessarily mean they neglect the 
poorest: „Moving „upmarket“ to serve more profitable customers may ultimately allow 
an institution to reach a larger absolute number of poorer customers and/or women 
through cross-subsidization, scale economies or both” (Cull et al. 2009: 13). On the 
subject of commercialization they conclude that this can have positive as well as 
negative effects. On one hand, increasing competition forces MFIs to develop more 
cost-effective practices and techniques which leads to lower interest rates. On the 
other, MFIs are pressured to serve clients who are better off with higher loans to save 
expenses (Cull et al. 2009: 16). 
 
A second study by Adrian Gonzalez (2010) based on MIX data and indicators defined 
by the SPTF, confirmed the findings of Cull et al and others that there are trade-offs 
and synergies between social and financial performance. He especially emphasized 
the positive effects of staff training on productivity and portfolio quality. However, 
Gonzalez states that several correlations are not as evident as many think, and he 
questions the common belief that MFIs working in rural areas are less efficient than 
those working in cities. He argues that in markets like India or Cambodia rural 
borrowers may actually live closer to each other than their urban counterparts, so issue 
of higher costs for travelling is invalid. These observations alert one to the dangers of 
accepting that correlations found by other researchers are applicable in other contexts 
without first subjecting them to one’s own thorough vetting process. Gonzalez further 
concludes that available data are insufficient to allow deeper understanding of some 
aspects, either because the sample is too small or because the quality of information is 
limited. For example, the SPTF social performance indicators ask if an MFI offers non- 
financial services, but fails to define the nature of these services (Gonzalez 2010).  
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A different source of data for analyzing the relationship between social and financial 
performance of MFIs was used by Bédécarrats et al. (2010). They investigated 287 SPI 
audits collected by CERISE. Since these social audits evaluate MFIs in detail 
according to various categories, the problem of limited data quality mentioned by 
Gonzalez was avoided. Bédécarrats et al. established that MFIs which target very poor 
clients face higher operational costs. This represents a very significant trade-off. 
Consistent with Gonzalez’s findings the CERISE data also indicated that loan officers 
in rural areas are more productive. The authors see participatory lending methods and 
grass root commitments as a reason. These group targeting strategies allow one staff 
member to serve more clients than the individual targeting strategies more common in 
urban areas. In conclusion, Bédécarrats et al. state that better economies of scale go 
hand in hand with improved social performance: “MFIs with the largest loan portfolios 
score highest in range and quality of services and social responsibility” (Bédécarrats et 
al. 2010: 6) 
 
 
5.3. Limits of social performance  
 
When working with the current methods of social performance measurement described 
in this chapter, three things must be kept in mind: (1) unlike impact assessments, social 
performance indicators do not give information on the true impact of microfinance 
services on the living conditions of the poor; (2) the social performance approach 
leaves much room for different interpretations and conclusions, and; (3) most social 
performance tools are still in an early stage of development. 
 
(1) Although social performance assessments are being employed increasingly by 
MFIs, donors and investors to prove their actions help reduce poverty, the various 
indicators do not provide an answer to the fundamental question: does microfinance 
really help the poor? In fact, there may be no universal answer to this question. Impact 
studies provide some hints by investigating the effects of microfinance on the lives of 
people within a select study group. For example, Ranjula Bali Swain (2007) 
investigated the effects of microcredit on women’s empowerment within an Indian self-
help group. However, researchers are challenged in correlating effects with specific 
microfinance activities, and extensive impact assessment requires much time and 
money. In contrast, social performance measurement takes a different approach by 
evaluating MFI activities rather than client impacts. For instance, a high ratio of female 
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customers is regarded as socially beneficial per se. Although the indicators used for 
evaluating social performance were derived from several impact studies and practical 
experience, they are in fact quite abstract. Important criteria for the development of 
assessment tools are not only the validity of results suggesting a positive social impact 
on clients, but also practicality, cost of implementation and usefulness as an MFI 
management aid. Social performance measurement is closely related to operational 
strategies so data need to provide specific, statistically verifiable inputs to an MFI’s 
practice. 
 
(2) The discussion about synergies and trade-offs between social and financial 
performance provides examples of various interpretations of social performance 
indicators in the context of a MFI’s financial framework. As cost efficiency is 
fundamental to management decisions, investments for improving social performance 
must be justified. A good example of this is the discovery that staff training improves 
productivity and portfolio quality. On the other hand, highlighting certain social 
performance indicators can be used to justify strategies which are primarily profit-
driven. For instance, although commercially oriented MFIs tend to serve a lower ratio of 
women and issue higher loans on average, they can point to the larger number of 
people they reach to enhance their scores on social performance assessments. The 
private microfinance investment company, Incofin, evaluated its MFI partners in 2007. 
They used their own social performance criteria similar to those defined by CERISE, 
but the indicators were not as diverse and were rated differently. Out of five categories 
the scoring system identified “scale and outreach” as most important and assigned to it 
30 percent of the MFI’s total score. Overall the social performance score of Incofin’s 
partners was very good, with 74.2 percent on average (Dewez 2008). The average 
score of 204 MFIs investigated by CERISE was 58 percent. Thus, while in many cases 
it can be useful to adapt social performance tools to an institution’s specific 
circumstances, it can also hinder comparability of institutions and may lead to distorted 
results which are biased in favour an institution’s public image. 
 
(3) For using social performance data in practical decision making processes it is 
important to have access to comparative values. Currently, many measurement tools 
are in early stages of development, data bases are limited (especially regarding 
historical reference values) and MFIs are unsure about how to make reasonable use of 
the data. A lot of capacity building on this is needed in the coming years.  
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6. Private foreign investors and social performance  
 
“I think that time has gone 
 when investing in microfinance was  
automatically associated with being social.” 
(Ledesma 2010) 
 
The leading specialized microfinance investors pave the way for succeeding 
companies and demonstrate a specific business model. In many respects they pioneer 
new territory as the whole industry is in a stage of fundamental and rapid 
developments. One consequence of this evolution is that SPM has emerged as an 
increasingly powerful influence that motivates companies to adopt solid business 
practices and improve their public images. In this chapter I discuss the involvement of 
private foreign investors in shaping a social performance discourse, referencing as 
examples, five organizations that define themselves as social investors: BlueOrchard, 
responsAbility, Oikocredit, Triodos and Triple Jump.  
 
I begin with an introduction to the five organizations, highlighting their core investment 
activities and their social performance engagement. This is followed by a comparative 
analysis of their respective investment activities, public image (websites and reports) 
and representatives’ opinions. This exercise reveals key factors that differentiate 
various approaches to social performance evaluation. I conclude this chapter with 
suggestions about how these strategies influence the discourse of social performance.  
 
 
6.1. Five private foreign investors at a glance 
 
The five selected enterprises rank among the most influential private foreign investors. 
Not only are they among the largest in terms of assets under management, they are 
also experienced and actively involved at the international level. The sample set 
includes institutions with different operating structures: BlueOrchard, responsAbility and 
Triple Jump are specialized asset management companies each of them offering 
several MIVs adapted to specific target groups. Triodos is an ethical bank which 
promotes microfinance funds along with sustainable investments such as renewable 
energy and organic agriculture. Oikocredit is not a fully licensed bank but a cooperative 
society with limited operations dependent upon the commitment and support of several 
thousand retail investors.  
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All members of our sample group belong to SPTF, participated at the SPTF Annual 
Meeting 2010, and publish reports of their social performance. While other enterprises 
meet the criteria for the sample group, within the context of this thesis there was a 
need to limit the sample size to those organizations I believe best represent the cross-
section of various types of private foreign investors currently active in microfinance. 
 
6.1.1. BlueOrchard 
 
BlueOrchard is one of the world’s leading MIV managers in terms of total assets under 
management. By the end of 2009 the Swiss company administered $895 million of 
which 86 percent or $714 million was invested in microfinance (+6 percent compared to 
2008). Its MFI partners are located in 39 countries. BlueOrchard consists of two 
enterprises: BlueOrchard Finance S.A. has offered debt products to MFIs since 2001, 
while BlueOrchard Investments Sàrl, founded in 2007, specializes in equity 
investments. BlueOrchard is headquartered in Geneva with offices in New York, Lima 
and Bishkek. In addition to financing, the company also offers advisory services to 
MFIs (BlueOrchard 2010a).  
 
BlueOrchard’s investment activities 
BlueOrchard’s flagship MIV is the Dexia Micro-Credit Fund (DMCF), launched in 1998 
as one of the world’s first commercial investment funds for refinancing MFIs with loans. 
With a net asset value of $524 million as of 6 January 2010 it represented more than 
half of BlueOrchard’s portfolio. Minimum investment in the fund is $10,000 and 
investors can expect an annual return of between 2 percent and 10 percent. 
BlueOrchard also manages or co-manages three more debt products with net asset 
values between $7 and $31 million (BlueOrchard 2010b). One of these, the 
Microfinance Enhancement Facility, was created by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) in 2009 to prevent a credit 
crunch during the global financial crisis. A fourth debt product, the Microfinance Growth 
Facility, was recently developed following a commitment by U.S. president Obama to 
support microfinance programs, and is backed by several public and private 
international investors. It will provide up to $250 million to MFIs in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, starting in mid-2010 (BlueOrchard 2010). In addition to its debt products 
BlueOrchard also manages three structured funds and one private equity fund. The 
structured funds are modeled on Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), which means 
that debt is structured in tranches (pools) with different risk/return profiles. The 
BlueOrchard Private Equity Fund was launched in December 2007 and held nine 
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investments worth $148.3 million as of December 2009. It is limited to a 10 year 
holding period and targets fast growing regulated microfinance banks (BlueOrchard 
2010b). 
 
BlueOrchard’s mission is...  
 
“[...] to empower the poor world-wide and improve their quality of life by promoting income-
generating activities through private investments in microfinance. We are convinced that 
microfinance investments can simultaneously produce social progress and financial returns. 
We generate profitable returns on investments while supporting the development of millions 
of promising small enterprises” (BlueOrchard 2010a).  
 
The company focuses on the world’s leading MFIs, which need to be at least 3 years in 
existence, have minimum total assets of $10 million, be externally audited and rated 
and have sound corporate governance. Loans provided by BlueOrchard have a 
maturity of 6 months to 7 years, fixed or floating interest rates and a minimum volume 
of $50.000 or a maximum of 20 percent of MFI total assets. The average loan size is 
$2.1 million and transactions are processed in U.S. dollars, Euros or local currencies 
where hedging mechanisms are available. The exact share of local currency loans is 
not published (BlueOrchard 2010). Most debt investments go to Latin America and the 
Caribbean (46 percent), followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia (each 18 
percent), while Africa (4 percent) and South Asia (3 percent) are under-represented 
(BlueOrchard 2010a). The equity investments are meant to provide MFIs with urgently 
needed risk capital through direct participation in their capital or through the creation of 
holding companies. They also contribute to the development of fast growing 
microfinance banks by sharing financial and operational expertise with investors, 
microfinance networks and technical assistance providers (BlueOrchard 2010).  
 
BlueOrchard recommends microfinance to its investors because of its low correlation 
with other asset classes and its focus on leading MFIs with a strong track record of 
stable returns. BlueOrchard conducts rigorous due-diligence and ongoing monitoring to 
ensure its partners fulfill their financial and social commitments. Its relationships with 
MFIs are structured as long-term, co-operative ventures with a common objective to 
bring sustainable economic development of the microfinance sector to emerging and 
recovering economies (BlueOrchard 2010).  
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BlueOrchard’s social performance results 
BlueOrchard collects data on social performance using several indicators defined by 
the SPTF. These data are published on their homepage, newsletters and annual 
reports along with financial information. Since 2009, BlueOrchard has published a 
special social performance report. Their Social Performance Report 2010 presented 
the following statistics: 
 
 the average loan size issued by MFI partners is $1,718 
 58 percent of the end clients are women, 39 percent men and 3 percent legal 
entities 
 45 percent of the clients are located in rural areas, 11 percent in semi-urban 
and 44 percent in urban areas 
 76 percent of MFI loans are allocated to micro-entrepreneurs 
 most clients are active in trade (42 percent), agriculture (21 percent), services 
(17 percent) and manufacture (7 percent) 
 77 percent of loans are issued to individuals, 23 percent to groups 
 from inception BlueOrchard has loaned over $1 billion to MFIs and thus 
provided about 700.000 low-income borrowers access to microcredits  
 
In the report’s editorial, Sarah Leshner, a Senior Investment Analyst responsible for 
social performance issues at BlueOrchard states that, up to now, the company has 
focused mainly on these outreach indicators for assessing its social performance. 
However, in 2009 a new social performance due diligence tool was developed and pilot 
tested with 10 MFIs. This tool collects information about the MFI’s target group, 
including prevention of over-indebtedness, interest rates, client poverty levels, the 
treatment of MFI employees and others. In future it will be incorporated into the credit 
committee’s decision making process. The Social Performance Report 2010 also 
contains detailed information about PlaNet Rating, the MIX Social Performance 
Reporting Initiative and the Cerise SPI audit tool. BlueOrchard supports these 
organizations by encouraging its partner MFIs to participate in surveys and 
assessments. In addition the company is involved with the following social performance 
initiatives: 
 
 SPTF: BlueOrchard is an active member 
 PRI: BlueOrchard is a signatory 
 The Smart Campaign: BlueOrchard is a signatory 
 The Rating Initiative: BlueOrchard is a member of the Steering Committee 
 M-CRIL: external evaluation of the Dexia Micro-Credit Fund 
(BlueOrchard 2010b) 
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6.1.2. responsAbility  
 
Next to BlueOrchard, responsAbility is another Swiss MIV manager with total assets 
close to $ 1 billion. Its microfinance portfolio grew rapidly in 2009, from $549 million to 
$840 million (+53 percent). Another $38.9 million was invested in small and medium-
sized enterprises, fair trade cooperatives and enterprises dedicated to independent 
media in low-income countries. About 230 MFIs in 52 countries receive funding from 
responsAbility either directly or through investments in microfinance portfolios 
(responsAbility 2010a). Headquarters are based in Zurich with branch offices in Paris, 
Lima and Nairobi (responsAbility 2009). 
 
responsAbility’s investment activities 
responsAbility’s biggest MIV is the responsAbility Global Microfinance Fund (rAGMF) 
which was incepted in 2003 and dispensed over $490 million to clients by the end of 
December 2009, of which $345 million was invested in microfinance or fair trade. The 
rAGMF is open for institutional as well as private investors with a low minimum 
subscription of $1,000 (responsAbility 2009). Three more MIVs investing in MFIs are 
available to institutional investors only. Most investment products are managed in close 
cooperation with Credit Suisse, which is one of the founding members of responsAbility 
(responsAbility 2010). 
 
responsAbility reports there are four billion people worldwide living at the “base of the 
global income pyramid”, because they lack development opportunities such as access 
to financial markets and services. Therefore the company aims to: 
 
“[...] use investments to empower people at the base of the global income pyramid. We help 
them realize their economic potential by giving them access to markets, information and 
other services important for their development from which they were previously excluded” 
(responsibility 2010). 
 
Clients of responsAbility must meet five parameters established by the MIV for 
financially and socially responsible investments. MFI applicants involved in businesses 
which responsAbility considers incompatible with its mandate will be added to an 
exclusion list. Its services include loans and debt securities, as well as equity 
investments in some cases. Clients are required to follow a social mission, be fully 
transparent and report financial statements on a monthly basis. They must have a track 
record of at least three years, total assets must exceed $1 million with minimum 
transactions of $150,000 (responsAbility 2010). Three quarters of them are processed 
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in U.S. dollars and the remainder in Euros (12 percent) and about 50 different local 
currencies (14 percent). Similar to BlueOrchard, responsAbility’s preferred regions for 
investment are Eastern Europe and Central Asia which, combined, receive 47 percent 
of the investment volume, and Latin America and the Caribbean with 39 percent. Only 
12 percent goes to South Asia and 2 percent to Africa (responsAbility 2010a). 
 
responsAbility’s social performance results 
responsAbility published its first social performance report in 2006. At the time its 
activities were concentrated on establishing the rAGMF, which had already been 
investing in 80 MFIs. The report explains the issue and necessity of social performance 
measurement and already shows some results on indicators such as number of clients 
reached, the ratio of women and the proportion of clients living in rural areas 
(responsAbility 2006). These data had been included in the monthly fund performance 
reports since January 2004. The most recent social performance report reveals the 
following data provided by 156 MFIs of responsAbility’s microfinance portfolio at the 
end of 2009: 
 
 the partnering MFIs reached 11.4 million borrowers and 6.3 million savers  
 the average loan size issued by MFI partners was $2,083 and average savings 
$1,360 
 54 percent of the clients were women, 41 percent men and 5 percent legal 
entities 
 48 percent of the clients lived in rural areas, 52 percent in urban areas 
 64 percent of the MFIs’ loans were dedicated to micro-entrepreneurs 
 most clients were active in trade (42 percent), agriculture (22 percent), services 
(17 percent) and manufacturing (6 percent) 
 75 percent of the loans were granted to individuals, 25 percent to groups 
 the MFIs employed 85.976 people (by the end of 2008) 
 
In addition to reporting on these social performance indicators, responsAbility 
developed its own assessment tool called “responsAbility Development Effectiveness 
Rating” (rADER). With rADER, responsAbility wants to add social performance criteria 
systematically to the due diligence process by grading MFIs on 19 indicators, divided 
into five categories: mission and objectives, products and services, operational 
systems and processes, access to financial services and contributions to local 
economic development. The first results of rADER analysis are to be published in the 
social performance report 2010. Furthermore, responsAbility is involved with the 
following social performance initiatives: 
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 SPTF: responsAbility is an active member 
 PRI: responsAbility is a signatory 
 Smart Campaign: responsAbility is a signatory 
 The Rating Initiative: responsAbility is on the advisory board 
 (responsAbility 2010a) 
 
6.1.3. Oikocredit  
 
Oikocredit, a Dutch based cooperative society with ecumenical roots, was probably the 
first international private enterprise to invest in microfinance. It is owned by its 
members: church related institutions, project members and support associations 
established by individuals. Founded in 1975, the non-profit organization initially 
financed various development projects but  soon after shifted its focus to MFIs. By 
June 2010, Oikocredit managed outstanding capital of €430 million of which 80 percent 
was invested in 579 MFIs. The remaining 20 percent went to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, cooperatives and fair trade. Oikocredit relies on a worldwide network of 31 
support associations, the headquarters in Amersfoort, Netherlands, and 35 regional 
and country offices which look after 842 project partners. In total the organization 
operates in 71 countries (Oikocredit 2010).  
 
Oikocredit’s investment activities 
Most of Oikocredit’s capital comes from over 36.000 individual retail investors in 
various countries. Subject to country-specific terms they can participate in the 
cooperative society through support associations with a minimum investment of around 
€200. Shareholders receive a relatively steady annual dividend, typically the 2% 
maximum imposed by Oikocredit’s statutes, which is determined every year at the 
general assembly. Relative to institutional fund investors, its return on investment, 
while limited, is largely unaffected by market volatility as Oikocredit subsidizes losses 
to some extent. Since its inception 35 years ago, no investor has lost money. In 
addition to the cooperative society comprised of individual shareholders, Oikocredit 
offers institutional investors a selection of specialized investment products, but these 
play a secondary role (Oikocredit 2010). 
 
Oikocredit’s mission statement declares that in addition to providing microfinance 
services, the organization strives to promote justice throughout the world by raising 
awareness and support of socially responsible investing:   
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“Oikocredit, as a worldwide cooperative society, promotes global justice by challenging 
people, churches and others to share their resources through socially responsible 
investments and by empowering disadvantaged people with credit” (Oikocredit 2010). 
 
Oikocredit uses six criteria for selecting project partners which include, suitable 
management, financial sustainability, social indicators and a preference for 
participatory structures. Their broad network of 35 offices in recipient countries are run 
by local staff which fosters close relationships with MFIs. Loans range from €50.000 to 
€4 million for terms of up to 8 years (Oikocredit 2010). Most MFIs funded by Oikocredit 
are categorized as tier 2 or 3 organizations, which indicates they are less established. 
Nearly half of all project partners are either cooperatives or NGOs, 30 percent are 
NBFIs and only 20 percent are companies or banks (Oikocredit 2010b). In 2009, the 
average loan amount was €659.000 and nearly half of them (46 percent) were issued 
in local currencies. About €26 million, or seven percent, of the funding capital was 
invested in MFI’s equity, whereas Oikocredit’s share participation was no more than 
one third of an MFI’s net assets. By region, Latin America was the preferred continent 
with 42 percent of outstanding invested capital invested, but Asia was catching up, 
largely due to the high growth rates in India. Overall, 28 percent of Oikocredit’s 
outstanding capital is invested in Asia, 15 percent in Africa, 14 percent in Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe and one percent in other regions. The regional focus for the next 
few years will be Africa, where Oikocredit intends to expand investments and open 
additional offices in Mozambique and Nigeria (Oikocredit 2010a). 
 
Oikocredit’s social performance results 
In 2009, Oikocredit established a department for social performance and financial 
analysis at its headquarters in Amersfoort which “[...] strengthened our capacity to 
ensure both social and financial returns” (Oikocredit 2010a). In 2010, its first social 
performance report was published and a separate website was launched to keep 
information up to date. According to SPTF social performance indicators, Oikocredit’s 
Social Performance Report 2009 (2010b) includes the following information: 
 
 367 partnering MFIs reach more than 17 million borrowers in over 70 countries  
 20 percent of the portfolio is invested in 18 low-income countries (World Bank 
definition) 
 the average loans size issued by MFIs is €930  
 85 percent of the clients are women 
 53 percent of the microfinance investments reach clients living in rural areas 
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In addition to tracking this information, Oikocredit developed an Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) scorecard to use for screening potential partners which 
focuses on criteria for client protection. Oikocredit also requires MFIs to disclose 
interest rate schedules for their financial products which are then compared with 
regional standards. Since 2008, partnering MFIs are systematically audited by Cerise 
and some have been encouraged to implement the PPI. To support MFIs working on 
social performance issues, Oikocredit uses its own capacity building fund for grants 
and co-operates with other institutions to provide training (Oikocredit 2010). In order to 
promote social performance at an international level, the cooperative society is 
involved with:   
 
 SPTF: Oikocredit is a member of the steering committee 
 PRI: Oikocredit is a signatory 
 Smart Campaign: Oikocredit is a member of the steering committee 
 PPI: Oikocredit worked closely together with the Grameen Foundation to 
implement the “Progress out of Poverty Index” 
 MFT: Oikocredit was one initiator of Microfinance Transparency and actively 
promotes transparent pricing 
 SPI: Oikocredit works closely together with Cerise and is the first investor to 
undergo a social audit itself 
 Social Microfinance Foundation: Oikocredit is a board member (the foundation 
provides technical assistance to MFIs) 
 Imp-Act: Oikocredit is a member of the consortium 
 CGAP: Oikocredit has been honoured with the MIV ESG Award 2009 to be one 
of three best in class for integrating environmental, social and governance 
factors into investment decisions 
(Oikocredit 2010) 
 
6.1.4. Triodos  
 
Triodos Bank is one of the world’s leading sustainable banks. It is based in the 
Netherlands but also has branches in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain and 
Germany. In addition to its wide range of bank services, the bank’s subsidiary, Triodos 
Investment Management, operates several microfinance funds. Since opening for 
business in 1994 it has been a pioneering private foreign microfinance investor, and 
supported 81 MFIs in 40 countries with total assets under management of €236 million 
by the end of 2009 (Triodos 2010). 
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Triodos’ investment activities 
Triodos Investment Management manages four MIVs with “[...] similar objectives but 
different risk profiles and funding structures, which means we can support microfinance 
institutions at different stages of development” (Triodos 2010). Each of the four funds 
files a separate annual report disclosing its performance in great detail. Key figures as 
of calendar year-end 2009 are summarized in the following table:  
 
Table 4: Triodos MIVs – key figures  
1
 MFIs with more than 100.000 borrowers 
2
 Risk classes 3 and 4 out of 4, categorized by Triodos Investment Management 
 
Source: own description based on Triodos 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d 
 
Triodos-Doen and Triodos-Hivos Fund were already established in 1994. The close 
association with Doen Foundation, the “Human Institute for Development Cooperation” 
(Hivos), allows them to assume greater risk and to invest in smaller, less mature MFIs 
in underdeveloped markets. Both funds endeavour to add value to MFIs through active 
participation in their governance and transfer of knowledge. About half of their loans 
are issued in local currencies. Triodos-Doen has about 45 percent of its microfinance 
portfolio invested in equity which supplies important seed capital to small MFIs. While 
their direct participation is used by Triodos Asset Management to influence 
management decisions, equity investments are kept below 10 percent of the MFI’s 
portfolio so that the ownership clearly remains with the institutions (Triodos 2010a). On 
the other hand, Triodos-Hivos Fund sometimes works in co-operation with the Hivos 
Funds Triodos-Doen 
Triodos-
Hivos Fund 
Triodos 
Fair Share 
Fund 
Triodos 
Microfinance 
Fund 
Launched in 1994 1994 2002 2009 
Microfinance 
Portfolio  €62.2 million €42.6 million €60.4 million €22 million 
Profit 2009 €9.5 million €0.39 million €7.9 million €0.38 million 
No. of MFIs 53 62 29 12 
No. of big MFIs1  10 9 8 5 
Local currency 42 percent 52 percent 28 percent 9 percent 
Equity investments 45 percent - 24 percent 5 percent 
Regional allocation: 
Eastern Eur./Central Asia 
Latin America 
Southern Asia 
Africa 
 
33 percent 
22 percent 
31 percent 
12 percent 
 
8 percent 
34 percent 
29 percent 
27 percent 
 
22 percent 
43 percent 
27 percent 
8 percent 
 
20 percent 
56 percent 
16 percent 
8 percent 
Risky investments² 40 percent 75 percent 25 percent No data 
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Seed Capital program which awards grants to start-up MFIs. When these start-ups 
become commercially sustainable they may receive funding from Triodos-Hivos Fund. 
This more aggressive approach is reflected by the small number of large MFIs in its 
portfolio, its strong presence in Africa and its 75 percent weighting in relatively high-risk 
investments. Only 16 percent of the supported MFIs are registered banks and the rest 
are NGOs, cooperatives or NBFIs (Triodos 2010b).   
 
In addition to these two funds with a clear social mission, Triodos Fair Share Fund was 
launched in 2002. This fund targets private individual investors. In the past five years 
the average return on investment has been seven percent. For investment partners the 
fund focuses on regulated MFIs and institutions that, while still in the development 
stage, have nevertheless achieved a certain level of maturity and professionalism 
(Triodos 2010c). In 2009 a fourth fund, the Triodos Microfinance Fund, was created to 
attract institutional investors and private banking clients. Up to the end of 2009 it had 
accumulated total assets of €39 million of which €22 million was invested in 
microfinance (Triodos 2010d). Triodos Microfinance Fund offers an annual return on 
investment of six to nine percent after expenses, low correlation with other asset 
classes, a diversified portfolio and effective hedges against currency fluctuations. The 
fund’s objective is to have 80 percent of assets invested in MFIs with proven track 
records and 20 percent in start-up institutions. About one third of assets will be in 
equity investments, the balance in debt (Triodos 2010). The fund’s mission statement 
follows: 
 
“Triodos Microfinance Fund has the prospect of an attractive financial return combined with 
the opportunity for the investors to make a proactive, measurable and sustainable 
contribution to the development of the microfinance sector into an inclusive financial sector 
in which the majority of people have access to financial services” (Triodos 2010d). 
 
While this description suggests a more commercial approach than the Triodos-Doen 
and Triodos-Hivos Funds, the coming years will determine whether or not that is, in 
fact, the case.  
 
Triodos’ homepage lists its criteria for selecting MFI partners along with details of its 
funds. These criteria include financial preconditions such as an outstanding gross loan 
portfolio of at least €1 million, transparent reporting and a commitment to Client 
Protection Principles. Loans are offered in US dollars, Euros or local currencies, 
ranging from €500.000 to €5 million for terms of up to 5 years. As a condition of 
investing in an MFIs’ equity, Triodos requires that one of its representatives be 
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appointed to the MFI’s board to have a say in the institution’s governance. In 2009 
investment activities were extended to Sri Lanka, Colombia and Malawi.  
 
Triodos’ social performance results 
The fund’s annual reports also include the issue of social performance. The necessity 
for reporting on social performance indicators in the face of commercialization of the 
global microfinance sector is discussed and corresponding MFI data are presented. 
The following table summarizes these data for the four funds:  
 
Table 5: Triodos social performance data 
 
 
Source: own description based on Triodos 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d 
 
In addition, the SPTF, Smart Campaign and MFT are discussed. The Principles for 
Responsible Investment were the subject of a press release on 27 January 2011 
(Triodos 2011). Triodos is involved with the following initiatives: 
 
 SPTF: Triodos is an active member 
 PRI: Triodos is a signatory 
 Smart Campaign: Triodos Triodos is a signatory 
 MFT: Triodos actively supports Microfinance Transparency  
 CGAP: Triodos has been honoured with the MIV ESG Award 2009 to be one of 
three best in class for integrating environmental, social and governance factors 
into investment decisions 
(Triodos 2010) 
 
Funds Triodos-Doen 
Triodos-
Hivos Fund 
Triodos 
Fair Share 
Fund 
Triodos 
Microfinance 
Fund 
No. of MFIs 
reporting 47 40 29 11 
No. of borrowers  3.247 million 4.653 million 2.576 million 1.448 million 
Average loan size €854 €453 €1137 €1277 
No. Of savers 4.314 million 2.570 million 3.396 million 1.763 million 
Female Clients 67 percent 70 percent 58 percent 52 percent 
Clients in rural 
areas 
57 percent 66 percent 38 percent 20 percent 
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6.1.5. Triple Jump  
 
The Dutch microfinance investment manager Triple Jump B.V. was founded in 2006 as 
a limited company. Before becoming independent it was part of the development 
organization Oxfam Novib, which started to invest in microfinance in the 1990s and is 
still one of four shareholders. The other shareholders are ASN Bank, the largest 
sustainable bank in the Netherlands, the NOTS foundation and the management of 
Triple Jump. Triple jump is headquartered in Amsterdam with regional offices in Lima 
and Skopje. It currently manages or advises five microfinance funds with total invested 
capital of €146 million and has business relations with 132 MFIs. In addition the affiliate 
foundation, Triple Jump Advisory Services, has served 25 MFIs with capacity building 
in 2009. It is sponsored by Oxfam Novib, DOEN Foundation, Triple Jump B.V., ASN 
Bank Foundation and the Dutch bank-insurer SNS Reaal (Triple Jump 2010). 
 
Triple Jump’s investment activities 
The leading MIV managed by Triple Jump in terms of capital invested is ASN-Novib 
Fund (ANF). Established in 1999 by ASN Bank and Oxfam Novib, it had invested €79 
million in 54 MFIs by the end of 2009. The ANF primarily invests in developing and 
mature regulated MFIs and, in some cases, NGOs. Loans are mostly denominated in 
US dollars or Euros with only seven and a half percent in local currencies. In addition, 
the portfolio consists of four equity investments. The fund is open to private individuals 
and achieved a net return on investment of just over four percent in 2009, and since 
inception the fund has not had to deal with any write-offs. The SNS Institutional 
Microfinance Fund where Triple Jump acts as a sub-advisor follows a similar pattern. 
Capital of €27.4 million, provided by institutional investors such as pension funds, is 
delivered as loans to the same target group which is served by ANF (Triple Jump 
2010a).  
 
In contrast, the Oxfam Novib Fund finances mainly Tier 3 MFIs and follows a clear 
social policy. Preferred MFI partners are young but growing institutions which service 
low-income and marginalized groups, especially women and people living in rural 
areas, as well as minorities and refugees. By year-end 2009, the fund had granted 
loans and guarantees with a total volume of €31 million to 83 MFIs of which 60 percent 
was in local currencies. While ASN-Novib Fund and SNS Institutional Microfinance 
Fund had average exposures of €1.5 and €2 million, Oxfam Novib Fund ‘s average 
loan size was only €370,000. The NOTS Fund, launched in late 2009, follows the same 
pattern. In addition, Triple Jump is a sub-advisor to the Calvert Foundation and as such 
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identifies, negotiates and monitors loans to MFIs which are promoted through the 
online platform microplace (Triple Jump 2010a). 
 
The different funds, supplemented with advisory services, allow Triple Jump to partner 
with MFIs at different stages of development. Their goal is to support NGOs in the early 
stages of achieving financial sustainability in their development towards becoming a 
mature institution. The company’s mission outlines the objective of this approach: 
 
“Triple Jump's mission is to contribute to the sustainable development of emerging market 
economies by facilitating investment in micro and small enterprises. Triple Jump seeks to 
support the expansion of viable microfinance institutions in all three stages of their 
development (emerging, expanding and mature) by providing capital and advisory services” 
(Triple Jump 2010). 
 
Triple Jump operates “[...] at the interface of commercial and development work” as an 
entrepreneur in order to achieve results and solutions without losing sight of its social 
objectives and integrity (Triple Jump 2010a). To qualify as a partner of Triple Jump, an 
MFI must satisfy certain social, financial and governance criteria, such as a social 
commitment, operational sustainability or trend towards sustainability, external audits 
and regular financial reports. The preferred regions of operation for Triple Jump are 
Central and South America which together account for 43 percent of all loans, followed 
by 35 percent for Eastern Europe and Central Asia combined, and nine percent each 
for Southern Asia and Africa (Triple Jump 2010). If Triple Jump takes an equity position 
in an MFI through the ASN-Novib Fund or the NOTS Fund, either an experienced staff 
member or a consulted expert must be assigned a position on the MFI’s board to add 
value and oversight. Long-term investments provide their partners with sufficient time 
to implement their strategies without being limited by strict exit deadlines (Triple Jump 
2010a). 
 
Triple Jump’s social performance results 
Triple Jump has published a comprehensive report on “Social Performance 
Assessment 2010” (Triple Jump 2010b). The report begins with an explanation of the 
necessity and potential of SPM with reference to definitions provided by the SPTF. All 
Triple Jump staff receive training on social performance by a social rating agency and 
in cooperation with Oxfam Novib a “Social Performance Assessment Questionnaire 
and Scoring Tool” (TJ SPA) has been developed. This tool is used systematically to 
collect data on the social performance of partners. It is based on a questionnaire which 
can be completed during the due diligence process and consists of a matrix with three 
stages - intent, implementation and results - and six categories: client protection, client 
  
- 83 - 
satisfaction, social performance information, outreach, gender and human resources. 
An MFI must score above 40 percent to be eligible for financing.  
 
From January 2009 to June 2010 Triple Jump collected TJ SPA data from 81 partners 
of which only 10 percent scored less than 50 percent. On average, MFIs in Asia had 
the highest scores and those in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
the lowest, which is consistent with results from similar investigations conducted by 
Cerise. The data also showed that top tier MFIs serve comparatively fewer women and 
fewer clients in rural areas. In addition, their average loan size is more than $1,600 
compared to about $900, $500 and $300 for tiers two, three and four, respectively. 
Subsequently, Triple Jump used this information to relate social performance to 
financial performance and look for potential trade-offs and synergies. While their study 
showed a positive association the result was not statistically significant, and their 
general conclusion was that financial performance does not come at the expense of 
social performance. Investigations of specific topics showed that a high ratio of women 
corresponded to higher productivity, well-trained staff reduced write-offs and that 
outreach was negatively correlated with operating expenses. This last statistic means 
that MFIs which were more active in rural areas and served poorer clients with very 
small loans had a lower operating expense ratio (Triple Jump 2010b). While this result 
may be surprising, it is consistent with the findings of a recent MIX study (see Gonzalez 
2010).   
 
Triple Jump is convinced the use of TJ SPA motivates its partner MFIs to pay attention 
to social performance and that it produces valuable information for improving both 
social and financial performance. The report on Social Performance Assessment 2010 
also provides the following information on social performance indicators: 
 
 152 MFIs supported by Triple Jump reach about 7.8 million people 
 71 percent of the clients are women 
 52 percent live in rural areas 
 
Worldwide, Triple Jump is involved with the following social performance initiatives:  
 
 SPTF: Triple Jump is an active member 
 PRI: Triple Jump is a signatory 
 Smart Campaign: Triple Jump and all of its shareholders have endorsed the 
Client Protection Principles and integrated them into the TJ SPA 
 MFT: Triple Jump promotes Microfinance Transparency  
(Triple Jump 2010) 
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6.2. Comparing investors’ performances 
 
The forgoing discussion is a brief comparative summary of the main features of five 
private foreign investment enterprises. The discussion reveals several similarities and 
differences between these enterprises which I address in the following paragraph. I 
also broaden the comparison by adding two more perspectives: first, the way this 
information is publicly distributed; and second, the views of institutions’ representatives 
on several related controversial topics. Conclusions drawn from these three research 
perspectives provide the foundation for my concluding assessment of the private 
foreign investors’ role in shaping the social performance discourse in microfinance. 
 
6.2.1. Investment activities and social performance information  
 
An examination of the investment activities of BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Oikocredit, 
Triodos and Triple Jump reveals the uniqueness of Oikocredit’s model. Whereas the 
other four members of our sample group channel capital towards the microfinance 
sector, Oikocredit uses its cooperative structure to collect money from shareholders 
and forward it to project partners. The main practical difference for investors besides 
the low minimum subscription of €200, is that Oikocredit intervenes to offset 
performance volatility and pays a stable dividend of two percent. In contrast, 
conventional institutional funds pass on profits as well as losses to their investors. 
Another difference is that Oikocredit investors become shareholders of the cooperative 
society and have defined rights of co-determination which can influence, among other 
things, the selection criteria for potential project partners. However, although it is not 
stated, in practice this is also applies to investment funds, especially when they are 
financed by a limited number of stakeholders, as in the case of Triodos Doen. 
 
A comparison of these investment products reveals two different strategies employed 
by the funds’ managers. First, they offer funds to attract institutional investors and 
wealthy individuals by offering worthwhile returns and high security. To achieve this, 
the funds invest first and foremost in the world’s leading MFIs which serve several 
thousand clients and have proven track records. Among these funds are the Dexia 
Micro-Credit Fund, responsAbility Global Microfinance Fund, Triodos Fair Share Fund, 
Triodos Microfinance Fund, ASN-Novib Fund and SNS Institutional Microfinance Fund. 
These more commercially oriented funds are also the biggest MIVs in terms of assets 
under management. 
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Second, they have funds with a stronger social mission which follow a non-profit 
approach, take higher risks by investing in tier two and three MFIs and issue smaller 
loans to a broader range of MFIs. These funds are primarily financed by foundations 
and NPOs which may also provide technical assistance to young MFIs. Examples are 
the Microfinance Enhancement Facility, Triodos-Doen, Triodos-Hivos Fund, Oxfam 
Novib Fund and NOTS Fund. 
 
BlueOrchard and responsAbility focus on funds belonging to the first, more 
commercially-oriented group. In contrast, Triodos started its microfinance activities with 
two funds with mandates to serve underdeveloped markets and only recently launched 
two more funds with a more commercial approach. Triple Jump manages and advises 
funds in both categories on a relatively equal basis. The investment activities of 
Oikocredit follow the second, predominantly socially-oriented strategy. 
 
Debt products dominate the activities of the five enterprises whereas equity 
investments, although on the increase, in most cases still represent a small part of the 
portfolio. Only BlueOrchard manages a specialized private equity fund with the 
considerable volume of almost $150 million. Given the limited history of equity 
investments in microfinance, the BlueOrchard Private Equity Fund reduces risk by 
focusing on top tier MFIs. Thus, a substantial share of equity investments, 45 percent, 
has been allocated to Triodos-Doen. Apart from the fact that only registered MFIs can 
receive this kind of funding, Triodos-Doen targets relatively small MFIs. Triodos 
requires a company representative to be appointed to an MFI’s board whenever it 
takes an equity position so it can play an active role in and lend value and support to 
the MFI’s governance and operations. Equity investments may also be promoted with 
either a financial or a social bias, so that some funds highlight the growth potential and 
increasing financial value of private equity while others emphasize the importance of 
this kind of funding for the development of small MFIs.  
 
Several investment characteristics reveal the differences between commercial and 
social orientation. One is regional spreading: Latin America as well as Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia are considered to be the most developed microfinance markets, 
whereas Southern Asia only recently achieved high growth rates while Africa still lags. 
Both BlueOrchard and responsAbility have allocated about 85 percent of their loans to 
MFIs in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Southern Asia and Africa are 
hardly served. Triple Jump has issued at least 20 percent of its loans to the latter two 
regions. Triodos Fair Share Fund and Triodos Microfinance Fund have a smaller 
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Eastern Europe/Central Asia portfolio with around 20 percent allocated to Southern 
Asia. At 31 percent allocation, Triodos-Doen is very active in this region, while Triodos-
Hivos Fund’s loan portfolio is 27 percent invested in African MFIs. Oikocredit has 
invested the bulk of its outstanding loans in Latin America and about 15 percent in 
Africa. Remarkably, Oikocredit’s proportion of local currency loans is 46 percent 
despite its broad diversification over more than 70 countries. A higher percentage of 
local currency is held by Oxfam Novib Fund and Triodos-Hivos Fund but both are much 
smaller in terms of capital and global coverage. Most of the other funds still process 
around 90 percent of their loans in US dollars and/or Euros.  
 
The focus of commercially oriented funds on large, mature MFIs is disclosed in 
publications to underscore their security and also is apparent from their high average 
loan sizes. The average exposure at BlueOrchard is $2.1 million and a little less at 
Triple Jump’s ASN-Novib Fund and SNS Institutional Microfinance Fund, while the 
average loan size of Oxfam Novib Fund is only €370,000. Social performance 
indicators reveal that differences in average loan size follow the same pattern at the 
MFI level. The average microcredit issued by MFIs financed through responsAbility is 
$2,083 compared to $1,718 for BlueOrchard’s partners. In contrast, MFIs financed by 
Oikocredit have average loans of €930. More socially oriented funds further serve a 
higher percentage of women and more clients in rural areas.  
 
Various other indicators make the different management strategies between 
commercially-biased and socially-biased fund orientation more apparent. A comparison 
of the four funds managed by Triodos suggests that the respective management 
approaches do not necessarily mirror the enterprise’s overall strategy. The fact that 
BlueOrchard manages the Microfinance Enhancement Facility and the Microfinance 
Growth Facility next to commercial Dexia Micro-Credit Fund, Collateralized Debt 
Obligations and a commercial private equity fund reinforces this observation. The 
features of different investment products seem to depend mainly on the types of 
financing: commercial funds are typically financed by institutional investors and wealthy 
individuals, funds with a clear social mission, foundations and NPOs. Oikocredit is a 
special case in many respects. Its capital sources are primarily individuals content with 
a limited return on investment and a strong emphasis on social performance. 
Oikocredit’s social public image is rooted in its origins as an ecumenical cooperative 
society with Christian values, and true to this image it continues to be an active 
participant in international social performance initiatives today. All five of the sample 
group are members of the SPTF and endorsed the PRI and the SMART Campaign’s 
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client protection principles, and some also support MFT. Oikocredit also works 
cooperatively with Grameen Foundation to implement the PPI, has adopted the Cerise 
social audit tool and is involved in several other initiatives. 
 
A common feature of all five enterprises is their use of certain criteria for identifying 
adequate MFIs as business partners. These criteria are very similar in each case and 
always include the necessity for a social mission. In addition, BlueOrchard, 
responsAbility, Oikocredit and Triple Jump have developed and are currently testing 
their own social performance assessment tools. To a great extent they follow the 
procedure of the Cerise social audit tool but weight criteria differently. All four 
enterprises promote their tools as proof they have policies in place to ensure their 
activities produce positive social impacts. By year-end 2010, only Triple Jump had 
published and analyzed their initial results so a comparison between the tools is not yet 
possible.  
 
6.2.2. Information channels 
 
Information provided on homepages and annual reports is always carefully selected 
and prepared so as to attract attention and highlight the institution’s strengths without 
overwhelming the reader with details. Consequently, an enterprise’s online appearance 
and publications showcase information directed to a target group. So far I have limited 
my description of the five selected microfinance investors to the contents of their 
respective information sources. I selected specific topics and indicators which provide 
the reader with a glimpse of the institutions’ activities which is necessary to conduct a 
comparative performance analysis. This selection was made easier by the fact that 
each group member displayed very similar information. A reason for this may be that 
specific indicators are used by internationally recognized institutions like MIX. 
Furthermore, the number of international players in microfinance is limited and through 
initiatives like the SPTF somewhat of a standard of reporting on social performance 
has been established. A third reason may be that the enterprises learn from each other 
and use competitor’s publications for reference.  
 
The homepages of BlueOrchard, responsAbility and Triple Jump are structured very 
similar, but Oikocredit’s website is somewhat different in that it is decentralized to 
accommodate its broad spectrum of retail investors. Their website is available in 
different languages and the content is country-specific. In contrast, Triodos has 
integrated its microfinance activities into the bank’s website as one subject next to 
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others like green energy and sustainable trade. The homepages of all five enterprises 
contain three categories of information:  
 
1. A description of the institution which includes an introduction to microfinance 
and social performance, the enterprise’s history and the mission, staff members 
and contact details.   
2. Products and services offered by the institutions, in some cases sub-divided 
into individual and institutional investor categories plus investment criteria and 
additional advisory services.  
3. News and publications offering information on current developments, 
factsheets, press releases, newsletters, annual reports, social performance 
reports and other relevant information.   
 
Also very popular are quotes and success stories from microcredit clients testifying to 
the positive influence of microfinance on their lives. Typically, the stories will introduce 
a person who has used a microloan to start or expand a business and turn it into a 
successful enterprise, replete with photos of the borrower and his or her business. 
Oikocredit even provides short movies about some of its project partners and an online 
database with information about most of its partners. This information includes the 
organization’s location, activities and amount of the loan received from Oikocredit and 
in some cases, photos, detailed portrayals and social performance data.  
 
It seems like Oikocredit uses its website to attract potential investors, establish a 
personal relationship between investors and microfinance clients and keep its existing 
members apprised of the organization’s current activities. BlueOrchard, responsAbility, 
Triodos and Triple Jump, which work mainly with a limited number of large investors 
like foundations and pension funds,  place more emphasis on presenting a formal, 
businesslike front with a focus on their investment products. Oikocredit prioritizes the 
social potential of an investment, so that a visitor touring its website will learn much 
about microfinance and the social agenda of Oikocredit before getting to the 
investment details. The other four enterprises place more emphasis on their investment 
activities and financial incentives such as strong returns and stability in times of crisis. 
The homepages of BlueOrchard and Triple Jump also include a login-tool for MFIs 
which suggests their websites are used for investor contact as well as for 
communication with credit customers.  
 
Besides websites, the five enterprises also use annual reports and social performance 
reports to convey information about their activities. Summaries of developments over 
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the past year are reported in general information about the institution and its corporate 
agenda. These reports are peppered with client photos and success stories intended to 
“humanize” the content and improve readability. While the content and volume of these 
reports may vary, the overall concepts and objectives are quite similar. BlueOrchard, 
Oikocredit and Triple Jump’s annual reports provide overviews of the institutions’ 
activities, whereas Triodos publishes four separate annual reports for each one of its 
funds. These are very extensive documents and report details of financial indicators 
and social performance data. responsAbility limits its annual financial reporting on its 
investments but has been pioneering the creation of a separate social performance 
report. First published in 2006, it seems like the report has been used as a model by 
BlueOrchard, Oikocredit and Triple Jump which recently published its first 
corresponding report. In addition, they all produce newsletters on a monthly or 
quarterly basis.  
 
The topic of social performance is an integral part of the public information provided by 
BlueOrchard, ResponsAbility, Oikocredit and Triple Jump, all of which subscribe to the 
SPTF definition of social performance and promote initiatives like the SMART 
Campaign and MFT and list their respective activities. In addition, BlueOrchard has 
dedicated a special edition of its newsletter to introduce social performance, 
responsAbility has published a discussion paper on how to measure the social impact 
of microfinance, and Oikocredit has launched a separate website about SPM. Only 
Triodos has not integrated the topic of social performance into its main communication 
media until now, although their funds’ annual reports contain information on several 
social performance indicators. 
 
6.2.3. Representatives’ opinions 
 
In addition to my investigations of the five institutions’ methods of operation and of the 
content and methods of communicating investor and public information, I conducted 
interviews with their representatives as a third research strategy. My reasoning was 
that staff in charge of the institutions’ social performance agendas would have some 
influence in shaping the policy behind these agendas. Even if these individuals are not 
always qualified to make executive decisions on some issues, such as investment 
policy, I assume that their personal experiences and opinions have considerable 
influence on respective management decisions In consequence, I regard the 
enterprises’ social performance specialists as key resources for the purposes of my 
research. 
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At the SPTF Annual Meeting 2010 I consulted representatives of the five selected 
enterprises: Sarah Leshner from Blue Orchard, Cecile Koller from responsAbility, 
GingLedesma from Oikocredit, Joke van der Ven from Triodos and Jessie Greene from 
Triple Jump. While some of these representatives were not solely in charge of their 
organization’s SPM program, their role as international spokesperson for their 
institution’s SPM policy was a testament to their expertise on the subject.  
 
The interviews took place either during the course of the five day SPTF Annual Meeting 
from June 28 to July 2, 2010, or shortly afterwards by telephone. I referred to Gläser 
and Laudel (2009) for methodology of guideline-oriented interviews and to Meuser and 
Nagel (1991) for evaluation methods. My interview-guideline presents questions from 
three categories: the institution’s self-conception, experience with SPM and opinions on 
current, related topics. Following are a discussion and interpretive analysis of the 
interview results. 
 
The institution’s self-conception 
All of the five consulted representatives describe their institutions as social investors 
which have recognized that just providing money to MFIs is not enough to achieve a 
positive social impact on poor people. They are active members of the SPTF and use 
best-practice indicators to measure social performance. When asked about their 
reasons for committing to social performance, they spontaneously listed three factors:  
 
1. Ledesma and van der Ven emphasized that SPM is a logical result of their 
mission: “[...] we want to see our mission become reality. We don't want it to 
remain slogans or nice statements in our publications” (Ledesma 2010). 
2. Coller and Greene also referred to their mission but added they also 
endeavoured to address the need of their financiers. While Coller identifies a 
big demand from socially motivated retail investors, Greene explains that one of 
Triple Jump’s shareholders, Oxfam Novib, encouraged and assisted them to 
work on SPM. 
3. Further and Leshner said their previous social performance assessments had 
been insufficient and they were now using new, internationally recognized 
methods to prevent dangerous situations in future: “[...] we discovered that 
when you are not as careful on the social side as you are on the financial side 
you can run into some dangerous situations” (Leshner 2010). 
 
The representatives saw their institutions as industry leaders and were willing to act as 
role models for social microfinancing. While Ledesma was very confident about 
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Oikocredit’s reputation as a leading private foreign investor in social performance 
activities – “[...] when SPTF members talk about social performance measurement and 
promotional social performance management, Oikocredit is almost mentioned in the 
same breath” - Leshner is more cautious: “[...] you know Oikocredit and Incofin have 
always had more social orientation I would say and so part of the reason that 
BlueOrchard has been so active and so visible is that we sort of view this as some of 
our responsibility as a leader in the industry.” Greene points out, that Triple Jump 
shares its system openly and gives advice on SPM on request from other institutions.  
 
Experience with SPM  
For all five enterprises attracting investment capital is crucial for their business, so they 
must adapt to investors’ needs. Each representative agreed that different types of 
investors weight social performance differently in their investment decisions: 
 
“[...] if it is a foundation or even if it is a high-net-worth individual they are much more likely 
to ask us questions on social performance criteria. So particularly foundations I think are 
very keen to prove that they are having the impact that they want, that they are reaching the 
population that they want, that they are helping to improve people’s life, that they are 
lending in a financially responsible way” (Leshner 2010). 
 
Institutional investors, on the other hand, have other priorities: “So if you're talking 
about a pension fund, they are interested in the return. Of course they think it is nice to 
invest in microfinance, but they are not looking for an elaborate in-depth social 
assessment” (Greene 2010). responsAbility published its first social performance report 
in 2006 and Coller also acknowledged their investors appreciate there is a report 
indicating positive social performance, although it’s not their priority. She explains that 
retail investors do not have many options for investing in microfinance and that 
institutional investors, in contrast, look for a social aspect although financial factors like 
return or risk profile, ultimately determine investment policy. Regarding retail investors, 
Ledesma says that two or three years ago Oikocredit was confronted with many 
requests from its shareholders concerning their social impact on poor people’s lives. 
Since increasing their social performance reporting the frequency of these questions 
has declined. 
 
On the outflow side all representatives identified big differences in the perception of 
social performance. Leshner reported that BlueOrchard mainly worked with top level 
MFIs and most of them had access to global initiatives like MIX or the SMART 
Campaign. Nevertheless, she made reference to two MFIs in Bosnia financed by 
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BlueOrchard and belonging to the same MFI-network that weighted SPM very 
differently. One MFI tracked its clients’ poverty levels and discussed the results at the 
board level while the other one had not established any such social performance 
protocol. responsAbility too, finances mostly well-established MFIs, and Coller agrees 
with Leshner: “In general MFIs have certain awareness for social performance 
management but how they put it into practice differs a lot”. Oikocredit focuses more on 
small and young MFIs and Ledesma says many of them still lack information and 
awareness about SPM: “I think the interest is much greater today than it was two or 
three years ago. But it is certainly true that you still have to promote it”. To facilitate this 
Oikocredit organizes training workshops for MFIs. The willingness of MFIs to take up 
SPM tools varies: “[...] for some it is almost like it goes without saying, it is an automatic 
thing and they raise it completely and totally. And for others it is still seen as a cost 
centre and therefore the business case of social performance needs to be proven”. 
This experience is shared by Greene as well as van der Ven, who adds that an MFI 
which is weak in SPM can still be financed by Triodos if it shows the willingness to 
improve in this area.  
 
Ledesma and Greene said they actively set incentives for MFIs to work on SPM. 
According to Ledesma, not only has Oikocredit always used defined social criteria for 
selecting partners. For several years MFIs that participate in socially relevant programs 
have been eligible for interest rate discounts of up to one percent. Greene reported that 
Triple Jump raises awareness of social performance and provides education through 
discussions with MFIs. It happens that they drop recommendations, for example to pay 
more attention on over-indebtedness in the course of the due diligence. They do not 
put these topics into loan agreements but tell the MFI that a good social performance is 
favourable for future negotiations. If an MFI is willing but technically incapable of 
implementing Triple Jump’s recommendations, the latter will provide the necessary 
technical training and assistance. BlueOrchard, according to Leshner, had just begun 
to offer social performance training to MFIs while Coller reported that responsAbility 
focuses on financing MFIs and does not (want to) offer social performance training or 
consulting services. The opportunities for that would be limited anyway because 
responsAbility is mainly a debt investor which gives it very limited influence on MFIs. In 
cases where responsibility does take an equity position it will make recommendations 
to the MFI about how to improve social performance. While Ledesma does not identify 
any major difference in influence related to investment type, Triodos’s van der Ven 
shares Coller’s opinion that an equity position brings with it far more influence over the 
MFI’s  policies: 
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“Because what we see is that in dept financing competition is growing so fast so that your 
influence is limited. There is a lot of prize competition which dominates the negotiations. But 
I think where you really impact clients is with the equity financing. And in that sense we only 
do equity... our strategy is to become a minority shareholder and we always want to have a 
seat on the board. So through our boards we really have an influence on the whole 
organisation and we try to protect the social performance of the organisation” (van der Ven 
2010). 
 
Asked for their opinions as to how MFIs can have a positive social impact on their 
clients, all five representatives immediately referred to the SMART Campaign’s client 
protection principles. Leshner and Coller think all of these principles are important for 
protecting clients, assuring a sustainable business model and for future development of 
the industry. Van der Ven agreed, but clarified that Triodos focuses on the principle 
behind the phrase “do not do harm to your clients”. She believed initiatives like 
measuring the poverty levels of clients introduces a risk that MFIs could become 
swamped by the process of gathering poverty related data. She recommended 
designing social performance tools so they can be used in a commercially viable way. 
 
Similarly, Greene suggested the way to simultaneously achieve a positive social impact 
and commercial viability is to employ a three step approach, as follows: 1. define a 
mission, 2. examine the needs of the target group and supply them with suitable 
products, and 3. listen and respond to client feedback as a basis for improvement. “[...] 
That is just good business practice. It is not a different system that they should put in, 
to have good social impact”. Ledesma also recommended these three steps, but 
instead of an emphasis on business principles she believed “a spirit of learning and a 
spirit of reflection within the organization” is imperative if the organization is to achieve 
its social performance objectives.   
 
Opinions to related hot topics 
Representatives’ comments and opinions on microfinance-related issues are useful for 
gaining a better understanding of the discourse. The previous chapters already 
introduced discussions on impact studies, funding by local banks, subsidies and the 
trend towards commercialism. Leshner, Coller, Ledesma, van der Ven and Greene had 
similar opinions on these topics.  Their view on impact studies was well stated by van 
der Ven: 
 
“Well, they are interesting to read. And it is something that the sector needs. But it is not 
the responsibility of the financial institutions themselves. Because in Holland, in Europe we 
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do not do impact studies. If somebody has a bank account it makes his life better”  
(van der Ven 2010). 
 
The five representatives agreed that impact studies can contribute valuable input 
towards improvement but have the disadvantages of being expensive, time-consuming, 
and generally,  inconclusive. They further agreed that impact studies should be 
conducted by universities or NGOs with donor funding, rather than by investors. As 
Coller put it, as impact assessments are case studies, it is highly impractical and cost-
prohibitive to conduct qualitative investigations on a complete microfinance portfolio. 
Thus, investors must focus on activities that lead to a “maximum valued added”. 
Ledesma illustrated this with an example showing that an approximate sum of 
€500.000 to fund one impact study could be more efficiently applied toprovide technical 
assistance to 20 or 30 MFIs. Oikocredit did conducd impact studies in the past before 
concluding that other applications of their resources produced a more practical, 
efficient delivery of positive benefits to their clients.   
 
Subsidies are also considered to be important to the microfinance sector but only when 
applied to a limited extent in an appropriate way. Smaller, immature MFIs working in 
underdeveloped markets may not qualify for commercial funding from the beginning. 
Ledesma believed that “[...] most MFIs are able to reach break-even within 12 months, 
some even within eight months”. Once the basic infrastructure is set up, subsidies 
should be removed. “It should not go on forever. At some time you have to decide, 
okay we can become sustainable and you do it. Or we can never become sustainable 
and then you should probably close the institution” (Greene 2010). Coller and van der 
Ven pointed out that subsidies should only be granted in the forms of technical 
assistance or equity investments, not as cheap loans: “Large subsidized loans at three 
or four percent are disturbing us a lot. I think the focus should be on financial 
sustainable products. [...] Let the money flow on the basis of a commercial price” (van 
der Ven 2010).  What is needed by startup MFIs and cannot be offered by commercial 
investors is equity financing and technical assistance. It is only for these purposes that 
public funding is justifiable. Oikocredit uses surplus funds exclusively for supporting 
MFI capacity building, not for subsidizing favourable loan terms.  
 
The interviewees recognized the potential high risk for subsidies to be a source of 
competitive distortion. On the contrary they welcomed the increasing involvement of 
local banks in microfinance activities. They considered local banks to be a valuable 
source of funding for MFIs as they offer a choice of terms that differ from those offered 
by private foreign investors. Although they acknowledged there will always be a certain 
  
- 95 - 
amount of competition between local and foreign funding, this competition should be 
embraced, not feared. In fact, all five representatives said one of their ultimate 
objectives was to contribute to the development of local banking infrastructures, while 
recognizing the need for foreign investments was still very high: “I think there will 
always be demand. And I think the question is how do investors react to the changing 
landscape” (Leshner 2010). Currently, local bank infrastructures are woefully 
inadequate to meet the demands for microfinance services. However, as Greene 
stated, on occasion foreign investors will even assist MFIs in getting better funding 
from local markets:  
 
“We actually sometimes give a loan and then the MFI uses our loan as a deposit at a local 
bank so that the local bank gives them a local loan. Then we even go with the MFI and help 
them to get good terms from the local bank. So we are stimulating in fact our clients to get 
local sources of funding at good terms” (Greene 2010).  
   
Finally, the five interviewees were asked to comment on the trend towards 
commercialism in the microfinance sector. Greene said she worked mainly with MFIs in 
Africa and saw very little commercialism there. She was aware of some newer, larger 
institutions which “[...] focus more on the upper segment of the market but I don’t think 
it’s at the cost of the other MFIs”. Leshner, Coller and van der Ven clearly appreciated 
more commercialism as it corresponds with an extended outreach to the poor, better 
and cheaper products for clients, the establishment of needed business standards, 
such as more transparency, and a higher degree of professionalism. However, they 
also warned that commercial objectives can reduce social impact and even lead to 
harmful developments. They unanimously agreed that commercial players must act 
socially responsible and not neglect social goals in favour of stronger growth and 
higher investment returns for shareholders. As Leshner put it: 
   
“I think having more capital in the space is something that is terrific because it directs more 
resources towards clients who need it. But I think you need to do it in a responsible way so 
that there is not so much pressure to satisfy commercial objectives. Because then you end 
up growing too fast or lending irresponsibly, just to generate returns and at the end of the 
day the microfinance clients are the ones who suffer because they do not have suitable 
products, they do not have suitable prices or they are being over-indebted because the MFI 
itself has so much pressure to grow and is flooded with capital. So I think it can be tricky but 
ultimately I think we are all in agreement that this is a population of clients that we want to 
provide more capital to” (Leshner 2010).     
 
Van der Ven seconded that with her own comment: “We believe that you should 
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mainstream the whole idea of microfinance. It should be a commercially viable 
approach. The risk is to find the balance between profit and between impacts to 
society”. Although Ledesma also identifies the benefits of commercialism, she 
emphasizes the risk of mission drift, fearing that profit-driven MFIs may take away “the 
spirit of microfinance” and fall back on traditional mainstream banking practices that do 
not reach so called “un-bankable” people:  
 
“One of the things that you see in commercialisation is, for the benefit of efficiency and for 
the benefit of profits, you have MFIs adapting commercial, traditional banking methodologies 
that were precisely the reason why microfinance was developed. Because these traditional 
commercial banking methodologies were not effective in reaching the poor. So it's a little bit 
ironic that with commercialisation you now see parts of the industry, or some within the 
industry, going to endorse methodologies that were precisely the reason why the industry 
was developed in the first place” (Ledesma 2010).  
 
 
6.3. Inputs to the discourse of social performance 
 
The case studies of BlueOrchard, responsAbility, Oikocredit, Triodos and Triple Jump 
show that among leading private foreign investors social performance is not only a 
known term but also a recognized policy. All of them expend considerable efforts to 
implement SPM tools and remain current on new developments in SPM. From the 
information they provided, their respective SPM indicator ratings and their 
representatives’ opinions on several relevant topics, I can make the following 
statements about their roles in shaping social performance discourse in microfinance 
with confidence: (1) as leading representatives of the interest groups of private foreign 
investors they accept the necessity for and definition of social performance 
management, even assisting on occasion with development of SPMprocesses; (2) their 
transparent disclosure of information makes their agendas clear; and (3) they are 
willing to act as role models and promote SPM. Following is a more detailed discussion 
of each statement: 
 
(1) Microfinance is a globalized business and private foreign investors are active in 
many countries. Unlike industries on a regional or national level there is no 
international authority to establish and enforce a regulatory framework. While some 
regulation of MFIs’ can be found in some regions, foreign investors are flexible and can 
to some extent chose where and under what terms they offer their services to 
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MFIpartners. Despite the lack of regulators, industry leaders follow standard principles 
and business practices they have established on a cooperative, voluntary basis. The 
SPTF is a recognized forum where organizations’ representatives meet, discuss and 
contribute to their industry. The outcomes – definitions, guidelines and tools – are 
generally accepted and put into practice. Few other business sectors or development 
programs work as hard to evaluate their results concerning their social impacts on their 
clients or target groups. One could assume, as van der Ven said, that having access to 
formal financial services improves people’s living conditions. Nevertheless, private 
enterprises that are not even subsidized with donations or public money are endeavour 
to achieve a double bottom line. 
 
This may be rooted in the high expectations that were initially set when microfinance 
was promoted on a global scale, although evidence suggests it is not the retail or 
institutional investors who ask management enterprises to do SPM. Only in the case of 
Triple Jump did one of its shareholders request the company to engage SPM policies. 
Typically, it is the investment enterprises that initiate SPM implementation, probably as 
a proactive way to ward off critics. Advantages of SPM tools are that they are not that 
costly and may even improve financial returns. But there is also a strong awareness 
that rapid commercialization without social considerations can have undesirable 
results. 
 
(2) All five enterprises reported on social performance indicators like outreach, average 
loan size, percentage of female borrowers and clients living in rural areas. The results, 
as well as the representatives’ comments, show different approaches and they stand 
firm on their alignment. The more commercially oriented players target the world’s 
leading MFIs. They extend a broad outreach to serve a huge unsatisfied demand and 
favour market-based competition which leads to better services and lower costs. More 
socially oriented MIVs partner with smaller MFIs, often supporting them with local 
currency loans or additional technical assistance. They score better results when it 
comes to reaching more disadvantaged clients, such as women, the very poor and 
those living in rural areas. Ultimately, the investor decides which path to follow and, 
depending on the approach, a clear pattern emerges: institutional investors favour the 
more commercial approach which brings them a higher financial return, while 
foundations and retail investors are more interested in serving the needs of the most 
disadvantaged clients.  
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BlueOrchard and responsAbility are more commercially oriented compared to the more 
socially driven Oikocredit. Triodos and Triple Jump manage and promote MIVs of both 
types. The final goal of both approaches is to build up domestic, inclusive banking 
systems as foundations for sustainable economic development. Which strategy is more 
likely to achieve this goal? Using attractive rates and terms to attract large amounts of 
capital from investors, and fostering large MFIs using new technologies to optimize 
efficiencies? Or supporting the laborious development of small MFIs that reach only a 
limited number of potential clients but probably have a better qualitative social impact 
on their lives? The five sample enterprises respect both strategies and offer products 
that reflect their preferences or the preferences of their financiers.   
 
(3) Coller stated that responsAbility is, first and foremost, an investor with a focus on 
the task of financing MFIs. Nevertheless, the company is a pioneer in terms of 
reporting on social performance indicators. Leshner admitted that BlueOrchard has not 
been so active in the area of reporting up to now, but considered it the responsibility of 
an industry leader to participate. Oikocredit, which created a separate department for 
social performance issues, is fully engaged in developing SPM tools and perceives 
itself as the leading private foreign investor in the field of SPM. All five enterprises are 
members of the SPTF, support the Smart Campaign and other initiatives like MFT and 
social ratings. In addition, they take into account SPM issues when dealing with 
MFIpartners. They have created their own social performance assessment tools for 
evaluating MFIs and conduct awareness campaigns during the due diligence process, 
sometimes offering consulting or co-financing technical assistance training. They 
commit themselves to SPM and serve as active role models for other institutions, both 
investors and MFIs. This united commitment gives them a strong collective voice in the 
discourse of social performance and contributes significantly to its promotion. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
“To properly appreciate the great achievements of the  
microcredit movement, one has to be more skeptical of its self-image  
than is normally considered polite or respectful.” 
(Jain and Moore 2003: 29) 
 
Proving a double bottom line – that is the motivation for private foreign investors to 
participate in social performance initiatives, implement standards and inform the public 
about SPM. They want to reassure all interested parties that their investments are not 
only financially profitable, but also have positive social impacts on the lives of the poor. 
The means of proving this is not predefined, but rather the underlying question in an 
ongoing discourse. This thesis analyzes private foreign investors’ roles in shaping the 
discourse of social performance in microfinance. I first presented a brief introduction to 
the methods of discourse analysis and the topic of microfinance. Next, I presented the 
interest group of private foreign investors as well as current points of discussion 
concerning SPM. Finally, as case studies I conducted a detailed investigation of five 
private investment enterprises in the context of their involvement with social 
performance discourse. Following this procedure, I identified answers to the questions: 
Which strategies do private foreign microfinance investors follow with regard to the 
discourse of social performance in microfinance? What influence might their 
participation have on the development of the entire microfinance sector given the trend 
towards increasing commercializing of the industry? 
 
In this final chapter I discuss my main findings. I select various topics and for each one 
dedicate a paragraph to summarize my empirical findings and a second paragraph to 
interpret these findings according to Keller’s theoretical background of discourse 
analysis based on the sociology of knowledge. I close with a self-reflection about the 
scientific validity of this thesis. 
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 What people think about microfinance 
The beginning of my investigations was the observation that there are a number of 
articles, books, studies and other publications in circulation that suggest microfinance 
represents – a little overdrawn - either a panacea for eliminating poverty or a direct 
route to hopeless indebtedness of poor households. Between these two extremes 
many of those involved with the microfinance sector endeavour to define the proper 
role and limitations of microfinance, and to establish realistic guidelines for a 
sustainable, socially favorable and commercially viable business approach. This can be 
accomplished in many different ways. One method is impact assessments: a number of 
case studies have been published which reveal the complexity of the financial 
situations of the poor and the possible consequences of offering them microfinance 
services. However, for various reasons another approach called “Social Performance 
Management” (SPM) is gaining in popularity and acceptance throughout the sector.  
 
With reference to Foucault’s view of discourse analysis a discussion of the potential of 
microfinance to reduce poverty can be interpreted as one expression of today’s global 
awareness for social justice. The MDGs mark one important step towards a broad 
agreement that in today’s world, in contrast to earlier historical periods, poverty is no 
longer predetermined nor justifiable. Development cooperation is dedicated to poverty 
reduction and various instruments are rated according to their social impacts. Like any 
initiative, the microfinance concept is carried and discussed by specific social actors. 
Some support and others criticize the sector depending on their role, be it practitioner, 
scientist, client, investor, journalist or one of many others. They all battle for 
recognition, but in the end power relationships influence which statements prevail and 
become accepted by society as credible (see Berger and Luckmann). Currently, a 
broad alliance of actors advocate for SPM while other methods for “proving” the social 
impact of microfinance, such as case studies, are  falling out of favour. Increasingly, 
SPM initiatives become institutionalized and thereby gain legitimization and the 
perception of objectivity. 
 
 The social performance discourse 
SPM is an open concept which defines a certain framework while remaining fluid 
enough to allow for discussion and adoption of new policies and activities. Some 
initiatives which are already broadly recognized like the Smart Campaign or MFT are 
currently entering a stage of institutionalization. Others are at early stages of 
development and some may not prevail. The agreement of different microfinance 
stakeholders with the SPM framework makes the social performance discourse vital 
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and successful. For example, the SPTF is accepted throughout the sector as the 
central platform for SPM. Its members have defined indicators rated on the basis of 
their experiences and independent institutions like CGAP and MIX promote them. 
Finally, MFIs as well as investment companies like BlueOrchard report on these 
indicators. It is not certain for example, that a high ratio of female microcredit clients is 
always socially beneficial as impact studies have shown that possible outcomes like 
women-empowerment can backfire and produce negative side effects. However, 
statistically the higher ratio tends to correlate with a positive impact which is relatively 
easy to monitor. The fact that different institutions rely on these indicators convinces 
people they are a reliable measures of social impact. 
 
Based on Foucault’s definition I identify “social performance in microfinance” as a 
discourse. Various actors around the world refer to this term when discussing the social 
character of microfinance. This discourse has a very short history and while its hour of 
birth cannot be determined, an important baby step was the creation of the SPTF in 
2005. However, the first editions of investors’ social performance reports in 2010 
suggest the topic has only recently attracted broad public attention. Today, a number of 
microfinance practitioners are working to establish SPM as a credible policy worthy of 
universal acceptance by the microfinance industry and related participants. Obviously 
the characteristics of SPM serve a wide range of interests. For instance, researchers 
may place value on the ease of data gathering methods and potential for statistical 
evaluation, while donors can use an index like the PPI to confirm their money really 
does reach poor people. Practitioners no doubt appreciate the low cost of implementing 
SPM tools and the meaningful results which can be used to improve business 
practices. Admittedly, SPM has its limits and disadvantages, but the fact that 
statements of different participants follow the same guidelines that constitute the social 
performance discourse, leads to the formation of corresponding knowledge and social 
practices.  
 
 The importance of private foreign investments 
As the current trend towards commercialism suggests, private foreign investment 
enterprises are already powerful players and will wield even more power in the future. 
The high demand for microfinance services and poorly developed domestic banking 
systems guarantee an ongoing need for foreign investments. The objective of public 
institutions is to hand over this task to private enterprises. The latter provide MFIs 
much needed funding for expansion, not only through loans but increasingly through 
equity investments. In addition, they transfer know-how and foster the implementation 
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of more efficient business practices and technologies. These private enterprises also 
support MFIs directly (i.e., among other things with funding) or indirectly (i.e., by setting 
incentives) to facilitate expansion of their business activities and make the gradual 
transition from small, dependent NGOs to self-sustaining, registered entities. Although 
MIVs only finance a limited number of several thousand MFIs worldwide, they help 
establish best practice models for others to follow. Moreover, private foreign investment 
enterprises represent a direct interface between MFIs and institutional and individual 
investors. Additional to capital transfers they also exchange knowledge and distribute 
information about microfinance. For example, apart from advertising and media 
attention, Oikocredit alone has 36,000 retail investors who are regularly serviced with 
updates on sector developments. 
 
The standing of private foreign investors suggests a powerful status of this interest 
group in the sector. They have several avenues for expressing their opinions and 
exerting their considerable influence. Their actions and statements are closely 
monitored by others whose interests may be directly or indirectly linked to the MIV. For 
instance, the funding of MFIs may rely on the fulfillment of an MIV’s criteria, or the 
investment decision of a wealthy individual may be based on the public image of an 
investment enterprise.  
 
The danger of high growth rates 
Private foreign investment enterprises finance MFIs once they have reached a certain 
point of financial sustainability and professionalism. Some MIVs nurture already young 
but growing MFIs while others focus on top tier institutions. For upcoming MFIs it is 
important to get, or at least give the perception of receiving, MIV support because 
expanding outreach to more clients automatically leads to a need for additional capital. 
Top tier MFIs are established banks which serve several hundred thousand clients. 
They use MIV funding with other capital sources like deposits and loans from domestic 
banks. Many private foreign investors prefer these institutions as partners because 
they are reliable and can be serviced with loans of several million US dollars. Ironically, 
because of the rapid growth of MIVs in recent years and the limited number of existing 
top tier MFIs, the demand for foreign investment is actually decreasing relative to the 
supply. As MIVs must achieve a certain minimum return on investment a high 
proportion of liquidity in their portfolios forces them to find investment opportunities. For 
top tier MFIs the upside of this is they gain a stronger bargaining position. The 
downside is they may be tempted to accept loans that are too large and eventually find 
themselves under pressure to find enough customers. The end result could be an 
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overheated microcredit market, with negative effects on the end-clients. In the medium 
term many more top tier MFIs will appear and MIVs will likely downscale and serve 
more less established institutions bringing stability to the sector. Nonetheless, the risk 
is ever-present that microfinance clients, being the most vulnerable components in the 
system, will suffer the most from unbalanced market relations. 
 
The risk of increasing commercialism of the microfinance sector is the main reason for 
initiation of the social performance discourse, and influences its terms and strategies. 
Protecting the end clients is the ultimate objective of various statements, initiatives and 
emerging institutions. Microfinance customers are commonly described as vulnerable, 
dependent and powerless, therefore the discourse suggests they need to be protected 
through regulations and standards. SPM is intended to distinguish socially motivated 
participants from others which follow only profit-maximizing policies, take advantage of 
the good image of microfinance and neglect the initial social mission. The latter not 
only harm the poor, they also damage the reputation of the whole sector. For this 
reason social performance discourse is shaped by arguments for differentiation. 
Looking at links and overlaps with other discourses, social performance is connected 
with topics like commercialism of microfinance, mission drift in microfinance, ethical 
investments, efficient development cooperation and inclusive financial systems. 
Although I have not investigated whether or not these examples actually form 
discourses, the apparent correlations with these issues demonstrates that discussion 
about social performance in mircofinance is not isolated and may be observed from 
different perspectives.   
 
Private foreign investors and SPM 
Most of the leading private investment enterprises define themselves as social 
investors. Many also include social performance issues in their communication 
channels and contribute to the ongoing discourse. This is not a matter of course. Unlike 
public institutions, private foreign investment enterprises must not only cover their 
operating costs, they must also offer investors favourable financial terms in order to 
attract capital. To keep their businesses alive and well they need to focus on optimizing 
financial efficiency. Their task is clear: they must direct capital from individual and 
institutional investors to profitable MFIs. They could concentrate on financial data like 
return on investment or low default rates and argue that market competition 
automatically leads to good conditions for clients, and many people would agree. The 
fact that they don’t take that position implies they see the SPM approach as necessary 
and useful to their business. Entry points for participation seem to be the SPTF, client 
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protection principles (The Smart Campaign and PIIF) and reporting on social 
performance indicators. In addition, the five investigated enterprises are active in other 
initiatives to varying degrees. While impact studies are not so popular among private 
foreign investors, they do promote SPM. They agree on the framework, put 
recommendations into practice and invite others to join. They regard SPM as a good 
way to prove the double bottom line of their business, which is one of their central sales 
arguments. As the discussions about synergies and trade-offs between financial and 
social performance show, they also see SPM to some extent as financially worthwhile.  
 
Social performance indicators do not tell much about the qualitative impact of 
microfinance services on the everyday life of a person living in poverty, nor is that its 
function. They are relatively superficial which has the benefit of making data collection 
and large-scale comparative analyses relatively easy. Private foreign investment 
enterprises prefer social performance assessments over impact studies. Interestingly, 
their main message to the public is: “our SPM report proves that our activities help poor 
people to escape from poverty”. For instance, they offer evidence favouring high ratios 
of female borrowers but they cannot prove that microcredits really help those women to 
improve their situation. Instead, private foreign investors use different methods to 
create a positive image of their activities. The qualitative social impact is often 
demonstrated by the success stories of MFI clients, for example a woman who builds 
up a shop, uses the profits to send her children to school and gains social recognition. 
Based on these anecdotes, a high percentage of female clients appears to be 
favourable. In fact, only the indicator “number of female borrowers” is scientifically valid 
and in very few cases are impact studies about women’s empowerment through 
microfinance cited. Even when they are, it is neither credible, nor scientifically valid to 
apply observed results from one location (with its specific socio-economic context) to 
another without conducting an empirical study. This example demonstrates that what is 
considered knowledge within a society is often a product of manipulated, truncated and 
biased information bytes, or as Keller might put it: the outcome of certain statements 
prevailing against others.         
 
SPM strategies in the face of commercialization 
As private foreign investors are main participants in the trend of commercialism in 
microfinance, it is not surprising that they welcome this development. However, the 
MIV representatives Leshner, Koller, Ledesma, van der Ven and Greene emphasized 
that while it is not easy, it is necessary to find the right balance between financially and 
socially motivated activities. All of the five investigated enterprises disclose information 
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on social performance indicators. They are not averse to being compared to 
competitors and give explanations for their organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. 
For this, MIVs follow two lines of argument: either they emphasize their capacity to 
serve a large number of clients or they highlight their success of reaching the most 
disadvantaged target group. The first strategy follows a more market-based approach, 
assuming that competition between MFIs will lead to lower costs and better products 
for clients. This implies the MIVs compete with other investment firms for large 
investors and need to offer favourable financial terms, such as high investment returns, 
in addition to a social bonus. The second possible strategy of MIVs adheres more to 
Yunus’ mission of serving the “unbankable poor” with unconventional methods. These 
MIVs appeal mainly to the social consciences of financiers which are primarily 
foundations, NGOs and individuals. Most of the investment enterprises offer MIVs of 
both categories, although they may have a preference for one approach. For example, 
the core business of BlueOrchard and responsAbility is managing MIVs which invest in 
top tier MFIs, while Oikocredit’s focusis on young and emerging institutions. Triodos 
and Triple Jump manage a relatively even balance of both types of MIVs. Nevertheless 
all five investigated enterprises agree on the importance of SPM. All of them participate 
in some initiatives but, unsurprisingly, the more socially oriented organizations are 
more active in this regard. 
 
Microfinance is not charity. Most participants, including the sample group of private 
foreign investors, agree on that. This is one important feature that makes the concept 
so popular with the public. Many people no longer believe in donation based 
development programs and value microcredit as one way to help poor people help 
themselves. This attitude can be seen as one expression of today’s ideological 
supremacy of capitalism and market based economic theories. In practice there is 
some scope for following either a radical free-market approach or taking certain kinds 
of regulation into consideration. The social performance discourse is one outcome of 
the latter, but even within the agreement of the framework the investment enterprises 
make their preference known. For example, the emphasis on serving a high number of 
poor people often follows the assumption that once people have access to the financial 
market they will be able to enhance their living standard. Others point out that initiatives 
like the PPI are necessary to evaluate whether or not borrowers’ lives really do improve 
and that additional services like training are important for a client’s success. 
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MIVs influence on the industry’s future development  
For investment enterprises, funding provides some opportunities to influence MFIs, 
especially in the case of equity investments. As a consequence, the MIVs’ alignment 
towards commercial and social aspects can change the MFIs’ business practices. For 
instance, formerly non-profit oriented NGOs which have transformed into registered 
institutions and now partner with MIVs, may be urged to put more weight on earning a 
surplus to satisfy investors’ demands for profits. Also, foreign investors can call 
attention to the importance of SPM, demand the signing of the client protection 
principles or offer training on using the PPI. Beyond MFIs, which have a direct business 
relation with MIVs, other institutions may also be affected when they adopt best 
practices. Thus, if MIV funding allows an MFI to introduce new techniques like mobile 
banking, others may also work towards offering this service. Furthermore, when an 
investor encourages an MFI to introduce the PPI and this allows the management to 
adapt their business practices in an effective way, other MFIs may follow the example. 
So, the MIV manager can influence different aspects of MFIs’ business practices, if it 
so chooses. Regarding social performance initiatives, they can forward information 
about new developments to MFIs, link their partners with research facilities and provide 
incentives to implement tools. Similarly, private foreign investors inform their audience 
about social performance issues and indicators. SPM gives them arguments for 
proving their social awareness among investors. They contribute to distribution of 
industry information and shaping the public image of microfinance.  
 
What if private foreign investors would not support SPM? The discourse would 
definitely not be as vital and popular as it is today. As SPM is focused on business 
practices, the engagement of various participants is fundamental. It is questionable 
whether initiatives like client protection principles would make sense if leading foreign 
investors would not support them. Other stakeholders like NGOs and Foundations may 
encounter problems raising awareness of the benefits of certain tools among MFIs. 
This is certainly much more effective when it happens during the due diligence process 
for funding. Thus, the strong commitment of leading investment enterprises to support 
SPM offers hope for ongoing development of tools to protect the social character of 
microfinance in times of increasing commercialism. Although it certainly happens that 
some statistics and marketing techniques are used to present a microfinance fund as 
more social than it actually is, and financial indicators have more weight in investment 
decisions, the SPM discourse reminds the various players involved not to lose sight of 
the mandate to support the poor as they work themselves out of poverty.  
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Scientific self-reflection 
As Kelles emphasizes that a discourse can never be captured exhaustively and its 
analyses only give some insight on certain aspects, I limited my investigations to a 
specific group of players and five case studies. But it appears the issue of social 
performance touches many aspects of microfinance, as well as other fields like 
development cooperation or ethical investments. I endeavored to maintain a balance 
act between showing the complexity of the discourse and keeping the focus on the 
specific issue of research. The final conclusions leave much room for interpretation, 
discussion and further research. This is not a shortcoming but, rather, the only logical 
outcome of the research program. Since discourse is vital and its character changes in 
an ongoing process, its analyses can not draw a static picture. The assessment itself is 
a statement and may contribute to further development of the discourse. In conclusion, 
my approach and findings are open for discussion and it is my hope that further 
contributions to the discourse of social performance in microfinance will be inspired by 
this work.   
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